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Abstract  
 
The absence of strong supranational institutions and the failure of states to 
comply with their integration obligations feature prominently in almost every 
discussion on economic integration in Africa. There seems to be a 
consensus that without strong supranational institutions to enforce 
compliance, economic integration in Africa may not succeed. This thesis 
takes a different approach to the discussion on compliance.  
The thesis argues that the failure of African states to comply with their 
integration obligations is not necessarily a function of deliberate and blatant 
disobedience for the norms of economic integration. Rather, there are other 
systemic challenges which impede the ability of African states to comply with 
their obligation. To resolve these challenges and ensure compliance, the 
thesis suggests that African states need to continuously engage in a 
discursive process wherein the norms of economic integration are constantly 
iterated and given authoritative interpretation. Furthermore, institutional, 
technical and infrastructural capacity needs to be developed across the 
continent in order to create favourable conditions for the implementation of 
the norms of integration. To this end, more attention needs be paid at the 
regional and national level to initiatives which improve good governance and 
aid the internalisation of the norms of economic integration among African 
states. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.0 Background 
Africa is one of the poorest continents in the world and is home to over two-
thirds of the world’s least developed countries.1 Most African countries are 
plagued by various economic, political, social and development problems. 
These problems include a lack of basic infrastructure, poor national 
governance, non-adherence to the rule of law, political instability, poverty, a 
high infant mortality rate, fragmented markets, and low levels of formal intra-
regional trade between African states.2 These problems often spread beyond 
national boundaries and affect the entire continent. To resolve these 
problems, African states have decided to use regional integration3 as a 
means for collective action.4 Consequently, economic integration treaties 
(integration treaties)5 have been adopted to regulate the process of 
                                                          
1
 United Nations Development Programme Regional Integration and Human Development: A 
Pathway for Africa (UNDP, New York, 2011) 3. Of the 48 least developed countries 
worldwide, 33 are in Africa: United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least 
Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing 
States (UN-OHRLLS) LDC Factsheet 2012, available at 
http://www.unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/UN_LDC_Factsheet_053112.pdf [accessed 23 
December 2012]. 
2
 United Nations Economic Commission Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa,  Addis Ababa, 2004) 33; Severine Rugumamu 
Africa’s Search for Regional Cooperation and Integration in the 21
st
 Century (ACBF Working 
Paper No 3, 2004) 1; Vinaye Ancharaz et al ‘Impediments to regional trade integration in 
Africa’ (2011) 2(11) African Economic Brief 1–8; Greg Mills ‘Africa and regional integration: 
what works and why’ (2004) 11(2) South Africa Journal of International Affairs 21–29.  
3
 Deji Olowu ‘Regional integration, development, and the African Union agenda: challenges, 
gaps and opportunities’ (2003) 13 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 211–253 
at 214; John Akokpari ‘Dilemmas of regional integration and development in Africa’ in 
Akokpari et al (eds.) The African Union and its Institutions  (Fanele, Auckland Park, South 
Africa, 2008) 85–110 at 85;  European Centre for Development Policy Management 
(ECDPM) Building the African Union Institutional Architecture Background note for a multi-
stakeholder seminar, 21 October 2009 (Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala) 1–4 at 1. 
4
 Collective action refers to a situation where a group of actors with a common interest work 
together towards the attainment of a specific goal. See Elinor Ostrom ‘Collective action and 
the evolution of social norms’ (2000) 14(3) Journal of Economic Perspectives 137–158; 
Elinor Ostrom ‘Collective action and proprietary rights for sustainable development: 
understanding collective action’ Focus 11, Brief 2 of 16, February 2004, available at 
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/pubs/2020/focus/focus11/focus11_02.pdf [accessed 20 
December 2012]; Mancur Olson The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the 
Theory of Groups  (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1965) 1.  
5
 The phrase ‘integration treaties’ is used in this thesis in a generic sense to describe the 
constituent treaties establishing the African Union, the African Economic Community, the 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
2 | P a g e  
 
integration. These integration treaties create normative practices which serve 
as coordination points for augmenting cooperation between African states 
and also facilitate the resolution of collective action problems.6 The 
integration treaties create an iterative process which enables African states 
to replace ‘short-term calculations of [national] interest with long-term 
strategic analysis’.7 In other words, the integration treaties provide an 
enabling regulatory framework to manage the collective efforts to foster 
social and economic development on the continent.  
Presently, economic integration in Africa is taking place at the regional 
and sub-regional levels. At the sub-regional level, the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) are responsible for economic integration. There are 
currently eight recognised RECs in Africa:8 the Community of Sahel-Saharan 
States (CENSAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU).9 At the regional level, economic integration is 
pursued by the African Union (AU)10 through the creation of the African 
                                                                                                                                                                    
regional economic communities and any other subsidiary instrument adopted by these 
frameworks to promote economic integration. 
6
 S Sitaraman State Participation in International Treaty Regimes (Ashgate Publishing, 
Aldershot, 2009) 1. Collective action problems arise when actors within a collective action 
group tend to defect on the basis of the calculation of their short-term interest and 
consequently defeat the purpose of the long-term interest for which collective action was 
sort. Mancur Olson suggests that collective action problems arise where the private 
incentives of individuals dictate that their aggregate contributions to the production of 
collective goods will be insufficient to provide an optimal supply of goods. Therefore, he 
suggests that rational, self-interested individuals may not always act to achieve the common 
interest of the group unless externalities such as coercion or special incentives are used. 
See Mancur Olson  The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1965) 2; Elinor Ostrom ‘Collective action and the 
evolution of social norms’ (2000) 14(3) Journal of Economic Perspectives 137; Russell 
Hardin ‘Collective action as an agreeable n-prisoners’ dilemma’ (1971) 16 Behavioural 
Science 47281 at 473-474. 
7
 Jose Alvarez International Organizations as Law-Makers (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2005) 339. 
8
 There are other regional arrangements in Africa but these eight RECs are the ones 
approved by the African Union to be the foundation for continental integration.  
9
 Membership of most of the RECs is largely region–specific, with the exception of 
COMESA, which has members from North, East and Southern Africa. 
10
 The African Union was established by the Constitutive Act of the African Union signed 11 
July 2000, entered into force 26 May 2001, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/23.15. See The Durban 
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Economic Community (AEC).The AU, the AEC and the RECs are 
established by integration treaties that create the norms regulating the 
conduct of African states as it relates to achieving economic integration.  
Despite the concerted efforts to adopt integration treaties to resolve 
some of Africa’s socio-economic problems, a careful examination of the state 
of economic integration in Africa reveals that African states have difficulties 
complying with the obligations created under the integration treaties.11 Issues 
such as multiple and overlapping memberships of RECs, an absence of 
political will to surrender sovereignty to regional institutions and implement 
the objectives of the integration treaties, divergence in the economic policies 
of African states, and the failure to streamline national policies with regional 
policies12 all account for non-compliance by African states.13  
Such non-compliance takes various forms. Although most integration 
treaties provide for some form of free movement of goods and persons, 
these conditions are almost non-existent in African states. There is little 
cooperation in the areas of agriculture, energy, infrastructure and other non-
trade related sectors. Furthermore, there has been a consistent failure on the 
part of African states to adhere to the timetables for integration set by the 
integration treaties. For example, the Treaty Establishing the African 
Economic Community (Abuja Treaty) sets out six stages for achieving 
complete economic integration in the continent.14 The Abuja Treaty specifies 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Declaration in tribute to the Organization of African Unity on the occasion of the launching of 
the African Union 41 ILM 1029 (2002).  
11
 See generally African Union Status of Integration 2 ed  (African Union, Addis Ababa, 
2009); African Union Commission (AUC) Minimum Integration Programme 2009-2012 (AUC 
Economic Affairs Department, Addis Ababa, 2010) 1. 
12
 Chukwuma Agu ‘Obstacles to regional integration: the human factor to trade facilitation 
and port reforms in Nigeria’ (2009) 2(4) International Journal of Private Law 446.  
13
 Mothae Maruping ‘Challenges for regional integration in sub-Saharan Africa: 
macroeconomic convergence and monetary coordination’ in Jan Teunissen et al (eds) Africa 
in the World Economy–The National Regional and International Challenges (Fondad, The 
Hague, 2005) 146; A Aly Economic Cooperation in Africa (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Colorado, 1994) 68; UNECA ‘Meeting the challenges of regional integration, intra-African 
trade and economic growth in Africa’ 2007 Policy Brief 9. 
14
 Article 6 Abuja Treaty. The stages and timeframe for implementation are:  
a. Strengthening existing regional economic communities and establishing 
new regional economic communities in regions where they do not exist (5 
years); 
b. Stabilising trade tariffs, customs duty and other barriers to intra-community 
trade, strengthening sectoral integration, coordination and harmonisation of 
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a timeframe for the completion of each stage and also states specific goals 
that need to be achieved in each stage of integration. However, the timelines 
for the completion of each stage have not been adhered to and not all the 
goals have been met.15  
A careful examination of the factors that have increased the level of 
non-compliance with economic integration treaties reveals that while some of 
the factors (such as conflicting obligations arising from multiple memberships 
of RECs) are of a legal nature, other factors are non-legal (such as having 
divergent macroeconomic policies and poor infrastructure). The combination 
of legal and non-legal factors that affect compliance with African integration 
treaties complicates the discussion on compliance. However, since economic 
integration is pursued within a treaty framework, it becomes imperative to 
explore methods that can be used within the treaty framework to reduce non-
compliance arising from both legal and non-legal factors.  
1.1 The problem 
Integration treaties in Africa cover several areas where collaboration is 
needed to resolve the collective challenges faced by African states. Such 
collaboration creates the need for some form of collective governance to 
ensure that African states conform to the set of norms that regulate their 
interactions in areas of common interest. This is because the norms created 
to resolve these problems have to be collectively implemented if the desired 
benefits of integration are to be realised. In regions like the European Union 
(EU), where regional integration has been achieved, the monitoring and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the activities of the regional economic communities, and gradual 
harmonisation of customs duty for third countries (8 years); 
c. Establishing free trade areas and a Customs Union at the level of each 
regional economic community (10 years); 
d. Coordinating and harmonising tariff and non-tariff systems among regional 
economic communities with a view to establishing a continental Customs 
Union (2 years); 
e. Establishing an African Common Market and the adoption of common 
policies (4 years); 
f. Integrating all sectors of the African economy, establishing an African 
Central Bank and a single African currency, setting up an African Economic 
and Monetary Union and electing the first Pan African Parliament (5 years). 
15
 African Union Commission (AUC) Minimum Integration Programme 2009-2012 (AUC 
Economic Affairs Department, Addis Ababa, 2010) 1-3. 
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enforcement process is carried out by supranational institutions such as the 
European Commission and the European Court of Justice. These institutions 
wield enormous powers over the member states of the EU and have played 
a vital role in ensuring that EU states comply with EU economic integration 
norms.16 In several instances these institutions have required member states 
of the EU to bring their actions into conformity with the EU integration 
norms.17 As a result of their ability to compel EU states to align their conduct 
with EU integration norms, these institutions are deemed to possess 
supranational authority.18 Before proceeding further, it is important to state 
that this thesis does not adopt a comparative approach in its study of 
economic integration in Africa. Rather, it examines African economic 
integration on its own terms.  
In Africa, the approach to economic integration has been slightly 
different to the EU approach. While regional courts and Commissions or 
Secretariats have been created, they have not been as influential as their 
counterparts in the EU. The Commissions or Secretariats in Africa neither 
have the inherent powers to make decisions that are binding on African 
states nor do they have the powers to sanction African states that fail to 
implement the agreed integration norms.19 In other words, the Commissions 
                                                          
16
 See Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz ‘Integration, supranational governance, and 
the institutionalization of the European polity’ in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet 
(eds) European Integration and Supranational Governance (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2008) 1-26; Neil Fligstein and Jason Mcnichol ‘The institutional terrain of the European 
Union’ in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds) European Integration and 
Supranational Governance 59. 
17
 Costa v Ente Nazionale per L’Energia Elettrica (ENEL) ECJ Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585. 
18
 For discussions of European supranational institutions, see Jonas Tallberg European 
Governance and Supranational Institutions: Making States Comply (Routledge, New York, 
2003); Jonas Tallberg ‘Delegation to supranational institutions: why, how, and with what 
consequences?’ (2002) 25(1) West European Politics 23–46; Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie 
Slaughter ‘The role of national courts in the process of European integration: accounting for 
judicial preferences and constraints’ in Anne-Marie Slaughter et al (eds) The European 
Courts and National Courts–Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998) 
254–276; Liesbet Hooghe The European Commission and the Integration of Europe: Images 
of Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004). The concept of having 
institutions outside the framework of the states making binding decisions on the states is 
referred to as supranationalism. It is defined as ‘the development of authoritative institutions 
of governance and network of policy-making activity above the nation-state’. See Ben 
Rosamond Theories of European Integration (Macmillan Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2000) 204. 
19
 B Fagbayibo ‘A supranational African Union? Gazing into the crystal ball’ 2008 De Jure 
493–503. 
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or Secretariats do not have supranational authority. The non-conferral20 of 
supranational authority on the Commissions or Secretariats has been 
attributed to the unwillingness of African leaders to part with their 
sovereignty.21 This has also raised questions as to whether economic 
integration will succeed on the continent. These doubts are based on the 
assumption that, in the absence of institutions with supranational authority to 
enforce integration objectives, it is likely that African states will rarely comply 
with integration obligations.22 As logical as this assertion may sound, it is 
doubtful that the mere transfer of supranational authority to regional 
institutions will necessarily lead to compliance or effective economic 
integration. One reason for this doubt is that three of the eight RECs 
(namely, COMESA, EAC and ECOWAS) have regional courts which are in 
operation.23 These courts have jurisdiction over all matters covered by the 
integration treaties and their decisions are binding on member states.24 While 
these courts have given important judgments in human rights disputes and 
have created a robust jurisprudence in this area,25 they have not been used 
                                                          
20
 For different methods through which states transfer sovereignty to international 
organisations, see generally Dan Sarooshi International Organizations and their Exercise of 
Sovereign Powers (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005). 
21
 Severine Rugumamu Africa’s Search for Regional Cooperation and Integration in the 21
st
 
Century (ACBF Working Paper No 3, 2004) 1; Nsongurua Udombana ‘A harmony or 
cacophony?’ The music of integration in the African Union Treaty and the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development’ (2002) 13 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 202.  
22
 B Fagbayibo, (note 19) 501. 
23
 The following RECs have functioning Courts: COMESA, the EAC, and ECOWAS. SADC 
has a Tribunal which has been temporarily suspended pending a review of its jurisdiction. 
The ECCAS Treaty provides for the creation of an ECCAS court of justice but it has not 
commenced operations. 
24
 See chapter 5 for a discussion of the jurisdiction of the regional courts. 
25
 In ECOWAS 15 of the 27 decided cases have been based on human rights violations: see 
http://www.courtecowas.org/site/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=114&Itemi
d=27&lang=en [accessed 1 March 2012]. In the EAC, of the 13 cases that have been 
decided either on appeal or in the court of first instance, six dealt with human rights issues: 
see http://www.eacj.org/judgments.php [accessed 1 March 2012].  
In SADC, of 15 decided cases, seven were based on human rights issues: see 
http://www.sadctribunal.org/pages/decisions.htm [accessed 1 March 2012]. (The number of 
cases examined is based on the cases published on the websites of the courts as at 1 
March 2012. For the purpose of this evaluation, cases are counted once even if listed twice. 
For example, a reported preliminary objection and the substantive decision are counted as 
one case.) Some important decisions by regional African courts include Socio-Economic 
Right Accountability Project  v The Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Universal Basic 
Education Commission ECW/CCJ/APP/0808 (ECOWAS, 27 October 2009), Hadidjatou 
Mani Koraou v The Republic of Niger ECW/CCJ/APP/08/08 (ECOWAS, 27 October 2008); 
Ruling on Preliminary Objection in Independent Medical Legal Unit v The Attorney General 
of Kenya and 4 Others (Reference No 3 of 2010 First Instance Division); The Honorable 
Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya and Independent Medical Legal Unit Appeal No 1 
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as a forum for litigating disputes arising from non-compliance with economic 
integration norms. Therefore, the courts have not had the opportunity to 
shape or refine these norms. One may thus infer that the mere presence of a 
supranational court or commission may not necessarily bring about 
compliance with the applicable norms. Be that as it may, the failure of 
citizens to litigate issues pertaining to economic integration in the regional 
courts is significant to the discussion on compliance with integration treaties 
in Africa. This is because judging from the history of economic integration in 
the EU, some of its most defining moments were brought about by 
judgments of the European Court of Justice in cases instituted by legal 
persons.26 The question is why this has not been the case in Africa. 
While it is important to have institutions to monitor the process of 
economic integration, the absence of strong supranational institutions in 
Africa should not be viewed as spelling doom for economic integration. 
Rather, what is needed is a critical analysis of the existing framework with 
the goal of finding methods that would enhance the ability of member states 
to comply with norms of economic integration. Economic integration treaties 
are like any other treaty in international law, and international law (with a few 
exceptions) mostly lacks a central enforcement mechanism for securing 
states’ compliance with their obligations. However, despite the absence of a 
central enforcement mechanism in international law, states generally comply 
with their international obligations.27 Therefore, in the absence of institutions 
                                                                                                                                                                    
of 2011 (Appellate Division) 7–13; James Katabazi & 21 Others v EAC Secretary General & 
Attorney General of Uganda Reference No 1 of 2007: Judgment of 1 November 2001; Mike 
Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v The Republic of Zimbabwe SADC (T) Case No 2/2007. See also 
James Gathii ‘The under-appreciated jurisprudence of Africa’s regional trade judiciaries’ 
(2010) 12 Oregon Review of International Law 245–283. 
26
 It is important to note that the principles of primacy of community law and direct effect of 
community which shaped the jurisprudence of the EU were made popular through the 
judicial pronouncements of the European Court of Justice. See Costa v Ente Nazionale per 
L’Energia Elettrica (ENEL) supra (note 17); Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie 
Belastingen ECJ Case 26/62 [1963] ECR. 
27
 Andrew Guzman How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2008) 8; Louis Henkin How Nations Behave 2 ed. (Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1979) 47. In her book The Power and Purpose of International 
Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) Mary O’Connell emphasises the role of 
enforcement mechanisms in the international legal order.  This however does not detract 
from the fact that there are numerous treaties which do not have enforcement mechanisms 
but are complied with. HLA Hart, a leading positivist, also dispels the notion that the absence 
of sanctions or effective coercive mechanisms reduces the efficacy of international law. See 
HLA Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1961) 217–218.  
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that enforce compliance, it is still possible for states to align their behaviour 
with the prescribed objectives of a treaty. Instead of constantly asserting that 
the failure of African states to cede authority to supranational institutions has 
led to the failure of economic integration in Africa, legal scholars should start 
to explore methods of securing compliance within the existing framework of 
economic integration in Africa. 
In discussing such compliance, our understanding would be enriched 
if we proceed from the premise that, while the norms of economic integration 
have to be assimilated by African states, for economic integration to 
succeed, there also needs to be a collective effort by both state and non-
state actors to assimilate these norms. On a continent where citizens often 
do not trust their governments, it is vital for us to explore methods that make 
citizens feel they have a stake in the integration process.  
Why is it important for the integration process to be collective? We are 
quick to assume or posit that African leaders are unwilling to implement the 
objectives of economic integration at the national level, but we ignore the fact 
that decisions at the national level may be influenced by factors that are 
beyond the powers of the president or head of state. For example, in a 
country that is highly dependent on revenue generated from customs tariffs, 
a president trying to liberalise trade would have to explain to the national 
parliament why the country will have to lose its main source of revenue in 
order to comply with its economic integration commitments. Unless national 
parliaments are involved in the integration process from the onset, the 
outcome of the policies may largely depend on whether the president is able 
to gather enough support in parliament. Citizens may also be averse to the 
idea of opening up the borders of a country to ‘foreigners’. The xenophobic 
attacks that occurred in South Africa indicate that some citizens may be 
opposed to the idea of granting Africans from neighbouring states easy 
access to South Africa’s resources. All these systemic challenges have to be 
taken into consideration in any discussion of compliance with African 
integration treaties. 
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1.2 Research question 
The central research question in this thesis is, in the absence of 
supranational institutions, ‘how can compliance with African integration 
treaties be secured, taking into account the legal and non-legal factors that 
may impact on the ability of states to comply with their integration 
obligations’. In answering this question, three sub-questions are posed. The 
questions are:  
(1) What factors generally lead to compliance and non-compliance with 
treaty obligations, and are these factors relevant in the context of African 
integration treaties? 
(2) What strategies can be adopted by African regional institutions to 
encourage compliance with African integration treaties? 
(3) What steps can African states take within their national domain to 
facilitate compliance?  
1.3 On compliance  
Before proceeding to discuss the above questions in the chapters that follow, 
it is vital to have a conceptual understanding of treaty compliance in 
international law, and its implications for the discussion of compliance with 
integration treaties in Africa. Defining treaty compliance poses some 
challenges because there are different opinions about what amounts to 
treaty compliance.28 Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter define treaty 
compliance as ‘a state of conformity or identity between an actor’s behaviour 
and a specified rule’.29 However, they are quick to acknowledge that treaty 
compliance is ‘not uniquely applicable to legal rules’.30 Benedict Kingsbury 
                                                          
28
 Benedict Kingsbury ‘The concept of compliance as a function of competing conceptions in 
international law’ (1998) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 345–346; Robert Howse 
and Ruti Teitel ‘Beyond compliance: rethinking why international law really matters’ (2010) 
1(2) Global Policy 127–136. 
29
 Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter ‘International law, international relations and 
compliance’ in Walter Carlnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (eds.) Handbook in 
International Relations (Sage Publications, London, 2002) 539. See also Roger Fisher 
Improving Compliance with International Law (University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 
1981) 20; Ronald Mitchell Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty 
Compliance (MIT Press: Cambridge, 1994) 30. 
30
 Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter (note 29) 539.  
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argues that the discussion on compliance often proceeds on the premise that 
there is ‘a shared understanding that compliance is adequately defined as 
conformity of behaviour with legal rules’.31 Kingsbury challenges this notion 
of treaty compliance as simply being a ‘correspondence of behaviour with 
legal rules’, and argues that the ‘[c]oncepts of “compliance” depend upon 
understanding the relations of law, behaviour, objectives and justice’.32 
These relations need be properly understood within the context of a theory or 
theories of international law in order to properly evaluate compliance.33 
Robert Howse and Ruti Tietel share Kingsbury’s views, and suggest that 
when compliance is viewed merely from the perspective of the observance of 
rules, it obfuscates the understanding of the normative effects of international 
law.34 They argue that an examination of international law in general ‘through 
the lens of rule compliance leads to inadequate scrutiny and understanding 
of the diverse complex purposes and projects that multiple actors impose 
and transpose on international legality, and especially a tendency to 
oversimplify if not distort the relation of international law to politics’.35 
Taking a different approach to the meaning of compliance, Oran 
Young suggests that ‘compliance can be said to occur when the actual 
behaviour of a given subject conforms to prescribed behaviour, and non-
compliance or violation occurs when actual behaviour departs significantly 
from prescribed behaviour’.36 Young’s definition of compliance constitutes a 
more holistic approach to evaluating compliance because the prescribed 
behaviour may not always take the form of a legal rule or set of rules. In the 
same vein, Harold Jacobson and Edith Weiss suggest that compliance takes 
the form of adherence to specific obligations (procedural and substantive) of 
a treaty, as well as adherence to the spirit of the treaty.37  
                                                          
31
 Benedict Kingsbury ‘The concept of compliance as a function of competing conceptions in 
international law’ (1998) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 345. 
32
 Ibid 346. 
33
 Ibid 346, 368. 
34
 Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel (note 28) 127. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Oran Young Compliance and Public Authority (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
1979) 172. 
37
 Harold Jacobson and Edith Weiss ‘Strengthening compliance with international 
environmental accords: preliminary observations from a collaborative project’ (1995) 1 
Global Governance 123–125. 
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Situating the above discussion in the context of economic integration 
in Africa, one may question whether compliance can be achieved solely by 
relying on a state’s conformity with legal rules. Should compliance mean 
merely a state’s adherence to legal rules or would adherence to non-juridical 
rules also qualify as compliance? Legal rules in this context are those rules 
in a treaty that create core legally binding obligations on  member states, 
such as a rule that mandates a member state to eliminate tariff and non-tariff 
barriers for the purposes of creating a customs union.38 A non-juridical rule, 
on the other hand, is a rule that creates no legally binding obligation but is 
necessary for the attainment of the spirit of the treaty, for example, a rule that 
requires member states to take the necessary steps to maintain and 
rehabilitate the highways within their territory.39 While both rules are provided 
for in the treaty, the normative character of the rules is different. The former 
rule is an essential legal requirement for the creation of a customs union, 
while the latter facilitates the proper functioning of a customs union. 
Therefore, maintaining good highways within a customs union is as important 
as removing tariff and non-tariff barriers. If a state adheres to the legal rule of 
removing tariff and non-tariff barriers but has deplorable roads its compliance 
should be called into question. Since compliance is a function of conformity 
with prescribed behaviour, it should invariably follow that rules other than 
legal rules may prescribe the acceptable behaviour. 
 Apart from definitional issues, the broad areas covered by economic 
integration in Africa obfuscate our ability to determine acceptable levels of 
compliance or gauge the extent to which states comply. Although it is not the 
focus of this thesis to measure the extent of compliance with African 
integration treaties, an illustration of this point is not out of place. For 
example, would a member state that has integrated only its trade and 
agricultural sectors be deemed to have attained an acceptable level of 
compliance? Or would implementing only the rule on the free movement of 
persons suffice? Given the diverse nature of the issues for which economic 
integration is being sought in Africa, an evaluation of compliance solely from 
the perspective of adherence to specified legal rules might obscure our 
                                                          
38
 Article 4(1) (a) COMESA Treaty. 
39
 Article 84(a) COMESA Treaty. 
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understanding of African integration treaties and therefore Young’s definition 
of compliance as ‘conformity of actual behaviour with the prescribed 
behaviour’ will be adopted in this thesis.  
Young’s definition also allows us to draw a distinction between treaty 
compliance, implementation and effectiveness.40 Compliance, although 
closely related to ‘implementation’ and ‘effectiveness’, is distinct from both.41 
Implementation occurs when an international agreement is domesticated 
through the passage of the requisite national legislation to create domestic 
rules and possibly enforcement mechanisms.42 While implementation may be 
a necessary step towards achieving compliance with the treaty, it does not in 
itself constitute compliance with the treaty. A state might not comply with 
international law even after implementing the required domestic legislation 
and, conversely, a state might comply with international law without 
implementing domestic legislation.43 For example, an integration treaty that 
seeks to increase intra-regional trade may specify the elimination of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers within a regional bloc in order to boost intra-regional trade. 
In furtherance of this obligation, member states may pass domestic rules that 
prohibit the imposition of tariff and non-tariff barriers on goods originating 
from the region. However, the state may fail to observe the domestic laws it 
has passed. In this scenario, while the state has implemented the required 
legislation, it is not complying with the integration treaty. On the other hand, a 
state might refrain from imposing tariff and non-tariff barriers without passing 
domestic legislation to that effect. 
 Effectiveness goes beyond whether the state has complied with or 
implemented the treaty. It is directed at determining whether the norms of the 
treaty achieve the policy objective of the treaty.44 A treaty may be complied 
                                                          
40
 Beth Simmons ‘Compliance with international agreements’ (1998) 1 Annual Review of 
Political Science 77.  
41
 See David Victor et al ‘Introduction and overview’ in David Victor, Kal Raustiala and 
Eugene Skolnikoff (eds) The Implementation and Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Agreements (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1998) 1-46. 
42
 Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter (note 29) 539; Beth Simmons (note 40) 77; 
Harold Jacobson and Edith Weiss (note 37) 123. 
43
 Jose Alvarez ‘Why nations behave’ (1997–1998) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 
305. 
44
 Ibid. 
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with but may be ineffective in meeting its stated goals.45 Using the above 
example, while a state might implement and comply with the obligation of not 
imposing tariff and non-tariff barriers, intra-regional trade might still not 
increase if all the countries within the region produce similar primary goods 
and lack the capacity to process them into secondary goods. Therefore, the 
treaty will be ineffective in terms of meeting its policy objective, which is an 
increase in intra-regional trade. This distinction between implementation, 
effectiveness and compliance is germane to the discussion on economic 
integration in Africa because it helps us understand that merely 
domesticating the norms of integration may not lead to compliance with 
economic integration treaties. 
Given these complexities, any evaluation based solely on how well a 
particular state(s) responds to a set of legal rules may not capture the true 
picture of compliance with African integration norms. Therefore, we must 
consider all the factors in order to develop the appropriate tools for securing 
overall compliance with African integration treaties.  
1.4 Justification for this research 
Why is it necessary to embark on this research? African states have 
committed themselves to economic integration through the adoption of 
binding integration tr aties that create norms regulating the process of 
integration. Consequently, the norms created are intended to resolve the 
economic and development problems that most African states encounter. 
However, decades after the adoption of these integration treaties, enormous 
challenges still persist and compliance has been minimal. If we work from the 
premise that African states voluntarily entered into the integration treaties 
with the aim of resolving their economic and development challenges, it may 
be safe to assume that the failure to comply with their obligations under 
these treaties is not always deliberate and premeditated.46 While there may 
                                                          
45
 Harold Jacobson and Edith Weiss (note 37) 124. 
46
 This assumption is based on the premise that states have a general propensity to comply 
with their treaty obligations.  See Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes The New 
Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University 
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be a collective will to give effect to the obligations created by the integration 
treaties at the regional level, there may be inherent factors which prevent 
states from meeting their treaty obligations. Therefore, it is important to 
understand how these factors impact on the ability of African states to 
comply with their obligations. Furthermore, given the slow pace in economic 
integration, it is imperative to examine the integration process without 
necessarily reinventing the wheel to determine how African states can 
effectively pool their resources to achieve economic integration within the 
existing framework.  
1.5 Definitions 
The phrases ‘regional integration’, ‘regional cooperation’, ‘regionalism’ and 
‘regionalisation’ are often used interchangeably in the discourse on regional 
development. These phrases describe the process of harmonising policies 
and developing strategies aimed at accelerating regional development 
among states. 47 Although these phrases may be used to describe the same 
process, they are technically distinct from each other.48 Ernst Haas draws a 
distinction between regional integration and regional cooperation.  He 
considers the study of regional integration as involving an explanation as to 
why states cease to be wholly sovereign by voluntarily mingling with their 
neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring 
new techniques for resolving conflicts between themselves.49 Haas also 
describes regional cooperation to mean the steps taken in order to achieve 
the process of regional integration.50 Asante suggests that regional 
integration may be deemed to be ‘the terminal or resulting condition, the end 
state, or outcomes or consequences of regional cooperation activities’.51 
Akokpari in his explanation of regional integration suggests that it may 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Press, Cambridge, 1995); Louis Henkin How Nations Behave 2 ed. (Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1979). 
47
 John Akokpari (note 3) 86.  
48
 Ibid. 
49
Ernst Haas ‘The study of regional integration: reflections on the joy and anguish of pre-
theorising’ (1970) 24(4) International Organisation 610. 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 Samuel Asante Regionalism and Africa’s Development: Expectations, Reality and 
Challenges (Macmillan, London, 1997) 21. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
15 | P a g e  
 
involve economic, market, social, political and security processes.52 In other 
words, the voluntarily mingling of states could involve any and all of these 
processes. For the purpose of this thesis, regional integration in Africa is 
examined in the context of economic integration.53 Economic integration has 
been defined by John Rourke to mean ‘a close degree of economic 
intertwining that, by formal agreement of informal circumstances, the 
countries involved begin to surrender some degree of sovereignty and act as 
an economic unit’.54 In distinguishing between economic integration and 
economic cooperation, he defines economic cooperation to mean ‘a process 
whereby sovereign states cooperate with one another bilaterally or multi-
laterally through IGOs (such as the IMF) or processes (such as the G-7 
meetings)’.55 
Margaret Lee defines regionalism ‘as the adoption of a regional 
project by a formal regional economic organization designed to enhance the 
political, economic, social, cultural, and security integration and/or 
cooperation of member states’.56 Regionalism thus seeks to transform a 
geographical area into an identified social space.57 Regionalisation is defined 
as ‘the process by which state and non-state actors seek to enhance their 
economic, political, cultural, social, and security interaction with societal 
forces within a region through formal or informal structures’.58 The distinction 
between regionalism and regionalisation lies in the fact that regionalism 
refers to a cognitive and state-centric aspect of the latter.59 Regionalisation 
on the other hand, could be driven by non-state actors and thus not 
necessarily be a function of regionalism. The non-state actors that drive the 
                                                          
52
 John Akokpari (note 3) 85, 86, 87. 
53
 It is important to note that although the focus of the thesis is economic integration, 
economic integration in Africa also involves elements of market and social integration. See 
section 1.6. 
54
 John Rourke International Politics on the World Stage (Dushkin Publishing Group/Brown & 
Benchmark Publishers, Guildford, Connecticut, 1995) 569. 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Margaret Lee The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa (University of 
Cape Town Press, Cape Town, 2003) 8. 
57
 Daniel Bach ‘New regionalism as an alias: regionalization through trans-state networks’ in 
Andrew Grant and Fredrik Soderbaum (eds) The New Regionalism in Africa (Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot, 2003) 22. 
58
 Margaret Lee (note 56) 8. 
59
 Daniel Bach (note 57) 22. 
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regionalisation include informal traders who are not necessarily driven by 
regionalist impulses.60 
1.6 Contextualising economic integration in Africa 
Using regional economic integration to promote and consolidate economic 
and social development in Africa has been an integral part of the aspirations 
of African leaders.61 The initiative by African leaders to integrate the 
continent started in the early years of independence of African states.62 
African leaders were of the opinion that concerted efforts were needed to 
improve the living conditions of the African people and to reduce the effects 
of Africa’s balkanisation.63 The adoption of regional economic integration was 
also necessitated by the fact that Africa needed to be globally competitive 
and therefore it was important to pool resources to become a formidable 
force in the international polity.64 In this regard, economic integration was 
and is still viewed as mechanism for creating a stronger bargaining base in 
the global arena.65 Furthermore, economic integration is seen as imperative 
if Africa is to become economically self-sustaining and consequently sever its 
ties of dependency that were a result of Africa’s colonial history.66 In 
                                                          
60
 John Akokpari (note 3) 87-88. 
61
 Teshome Mulat ‘Multilateralism and Africa’s Regional Economic Communities’ (1998) 
32(4) Journal of World Trade 115. See also United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) Economic Development in Africa Report 2009: Strengthening 
Regional Economic Integration for Africa’s Development  (United Nations, Geneva, 2009) 1; 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) Assessing Regional Integration in 
Africa (Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, 2004) 27.  
62
 UNECA Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV: Enhancing Intra-African Trade 
(Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, 2010) 7. It is important to note that although 
regional economic integration on a continental scale traces its origin to the early days of 
independence, some integration efforts within various sub-regions in Africa are older in 
origin. Some early examples of attempts to integrate the economies of different sub-regions 
in Africa include the Southern African Customs Union (1910), the Southern Rhodesia 
Customs Union (1949), the Ghana-Upper  Volta Trade Agreement (1962), and the 
Equatorial Customs Union (1962): UNECA Assessing Regional Integration in Africa 
(Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, 2004) 27. 
63
 Rene N’Guettia Kouassi ‘The itinerary of the African integration process: an overview of 
the historical landmarks’ (2007) 1(2) African Integration Review 1. 
64
 Peter Schraeder African Politics and Society (Bedford/St Martins, Boston, 2000) 307–308. 
65
 Mothae Maruping ‘Challenges for regional integration in sub-Saharan Africa: 
macroeconomic convergence and monetary coordination’ in Jan Teunissen et al (eds) Africa 
in the World Economy–The National Regional and International Challenges (Fondad, 
Hague, 2005) 130. 
66
 SKB Asante and David Chanaiwa ‘Pan-Africanism and regional integration’ in A Mazuri 
(ed) General History of Africa: Africa since 1935 vol. 8 (UNESCO, Paris, 1993) 724–743;  
P Schraeder African Politics and Society (note 64) 307–308. 
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emphasising the need to adopt regional economic integration, Kofi Annan 
stated that:  
The [African] continent continues to face numerous 
daunting developmental challenges. Economic growth is 
still far below what is needed to meet the millennium 
development goal of reducing poverty by half by the year 
2015. Adult literacy for the majority of sub-Saharan Africa 
stands well below the developing–country average. And 
the rising incidence of AIDS is dramatically reducing life 
expectancy. Effective regional integration has a major role 
to play in helping African countries address these and 
other common concerns.
67  
Regional economic integration treaties were therefore adopted to create a 
legal framework for cooperation between African states.68  
Regional integration is not a new concept in modern political and 
economic discourse and it is also not unique to Africa. Six countries in 
Europe set the precedent for modern regional economic integration with the 
formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the 
1950s.69 The ECSC subsequently developed into the EU and now has 27 
member states.70 Over the years, there has been a global increase in the 
                                                          
67
 Kofi Annan Message to the 9
th
 Summit of the COMESA Authority Kampala, Uganda, 8 
June 2004, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9353.doc.htm 
[accessed 15 March 2010]. 
68
 Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 defines a treaty as 
‘an international agreement concluded between  states in written form and governed 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation’. The territorial coverage of a treaty may 
be universal or limited to a particular region. See A Aust Modern Treaty Law and Practice 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000) 15. Abram and Antonia Chayes note that 
treaties are no longer used solely for the purpose of recording political settlements and 
agreements. Rather they are now used as a means of addressing complex economic, 
political and social problems that require cooperative action between states. See Abram 
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (note 46)) 1. 
69
 The countries are France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Luxembourg: Treaty 
Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 18 April 1951, 261 UNTS 140.  See 
Finn Laursen ‘Theory and practice of regional integration’ (2008) 8(3) Jean Monnet/Robert 
Schuman Paper Series 3.  
70
 See generally, European Union The History of the European Union, available at 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm [accessed 20 March 2010]; Erik Oddar 
Eriksen (ed) Making the European Polity (Routledge, New York, 2005); Martin Holmes 
European Integration: Scope and Limits (Palgrave, New York, 2001); Jeffery Stacey 
Integrating Europe: Informal Politics and Institutional Change (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2010); Anne-Maire Burley and Walter Mattli ‘Europe before the Court: a political theory 
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number of regional economic integration schemes, but the EU still remains 
the most successful and has in one way or the other influenced other 
regional attempts at integrating their economies.71 Africa has likewise been 
influenced by the EU. Some similarities do exist, although the approach to 
European economic integration and African economic integration is different. 
Two notable features of economic integration in Africa that are identical to 
those of EU integration are the creation of supranational institutions to 
oversee the integration process and the adoption of a market integration 
approach to economic integration. The difference in institutional approach is 
discussed briefly below, because the main distinguishing features were 
raised in section 1.1. The market integration comparison is discussed in 
detail. 
With regard to supranational institutions,72 an attractive aspect of 
economic integration in the EU is the manner in which member states, which 
were deemed absolutely sovereign, came to share part of their sovereign 
attributes with EU institutions that operate outside the realm of authority of 
member states.73 In this regard, the European Court of Justice, the European 
                                                                                                                                                                    
of legal integration’ (1993) 47(1) International Organization 41–76; Neil Fligstein and Alec 
Stone Sweet ‘Institutionalizing the Treaty of Rome’ in Alec Stone Sweet et al (eds) The 
Institutionalization of Europe (Oxford University Press, New York, 2001) 29–55; Andrew 
Moravcsik ‘Negotiating the Single European Act: national interest and conventional statecraft 
in the European Community’ (1991) 45(1) International Organization 19–56; Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community 25 March 1957, 298 UNTS 3; Treaty 
Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 25 March 1957, 298 UNTS 167; 
Treaty on European Union 7 February 1992, 31 ILM 253; Treaty of Amsterdam 2 October 
1997, 37 ILM 56. 
71
 Walter Mattli The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (Cambridge 
University Press, United Kingdom, 1999) 1. Other regions where economic integration has 
been undertaken include North America (NAFTA), the Caribbean (CARICOM) and 
Southeast Asia (ASEAN).   
72
 See section 1.1.  
73
 Philippe Schmitter ‘A revised theory of regional integration’ (1970) 24(4) International 
Organisation 836. Different theories have emerged as to how and why economic integration 
in Europe has been successful. Over time, two schools of thought have become prominent: 
the neo-functionalist and the intergovernmentalist. The neo-functionalist school suggests 
that there are two sets of actors that operate at a level below and above the state. The 
actors that are below the level of the state include interest groups and political parties. The 
integrative process is created to protect the interests of these groups. The other actors, who 
operate at a level above the state, are the regional institutions that possess supranational 
authority.  These supranational institutions promote integration by advancing the 
development of various interest groups within the state. These supranational institutions are 
independent and have the power to resolve disputes and make rules that define the regional 
polity. Neo-functionalists also posit that the creation of these supranational institutions 
results in a change of the expectations and behaviour of actors, who in turn divert part of 
their resources and policy efforts to the supranational level. At the middle of this interaction 
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Commission and the European Parliament have wielded enormous influence 
in the EU.74 As stated earlier,75 in Africa, member states have not necessarily 
                                                                                                                                                                    
between actors lies the government in which political powers inhere. Neo-functionalism 
suggests that the government may either accept or reject the decisions of the supranational 
authority but a rejection might be unprofitable to the government if it sets a precedent for 
other governments. See generally Ernst Haas The Uniting of Europe (Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, 1958);  Ernst Haas ‘International integration: the European and the 
universal process’ (1961) 15(3) International Organization 366–392; Ernst Haas ‘The study 
of regional integration: reflections on the joy and anguish of pre-theorising’ (note 49) 607–
646; Philippe Schmitter ‘A revised theory of regional integration’ (1970) 24(4) International 
Organization 836–868; Joseph Nye ‘Comparative regional integration: concept and 
measurement’ (1968) 22(4) International Organization 855–880; Leon Lindberg The Political 
Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford University, Stanford, 1963); Walter 
Mattli The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (note 70) 24–28; Wayne 
Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet ‘Neo-functionalism and supranational governance’ (2010) 
Working Paper 8, available at http://works.bepress.com/alec_stone_sweet/38 [accessed 10 
April 2011]. For criticism of the neo-functionalist approach, see James Caporaso ‘Regional 
integration theory: understanding our past and anticipating our future’ (1998) 5(1) Journal of 
European Public Policy 1 at 8-9; Andrew Moravcsik ‘Preferences and power in the liberal 
European Community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach’ (1993) 31(4) Journal of 
Common Market Studies 476. 
The intergovernmentalist approach, on the other hand, suggests that European integration 
can be explained as a series of interstate bargains betw en leading members of the 
European Community. It suggests that heads of government, supported by Ministers, initiate 
and negotiate major initiatives in the European Council, and each government views the 
European Community through its own lens of policy preferences. As such, European 
Community politics is a continuation of domestic politics and, even when societal interests 
are transnational, the primary form of their political character remains national. This theory 
downplays the role of supranational institutions in driving the integration process, and rather 
emphasises that states avoid granting an open-ended authority to central institutions that 
might infringe on their sovereignty. Also, in order to safeguard their countries against future 
erosion of sovereignty, policymakers demand the unanimous consent of members to 
sovereignty-related reforms. Intergovernmentalism regards member states as rational actors 
that control the integration process and, as such, supranational institutions do not play a 
very important role in the integration process because major decisions are reached by 
member states and not by the supranational institutions. However, Moravcsik, a leading 
intergovernmentalist, concedes that sometimes member states delegate substantial 
independent authority to institutions in order to enforce incomplete contracts. See generally 
Finn Laursen ‘Theory and practice of regional integration’ (2008) 8(3) Jean Monnet/Robert 
Schuman Paper Series 8; Andrew Moravcsik The Choice for Europe: Social Purposes and 
State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1998); 
Andrew Moravcsik ‘Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional 
statecraft in the European Community’ (note 70)  25; Andrew Moravcsik ‘Preferences and 
power in the European Community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach’ (1993) 31(4) 
Journal of Common Market Studies 473–524; Paul Taylor The Limits of European 
Integration (Croom Helm, Beckenham, UK, 1983); Helen Wallace et al (eds) Policy-Making 
in the European Communities (Wiley, London, 1977). 
One of the grounds on which intergovernmentalism has been criticised is that it a priori rules 
out the role of supranational institutions and transnational societies in promoting regional 
integration. See James Caporaso ‘Regional integration theory: understanding our past and 
anticipating our future’ (1998) 5(1) Journal of European Public Policy 11–12. 
74
 Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli ‘Europe before the Court: a political theory of legal 
integration’ (note 70) 41–42; Mark Pollack ‘The engines of integration? Supranational 
autonomy and influence in the European Union’ in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet 
(eds) European Integration and Supranational Governance (Oxford University Press: New 
York, 1998) 217–249; Rachel Cichowski ‘Judicial rulemaking and the institutionalization of 
European Union sex equality policy’ in Alec Stone Sweet et al (eds) The Institutionalization 
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relied on the ‘bureaucratic strictures and international rule-making or 
legislative processes of formal international institutions’.76 While formal 
institutions have been created, they have not being at the centre of the 
decision-making process. The decision-making process still ultimately lies 
with the heads of state and governments, and therefore decisions are made 
at an inter-governmental level. While some scholars might argue that this is 
not the best way to achieve integration, the fact remains this is the reality we 
have to work with, unless states decide to change this approach. 
1.6.1 Market integration 
Over the years, the recurring question has been why all efforts to achieve 
economic integration in Africa have been relatively unsuccessful. This notion 
of failure has partly emanated from the fact that the economic integration 
process in Africa is largely viewed from the perspective of liberalising trade, 
whereby the free flow of goods and services is ensured. In the words of 
Jeffery Herbst, ‘Africa is indeed littered with the carcasses of failed economic 
unions … It is therefore easy to conclude that regional integration has failed 
because international cooperation has been too difficult in Africa.’77  
This notion of failure is not completely unfounded but it is inadvertently 
misconstrued. If we compare Africa with the EU, the achievement of trade 
liberalisation has been relatively unsatisfactory.78 However, part of the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
of Europe (Oxford University Press, New York, 2001); Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne 
Sandholtz ‘Integration, supranational governance, and the institutionalization of the 
European polity’ in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds) European Integration and 
Supranational Governance (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) 1–26; Neil Fligstein 
and Jason Mcnichol ‘The institutional terrain of the European Union’ in Wayne Sandholtz 
and Alec Stone Sweet (eds) European Integration and Supranational Governance 59. 
75
 See section 1.1. 
76
 Tiyanjana Maluwa ‘The move from institutions: examining the phenomenon in Africa 
(2006) 100 American Society of International Law Proceedings 294. 
77
 J Herbst ‘Crafting regional cooperation in Africa’ in A Acharya and A Johnston (eds) 
Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007) 132. 
78
 From the outset the European Union set out as its primary aim the creation of a common 
market through the elimination of restrictions on the import and export of goods between 
Member States. Article 3 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome lists activities that have to be 
undertaken to create a common market in the European Union. The activities include the 
elimination of customs duties and quantitative restrictions in Member States, the 
establishment of a common customs tariff and of a common commercial policy towards third 
countries, abolishing obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services and capital, 
adopting a common policy for agriculture, adopting a common policy for transport, adopting 
a competition policy to avoid price distortion in the common market, the application of 
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reason why African economic integration is regarded as unsuccessful is that 
economic integration treaties are referred to as Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs), and therefore there is a reasonable expectation that they should 
effectively serve this purpose. However, the point that is often missed by 
critics is that while African economic integration treaties are referred to as 
RTAs, they are created to do much more than that.79 Economic integration in 
Africa is much broader than efforts to simply liberalise trade.80 A survey 
conducted by the Economic Commission for Africa shows that other than 
trade liberalisation, integration in the area of transport, communications, 
peace and security, energy and agriculture are all high priorities among 
RECs.81 In reality, it is incorrect to view African integration treaties as solely 
RTAs, because a closer look at African integration treaties shows that the 
creation of trade regimes is only one of the several objectives of these 
treaties. Integration in Africa is broadly based and embodies social, cultural, 
political, and economic considerations.82 
 For example, at its inception the OAU sought to promote unity 
between African states, eradicate colonialism, defend the territorial integrity 
of African states, and promote cooperation to achieve a better life for African 
people.83 Trade-related issues were incorporated into the mainstream 
agenda of the OAU only in subsequent years, through the adoption of the 
Lagos Plan of Action and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic 
Community. With the transformation of the OAU into the AU, the approach 
                                                                                                                                                                    
procedures by which the economic policies of Member States can be co-ordinated and 
disequilibria in their balances of payments remedied, the approximation of the laws of 
Member States to the extent required for the proper functioning of the common market, the 
creation of a European Social Fund in order to improve employment opportunities for 
workers and to contribute to the raising of their standard of living, and the establishment of a 
European Investment Bank. 
79
 James Gathii ‘African regional trade arrangements as flexible legal regimes’ (2009–2010) 
35 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 572–579. 
80
 United Nations Development Programme Regional Integration and Human Development: 
A Pathway for Africa (UNDP, New York, 2011) 3. 
81
 UNECA Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalizing Regional Economic 
Communities (Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, 2006) 77. 
82
 SKB Asante The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa (Praeger Publishers, New 
York, 1986) 8. 
83
 Article II OAU Charter. The OAU focused on ensuring peace and security and intervened 
in numerous post-independence conflicts in the continent. It also played a pivotal role in the 
liberation struggle in southern Africa. See Colin Legum ‘The Organisation of African Unity–
success or failure?’ (1975) 51(2) International Affairs 208–219; Festus Aboagye ‘Towards 
new peacekeeping partnerships in Africa’ (2001) 10(2) African Security Review 19–33.  
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towards integration remained multi-faceted, bearing in mind that peace, 
security, good governance and the protection of human rights are all 
essential aspects of economic integration. The objectives of the Constitutive 
Act of the AU include the promotion of political and socio-economic 
integration, peace, security and stability, democratic principles, good 
governance and popular participation.84  
 The treaties establishing the various RECs also reflect the broad 
nature of African integration. For instance, the Treaty establishing the East 
African Community (EAC Treaty) specifically identifies its objectives as 
developing policies and programmes aimed at ‘deepening co-operation 
among the [p]artner [s]tates in political, economic, social and cultural fields, 
research and technology, defence, security, and legal and judicial affairs, for 
their mutual benefits’.85 Article 5 of the Treaty of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC Treaty), as amended, includes in its 
objectives the promotion of sustainable and equitable economic growth and 
socio-economic development that will ensure poverty alleviation with the 
ultimate objective of its eradication, enhancing the standard and quality of life 
of the people of southern Africa and supporting the socially disadvantaged 
                                                          
84
 Article 3 Constitutive Act. The AU has put in place mechanisms such as NEPAD and the 
APRM to ensure that issues such as good governance, the protection of human rights, and 
economic governance are all given adequate attention and entrenched into the legal 
systems of African states. See chapter 4. 
85
 Article 5 Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, 30 November 1999, 
2144 UNTS 255. Regional integration in East Africa dates back to the colonial era with the 
formation of the Kenya Uganda Railway between 1897–1901, the Customs Collection 
Centre 1900, the East African Currency Board 1905, the Postal Union 1905, the Court of 
Appeal for Eastern Africa 1909, the Customs Union 1919, the East African Governors’ 
Conference 1926, the East African Income Tax Board 1940, the Joint Economic Council 
1940, the East Africa (High Commission) Orders in Council 1947-1961 and the Treaty for 
East African Co-operation 1967. With the dissolution of the Treaty for East African Co-
operation in 1977, the East African Community officially came to an end until its resurrection 
in 1999. See the Preamble to the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African 
Community, as amended on 14 December 2006 and 20 August 2007. See also East African 
Community Experts Report on the East African Political Federation: Addressing East Africa’s 
Fears, Concerns and Challenges and Consolidating its Pillars (EAC, Arusha, August 2010) 
6; African Union Status of Integration in Africa (SIA) 2 ed (African Union, Addis Ababa, 2009) 
96–97;Evarist Mugisa et al An Evaluation of the Implementation and Impact of the East 
African Community Customs Union  Final Report (EAC, Tanzania, March 2009); Korwa Adar 
and Mutahi Ngunyi ‘The politics of integration in East Africa since independence’ in Walter 
Oyugi (ed) Politics and Administration in East Africa (Konrad Adenaeur Foundation, Nairobi, 
1992)  395–442; Ingrid Diomi Delupis The East African Community and Common Market 
(Longman, London, 1970); Joseph Nye Pan-Africanism and East African Integration 
(Harvard University Press, Massachusetts,1965); Christian Potholm and Richard Fredland 
Integration and Disintegration in East Africa (University of America Press, Lanham, 1980). 
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through regional integration. The objectives also include promoting common 
political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted 
through institutions which are democratic, legitimate and effective. The 
objectives of almost all the RECs are couched in similar fashion.86 Even 
ECOWAS, which expressly states its objective to be the creation of an 
economic union, has achieved its greatest success in the area of peace and 
security through the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).87  
In standard neo-classical economic theory, economic integration or 
regional trade regimes proceed through a process of the removal of trade 
barriers, the liberalisation of the free movement of persons and the factors of 
production (such as labour and human capital), the harmonisation of the 
national policies of members of the integrating unit, and the complete 
                                                          
86
 Article 3 of the Treaty establishing the Common Mark t for Eastern and Southern Africa 
lists as its objectives the attainment of sustainable growth and development through the 
harmonious development of production and marketing structures, the promotion of peace 
and security to enhance economic development among member states, and contributing 
towards the establishment and realisation of the objectives of the African Economic 
Community. Article 4 of the Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central African 
States lists its objectives as including the promotion and strengthening of harmonious 
cooperation and balanced and self-sustained development in all fields of economic and 
social activity, particularly in the fields of industry, transport and communications, energy, 
agriculture, natural resources, trade, customs, monetary and financial matters, human 
resources, tourism, education, further training, culture, science and technology and the 
movement of persons, in order to achieve collective self-reliance, raise the standard of living 
of its peoples, increase and maintain economic stability, foster close and peaceful relations 
between member states and contribute to the progress and development of the African 
continent. Article 7 of the  Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development lists as its objectives the promotion  of joint development strategies and 
gradually harmonising macro-economic policies and programmes in the social, technological 
and scientific fields, harmonising policies with regard to trade, customs, transport, 
communications, agriculture, and natural resources, and promoting the free movement of 
goods, services, and people and the establishment of residence, creating an enabling 
environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic trade and investment, achieving regional 
food security, and encouraging and assisting the efforts of member states to collectively 
combat drought and other natural and man-made disasters and their consequences. 
87
 Article 3 of the Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of West African States 1993, 
35 ILM 660. See generally Jeremy Levitt ‘Humanitarian intervention by regional actors in 
internal conflicts: the cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone’ (1998) 12 Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal  333–376, Jeremy Levitt ‘Pro-democratic 
intervention in Africa’ (2006) 24 Wisconsin International Law Journal  785–834; Ademola 
Abass ‘The implementation of ECOWAS’ New Protocol and Security Council Resolution 
1270: new developments in regional intervention’ (2002) 10 University of Miami International 
and Comparative Law Review 177–216; Suyash Paliwal ‘The primacy of regional 
organizations in international peacekeeping: the African example’ (2010) 51/1 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 185, 206–214, Ademola Abass ‘The new collective security 
mechanism of ECOWAS: innovations and problems’ (2000) 5(2) Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law 211–229. 
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integration of the above processes.88 This standard progression is based on 
Jacob Viner and Bella Balassa’s idea of economic integration.89 Market 
integration as a feature of economic integration was given prominence by 
Jacob Viner in his seminal work, The Customs Union Issue. He posited that 
markets within a region could be integrated through the creation of a 
customs union. In creating a customs union, members of the customs union 
eliminate trade barriers between each other and also adopt common external 
tariffs for imports from non-member states. 90 Viner indicated that the 
beneficial nature of a customs union is dependent on whether it creates trade 
or diverts trade. Trade creation occurs when real resources are saved by 
shifting production in the direction of comparative advantage, thereby giving 
consumers the benefit of lower prices. On the other hand, trade is diverted 
when there is a shift from a low-cost external producer to a high-cost regional 
producer.91 Therefore, economic integration is more beneficial and welfare-
producing when trade is created rather than diverted. 92  
Balassa expanded on Viner’s theory by regarding economic 
integration as a whole to be a process and a state of affairs.93 Balassa 
suggests that economic integration, as a process, ‘encompasses measures 
designed to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to 
different national states; viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented by 
the absence of various forms of discrimination between national 
economies’.94 According to Balassa, economic integration can take several 
                                                          
88
 Guy Martin ‘Regional integration in West Africa: the role of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS)’ in E Hansen (ed) Africa: Perspectives on Peace and 
Development (Zed Books, London 1987) 172.   
89
 Jacob Viner The Customs Union Issue (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
New York, 1950); Bela Balassa The Theory of Economic Integration (RD Irwin, 
Homewood,Illnois 1961). 
90
 Jacob Viner The Customs Union Issue (note 89) 8. 
91
 For a more detailed explanation of trade creation and trade diversion, see Dennis 
Appleyard et al International Economics 5 ed (McGraw-Hill/Irwin, New York, 2006) 375–382; 
Bela Balassa ‘Trade creation and trade diversion in the European Common Market’ (1967) 
77(305) The Economic Journal 1–21.  
92
 Henry Mutai Compliance with International Trade Obligations: The Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 2007) 36; Margaret 
Lee The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa (University of Cape Town 
Press, Cape Town, 2003) 20. 
93
 Bela Balassa (note 89) 1. 
94
 Ibid. In describing economic integration, Balassa is quick to draw a distinction between 
‘integration’ and ‘cooperation’. He indicates that ‘whereas cooperation includes actions 
aimed at lessening discrimination, the process of economic integration comprises measures 
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forms, each signifying varying levels of integration.95 These varying levels of 
integration manifest in the form of free trade areas, a customs union, a 
common market, an economic union, and complete economic integration.  
In a free trade area (FTA), countries within the economic unit 
eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers but retain different tariffs against non-
members of the economic unit. In a customs union (CU), member states of 
the economic unit eliminate tariffs between each other and maintain a 
common external tariff with non-member states. In a common market (CM), 
tariffs are eliminated, a common external tariff is maintained, and restrictions 
on the movement of the factors of production are abolished. In an economic 
union, restrictions on commodities and factors of production are eliminated, 
and members of the economic unit harmonise national economic policies, in 
order to remove discrimination that was the result of disparities in these 
policies. Finally, Balassa points out that total economic integration 
presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, and social policies, and 
requires the establishing of a supranational authority whose decisions are 
binding on the member states.96 
Market integration as a feature of economic integration has been 
justified on the grounds that the creation of trade blocs causes an allocation 
and accumulation effect within the trade bloc.97 The allocation effect is the 
result of the fact that, in a competitive economy, the demand for goods 
directs resources to the production of such goods. Conversely, the removal 
of tariff and non-tariff barriers between competitive economies is thought to 
increase efficiency in resource allocation between these competitive 
economies.98 The accumulation effect suggests that, when regional markets 
                                                                                                                                                                    
that entail the suppression of some forms of discrimination’: Bela Balassa The Theory of 
Economic Integration (note 89) 2.  
95
 Margaret Lee (note 56) 19. 
96
 Bela Balassa (note 89) 2; Steven Radelet Regional Integration and Cooperation in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Are Formal Trade Arrangements the Right Strategy? Development 
discussion paper No 592 (July 1997) 5, available on http://www.cid.harvard.edu/hiid/592.pdf 
[accessed 19 April 2009].  
97
 Richard Baldwin ‘Review of theoretical developments on regional integration’ in Ademola 
Oyejide et al (eds) Regional Integration and Trade Liberalisation in sub-Saharan Africa  vol 1 
(St Martin Press, New York, 1997) 24–88. 
98
 A subset of the allocation effect is the ‘scale and variety effects’. The scale effect suggests 
that through resource allocation in a trade bloc, the protection of inefficient industries is 
reduced, thereby allowing room for efficient industries. This lowers the average cost of 
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are expanded, firms are given the opportunity to specialise and this reduces 
average production costs.99  
The benefits of market integration can be summarised as follows: (1) it 
increases production arising from specialisation according to comparative 
advantage, (2) it increases output arising from the better exploitation of scale 
economies, (3) it improves the terms of trade of the integrating unit with the 
rest of the world, and (4) it forces changes in efficiency arising from 
increased competition within the group.100 To achieve the benefits of market 
integration, certain conditions are presumed to exist within the economic unit: 
(1) the existence of perfect competition in transport markets, (2) the free flow 
of capital and labour inside but not between countries, (3) lower transport 
costs, (4) tariffs as the only trade restrictions and balanced trade between 
countries, and (5) prices reflecting the opportunity costs of production and 
the existence of resources such as labour.101 
Market integration has been adopted in Africa both at the sub-regional 
level (by RECs) and at the continental level (by the AEC). Some RECs like 
COMESA, ECOWAS and the EAC have adopted market integration as an 
integral part of their economic integration process.102 At the level of the AU, 
the Abuja Treaty also adopts a similar approach.103 Scholars like Colin 
McCarthy have questioned the rationale behind African states adopting 
market integration on the grounds that African states do not possess the 
essential favourable conditions for trade creation and therefore economic 
                                                                                                                                                                    
production and reduces consumer prices. The variety effect suggests that exposing a 
country’s economy to a wider market gives the consumer the opportunity to access a variety 
of goods, which helps to increase welfare. It also enables firms to choose from a wider range 
of factors of production and this enables an increase in productivity. See UNCTAD 
Economic Development in Africa Report 2009 (note 61) 5.  
99
 Ibid. 
100
 Margaret Lee ‘Regionalism in Africa: a part of problem or a part of solution’ (2009) 9 
Polis/R.C.S.P/C.P.S.R 3. 
101
 Jens Haarlow Regional Cooperation and Integration within Industry and Trade in 
Southern Africa: General Approaches, SADC and the World Bank (Averbury, Aldershot 
1997) 16. 
102
 See chapters XIII and IX Revised ECOWAS Treaty 1993, chapters six and seven 
COMESA Treaty 1994 and chapter eleven EAC Treaty 2007, as amended. 
103
 Article 6 Abuja Treaty 1991. A six-stage approach to economic integration is adopted by 
the Abuja Treaty. The stages range from the creation of free trade areas to the adoption of 
an African economic and monetary union. 
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integration may not affect their pattern of trade.104 Lee has also suggested 
that market integration has failed in Africa because the basic conditions 
which are presumed to exist in order to achieve market integration do not 
exist in Africa.105 
While the adoption of market integration by African states has been 
criticised, a thorough evaluation of the entire economic integration process in 
Africa reveals that, to some extent, the objectives of the RECs and the AU go 
beyond integrating the market economies of African states. The constituent 
treaties of the RECs and the AU indicate broad objectives that include 
creating infrastructure, promoting peace and security, enabling research in 
science and technology, agriculture, cultural development, and promoting 
political and social development.106 Therefore, although the market-oriented 
approach has been the focus, efforts have been made to integrate other 
sectors. Economic integration in Africa thus promotes market integration and 
other sectors which are necessary for the overall well-being of the continent. 
The broad nature of economic integration in Africa distinguishes it from other 
integration initiatives across the world. In this regard, President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, presenting his keynote address at the National Seminar on the 
African Union, stated that: 
Regional economic cooperation and integration can also 
make it possible for us to collectively build integrative 
infrastructures in transport, communications and energy 
which would otherwise be too costly for individual, small 
and fragmented African countries to undertake. Above all, 
in the ruthlessly competitive world of globalisation and 
liberalisation, cooperation and integration offers us the 
                                                          
104
 Colin McCarthy ‘Regional integration in developing countries at different levels of 
economic development-problems and prospects’ (1994) 4 Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems 1. 
105
 Margaret Lee ‘Regionalism in Africa: a part of problem or a part of solution’ (2009) 9 
Polis/R.C.S.P/C.P.S.R  4. 
106
 Article 3 ECOWAS Treaty, article 3 AMU Treaty, article 3 COMESA Treaty, article 4 
ECCAS Treaty, article 5 EAC Treaty, article 5 SADC Treaty, article 7 IGAD Agreement and 
article 4 Abuja Treaty. 
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only chance to be relevant and speak with one voice in 
international negotiations.
107 
The above position basically summarises the objectives of the constituent 
treaties for economic integration and shows that market integration is just 
one aspect of economic integration in Africa. The objectives of the economic 
integration treaties are usually framed in a broad manner that permits a 
broader approach to economic integration. For example, article 4 of the 
Abuja Treaty lists as part of its objectives the promotion of:  
economic, social and cultural development and the 
integration of African economies in order to increase 
economic self -reliance and promote an 
endogenous and self-sustained development … [t]o 
promote co-operation in all fields of human 
endeavour in order to raise the standard of living of 
African peoples, and maintain and enhance 
economic stability, foster close and peaceful 
relations among Member States and contribute to 
the progress, development and the economic 
integration of the Continent.
108 
A more apt description of economic integration in Africa would be one 
which depicts the integration process as development-oriented. In this 
regard, development integration should be seen as an integral aspect of 
economic integration in Africa. Development integration was developed as a 
response to the challenges associated with applying pure market integration 
in developing countries.109 It works on the premise that integration 
encompasses economic and social development.110 Jens Haarlow suggests 
that development integration: 
                                                          
107
 Olusegun Obasanjo Keynote Address at the National Seminar on the African Union, 
Organised by the Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa Abuja, Nigeria, 14–15 
May 2004. 
108
 Article 4 of the Abuja Treaty can be contrasted with the article of the Treaty of Rome 
which highlights its market-oriented approach to economic integration.  
109 
Henry Mutai (note 92) 37; T Ostergaard ‘Classical models of integration–what relevance 
for southern Africa?’ in B Oden (ed) Southern Africa after Apartheid: Regional Integration 
and External Resources (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1993) 34. 
110
 Margaret Lee (note 56) 4. 
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[i]s born out of the problems and dysfunction of the 
pure market integration approach, … the market 
approach’s static character, its sole focus on how trade 
creation and trade diversion will influence welfare, and 
its tendency to widen economic differences between 
lesser and more developed areas, when market forces 
are left to function on their own. The development 
integration approach’s answer to this is to change the 
agenda in three areas: 1. the objective of the 
integration process; 2. the timing and level of interstate 
binding commitments; and 3. the distribution of cost 
and benefits of cooperation.
111 
In addressing the weakness of market integration, development integration 
focuses on boosting the productive capacity of states in addition to the 
removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers.112 Unlike market integration, which is 
largely driven by market forces, development integration requires the 
intervention of regional partners, and this promotes cooperation and 
interdependence.113  
In a bid to equitably distribute the benefits of regional integration 
between regional partners, development integration implements redistributive 
measures that are of a compensatory and corrective nature. The 
compensatory measures could include financial and tax transfer 
mechanisms, while corrective measures could include reducing tariffs at a 
slower pace, planned regional industrial development, priority loans, and 
common fiscal incentives to invest.114 At a sub-regional level in Africa, the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) have adopted some form of development integration. In addition 
to liberalising their markets, these sub-regional groups have tried to boost 
                                                          
111 
Jens Haarlow (note 101) 30. 
112 
Stephen Karingi et al ‘Implications of the COMESA Free Trade Area and proposed 
Customs Union: empirical evidence from five member countries using GTAP model and 
database’ (2002) Regional Integration Research Network Papers 40; Tom Østergaard (note 
109) 33–34. 
113
 Tom Østergaard  (note 109) 34. 
114 
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their production capacities by cooperating in a number of areas. At the 
regional level, the AU has, in addition to the Abuja Treaty, adopted the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) document.115 However, as 
good as the development model of integration sounds, scholars have 
suggested that development integration is a difficult model to implement. The 
difficulty arises from the fact that a greater amount of commitment is needed 
from regional partners in order to implement the socio-economic policies 
required to boost productive capacities in member states.116 In other words, 
more commitment and positive effort is required from states in order to fully 
implement development integration. 
 To put this varied approach to economic integration into proper 
perspective, examples from the AU and SADC are illustrative. In the AU, in 
addition to the Abuja Treaty, which sets out the framework for market 
integration, member states have also adopted the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Policy Document. The NEPAD document 
seeks to address issues that hamper Africa’s production and development 
capacity and at the same time inhibit Africa’s access to global markets.117 
NEPAD enunciates in general terms the principles of governance and state-
building and also identifies structural economic issues for which it prescribes 
specific curative measures.118 In SADC, member states have adopted a 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). The RISDP maps 
out strategies for attaining development in the SADC region through strategic 
intervention in areas such as human and social development, infrastructure, 
                                                          
115
 See NEPAD Policy Document 2001, available at 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/au.nepad/nepad.pdf [accessed 10 February 2011]. Scholars like 
Akokpari argue that the NEPAD document puts capital and international markets at the 
centre of economic redevelopment. Though this position is to some extent valid, a careful 
reading of the NEPAD document shows that African states first commit to improving the 
socio-economic conditions which are necessary for development. African leaders argue that, 
if these socio-economic conditions are improved, Africa will be well placed to benefit from 
international capital. So what still lies at the heart for the quest to integration and 
development is the commitment by African leaders to ensure basic socio-economic 
conditions are met in order to enhance market access. See John Akokpari ‘Dilemmas of 
regional integration and development in Africa’ (note 3) 93–95. 
116 
Jens Haarlow (note 101) 35. 
117 
See chapter 4 for a discussion of NEPAD. 
118 
Maxwell Chibundu ‘NEPAD and the rebirth of development theory and praxis’ in Jeremy 
Levitt (ed) Africa: Mapping New Boundaries in International Law (Hart Publishing, Oregon , 
2008) 261. 
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gender equality and science.119 The direct application of neo-classical 
economic integration theory to African integration has been challenged by 
Guy Martin on the basis that the theory assumes that in each national 
economy there is full employment, perfect competition, and perfect internal 
mobility of the factors of production.120 These assumptions are not always 
true of African economies and therefore adopting a neo-classical economic 
integration approach without any variations may be counter-productive. In 
line with this argument, Bingu Mutharika has suggested that it is ‘unrealistic 
to apply the term economic integration in the same sense as used in the 
developed countries’.121  
 The structure and pattern of economic integration in Africa has been 
designed in such a way that it reflects the peculiarities of the African 
continent and also accounts for the absence of the basic assumptions of the 
neo-classical theory. The justification for adopting a development and broad-
based approach to integration lies in the fact that the basic conditions, such 
as the existence of perfect competition in transport markets, which are 
necessary in order to maximise the benefits of a market-oriented approach 
do not necessarily exist in Africa. Therefore, it is important to adopt a model 
which enhances the creation of these structures.122 
 In explaining the versatile nature of African integration, James Gathii 
describes African RTAs ‘as forums of integrated development and 
functionally specific projects’.123 This description aptly and concisely depicts 
the true nature of African integration treaties. Thus African integration 
treaties tend to address several core issues, such as infrastructural 
                                                          
119
 See Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan 55–73.  
120
 Guy Martin ‘Regional integration in West Africa: the role of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS)’ in E Hansen (ed) Africa: Perspectives on Peace and 
Development (Zed Books, London 1987) at 172.    
121
 B Mutharika Towards Multinational Economic Cooperation in Africa (Praeger Publishers, 
New York, 1972) 15. 
122
 Other conditions which need to exist in order to maximise the benefit of market 
integration include the free flow of capital and labour inside but not between countries,  lower 
transport costs, tariffs as the only trade restrictions and balanced trade between countries, 
prices reflecting the opportunity costs of production and the existence of resources such as 
labour. See Margaret Lee (note 56) 1 at 4; Jens Haarlow (note 101) 16; Guy Martin (note 88) 
172.   
123
 J Gathii African Regional Trade Agreements as Legal Regimes (Cambridge University 
Press, New York 2011) 19–24. 
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development, peace and security, good governance and human rights, the 
presence of which is essential to the creation of effective trade regimes. In 
West Africa, the creation of the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and 
Development (EBID) is another example of how RECs facilitate 
infrastructural development. EBID supports private and public sector 
development.124 As at December 2010, EBID had, since its commencement 
in 2004, financed 107 projects in 14 West African states.125 Sixty-six per cent 
of these projects were in the infrastructure sub-sector and they were 
implemented in rural communities.126 The significance of the work of EBID is 
that it helps to foster some of the basic conditions necessary for achieving 
economic integration.  
Economic integration in Africa may therefore be viewed as a means of 
coordinating and integrating markets and other non-market related sectors 
which are necessary for the overall well-being of the continent. This broad 
nature of economic integration in Africa distinguishes it from other integration 
initiatives across the world. 
1.7 Organisation of thesis 
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 highlights the problems with 
economic integration in Africa. It states that the low level of compliance with 
the objectives of the integration treaties is the bane of economic integration 
in Africa. The chapter poses the research question which the thesis seeks to 
answer. An analysis of the meaning of compliance is also carried out. Finally, 
the chapter sets out the context in which African economic integration is 
presently occurring, noting  that, while economic integration in Africa is to 
some extent similar to economic integration in the EU, the context in which it 
                                                          
124
 ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) EBID in Brief 3, available at 
http://www.ecowas.int/spot/en/china/ebid_in_brief.pdf  [accessed 27 May 2012]. 
125
 James Gbeho ‘Driving a People-centred Regional Integration’ Press Conference to Mark 
the 36
th
 Anniversary of the Founding of ECOWAS 27 May 2007 (ECOWAS Commission, 
Abuja) 8. 
126
 Ibid. Some of the projects that have been partly funded by the EBID are the Daoukro and 
Ouéllé-Ettrokro Local Agricultural Development Project (Cote d’Ivoire); the Akatsi-Aflao 
Road Project (Ghana); the Dakar Port Expansion Project (Senegal); the Benin Electricity 
Community / Transmission Company of Nigeria, and Electric Power Interconnection Project 
(Togo, Benin, Nigeria). See EBID EBID Audit Report 2004–2009; EBID The Project Portfolio 
of EBID as at 31/12/2010. 
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operates and its structure are significantly different. This difference in context 
and structure changes the dynamics of economic integration in Africa. 
Therefore, a direct comparison with the EU when seeking ways to resolve 
issues of compliance might not be completely beneficial.  
 Chapter 2 draws on the works of international law scholars to set a 
theoretical framework within which compliance with African integration 
treaties is examined in the thesis. The chapter works from the premise that, 
since economic integration in Africa is regulated by treaties, it is possible to 
find ways of improving the compliance rate of African states by examining 
methods for compliance which have been used in public international law. 
While drawing on several theories of compliance in international law, the 
chapter largely relies on the managerial approach to securing compliance 
with treaty obligations.127 In this regard, it focuses on factors that influence 
compliance and non-compliance. It posits that three main factors, namely, 
ambiguity in the texts of economic integration treaties, a lack of technical and 
institutional capacity on the part of African states, and the timelines laid down 
for achieving integration all impact negatively on the rate of compliance with 
treaty obligations.  
In resolving the factors that affect compliance, the chapter 2 suggests 
that, rather than relying solely on the use of enforcement mechanisms 
through supranational institutions, it is also important to advocate for 
methods that enable African states to entrench the norms of integration into 
their national legal systems. The chapter suggests that, through an iterative 
process of increased transparency and information sharing between African 
states, it is possible to achieve compliance. Furthermore, the participation of 
state and non-state actors is vital to the process of imbuing the norms of 
integration at the regional and national level. The discussion in chapter 2 lays 
down the theoretical foundation of the entire thesis. 
 In chapter 3, the role of the African Union (AU) in coordinating and 
facilitating economic integration in Africa is discussed. The chapter begins 
with the history of the process of integration in Africa to depict the efforts that 
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have been made by African states to achieve economic integration. Chapter 
3 also draws on the managerial approach examining the role of the AU 
institutions in securing compliance with the integration treaties. The chapter 
argues that compliance could be increased if the AU institutions resolved the 
existing ambiguities in the relationship between the AU, the African 
Economic Community (AEC) and the Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs). Resolving these ambiguities is necessary to clearly identify the role 
of each of these institutions in the process of integration. It would also enable 
the institutions set out their areas of competence in order to avoid conflicting 
objectives and obligations. Finally, the chapter suggests that if all these 
issues are resolved, the institutions of the AU will be better placed to monitor 
compliance with integration objectives. 
Chapter 4 focuses on initiatives of the AU, such as the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM), to shed light on how compliance with integration 
treaties can be monitored in the absence of strong supranational institutions. 
The chapter argues that although NEPAD and the APRM do not possess 
supranational qualities, they facilitate the process of compliance by 
identifying the areas where member states fail to comply with their 
obligations and helping to collectively boost compliance in those areas. 
These new initiatives represent a new direction in Africa’s institutional drive 
towards monitoring compliance with the norms of economic integration. The 
chapter suggests that, if these initiatives are effectively used, the absence of 
strong supranational institutions in the continent will not foreclose compliance 
with the norms of economic integration. 
 Chapter 5 explores methods that could be used by African states to 
internalise the norms of economic integration in their national domain. The 
idea in this chapter is that the goal of achieving economic integration in the 
continent will not be achieved if states fail to give effect to the norms of 
integration at the national level. However, giving effect to the norms at the 
national level is a complex process which is affected by many factors. In 
order to ensure that the norms created at the continental level are accepted 
at the national level, states have to put in place a participatory framework 
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which ensures that all stakeholders participate in the integration process. 
The chapter suggests the creation of national focal points in each member 
state to ensure that adequate links are created between government 
departments, parliament, citizens, trade unions and other stakeholders, who 
are essential to the implementation of the norms of integration or whose 
interests would be affected by the integration process. Furthermore, the 
chapter suggests that proper links need to be created between regional 
courts and national courts to ensure that the norms of integration are 
internalised and given effect to at the national level.  
 Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by reviewing the entire discussion in 
the thesis and making the connections between the chapters. The primary 
argument discussed in this chapter is that a new direction is needed in the 
discussion on compliance with African integration treaties. The chapter 
suggests that legal scholarship in the area of economic integration in Africa 
needs to focus its attention on how and why African states respond to the 
norms of economic integration. To achieve this goal, an in-depth 
understanding of the factors that impact on compliance is necessary. 
1.8 Conclusion 
Economic integration in Africa is being undertaken to facilitate development 
at the regional and sub-regional levels. In order to accommodate the 
disparity in the levels of development in the 54 African states, economic 
integration treaties have been crafted in such a way that they are broad 
enough to address the development needs of all African states. The broad 
nature of these integration treaties, coupled with the large number of African 
states engaged in the integration process, makes compliance with the 
integration treaties complex. Therefore, any strategy which seeks to facilitate 
compliance with African integration treaties should take all these factors into 
account.   
In engaging with the strategies for facilitating compliance with African 
integration treaties, this thesis takes into consideration the various legal and 
non-legal factors that impair the ability of African states to comply with their 
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integration obligations. The reason for this approach is that the norms that 
govern the integration process do not exist in the abstract. If these norms are 
to make an impact on the behaviour of African states, they must be applied 
in a way that takes cognisance of the peculiar nature of each challenge. 
Mechanisms that address issues of non-conformity that do not arise from a 
flagrant disregard for the norms of integration should be put in place.128 
While there is no specific method that can be adopted to resolve all the 
problems surrounding compliance, the impact of the causes of non-
compliance can be mitigated if the process is managed properly.
                                                          
128
 Also, in instances where non-conformity arises in development issues, coercion as a 
means of securing compliance may be ineffective because a state cannot be coerced to 
develop capacity it simply does not have. See Claire Kelly ‘Enmeshment as a theory of 
compliance’ (2005) 37 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 303–
356 at 303. 
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Chapter 2: Rethinking strategies for securing 
compliance with African economic integration 
treaties 
2.0 Introduction 
As stated in chapter 1, the focus of this thesis is not to gauge the extent to 
which African states comply with integration treaties; rather, the intention is 
to examine factors that impact on the ability of African states to comply and 
to suggest methods or areas that should be emphasised in order to secure 
compliance. This chapter therefore examines the factors that generally 
influence compliance and non-compliance with treaty obligations, and 
situates them within the context of African integration treaties.  
Non-compliance with treaty obligations is not unique to African 
integration treaties; it occurs in international law in general. Non-compliance 
with integration treaties may never be completely resolved, but could be 
mitigated so that it does not constitute a major threat to the success of 
economic integration.1 Generally, there is an assumption that when states 
become parties to a treaty, they intend to comply with the treaty norms and 
often comply.2 Nonetheless, the reality is that there are always instances of 
non-compliance. Harold Jacobson suggests that:  
It is obvious from what we know that the behaviour of some 
nations is closer to the international norms they have 
accepted than that of the others, that nations follow some 
norms more than they follow other norms, and that nations’ 
behaviour with respect to international norms changes over 
time. Calibrating these variations is an essential step toward 
                                                          
1
 Peter van den Bossche ‘In search of remedies for non-compliance: the experience of the 
European Community’ (1996) 3 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 372. 
2
 Louis Henkin How Nations Behave 2 ed (Columbia University Press, New York, 1979) 47. 
Ljiljana Biukovic ‘Compliance with international treaties: selective adaptation analysis’ (2006) 
The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 451.  
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
38 | P a g e  
 
understanding better the causal mechanisms that produce 
them.3 
Three vital points can be deduced from the above statement: (1) within a 
treaty regime, states might comply with some norms and yet fail to comply 
with others; (2) a state’s attitude towards compliance with treaty norms may 
shift over time; and (3) in order to ensure a certain level of uniform 
compliance, it is necessary to investigate the factors that induce the non-
compliant behaviour.  
This chapter seeks to address these points. To achieve this goal, the 
managerial approach to treaty compliance is adopted and used in the entire 
thesis as the benchmark for the analysis of African integration treaties. 
However, two other international law theories on treaty compliance are 
discussed to justify the decision to adopt the managerial approach to treaty 
compliance.  
The managerial approach to securing treaty compliance, as 
developed by Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, is based on the 
assumption that, as a general rule, states wish to comply with the 
international agreements they sign and, in instances of non-compliance, 
management rather than enforcement is a better approach to adopt to 
secure compliance.4 The managerial approach to treaty compliance has 
three phases.5 The first phase is that states generally have the propensity to 
comply with their treaty obligations. This propensity to comply is fostered by 
efficiency, national interest and regime norms. Secondly, when non-
compliance occurs, it often results from the ambiguity and indeterminacy of 
the treaty language, the limited capacity of states to give effect to their 
obligations, and the time limits within which they must perform their treaty 
obligations. Thirdly, in the event that non-compliance occurs, enforcement 
                                                          
3
 HK Jacobson ‘Afterward: conceptual, methodological and substantive issues entwined in 
studying compliance’ (1998) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 569 at 572. 
4
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes The New Sovereignty: Compliance with 
International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1995) 4; Abram 
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes ‘On compliance’ (1993) 47 International Organisation 
175. Henkin had previously argued that ‘almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all the time.’ See Louis Henkin 
(note 2) 47. 
5
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes The New Sovereignty (note 4) 1–28. 
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through the use of sanctions will not yield the best results in aligning the 
actual behaviour of states with the prescribed behaviour under the treaty. 
Instead, an iterative process that combines the use of transparency, dispute 
settlement, capacity-building and persuasion is appropriate to secure 
compliance.  
The managerial approach to securing compliance with treaty 
obligations is adopted in this thesis because it gives a satisfactory account of 
how to ensure better compliance with treaties designed to resolve 
coordination problems (such as integration treaties).6 African integration 
treaties have broad objectives, cover a plethora of areas, and involve a large 
number of states. In order to ensure that all states to a large extent align their 
practice with the stated objectives of the integration treaties, it is important to 
adopt a framework that ensures that the obligations of the states are clearly 
stated, that their capacity to meet the obligations is enhanced, and that 
states are given enough time to align their practices with the stated 
objectives. Furthermore, the managerial approach is also useful in the 
context of African integration because it does not place too much reliance on 
the use of sanctions or coercive measures. This approach is important in 
Africa, because the institutional framework for integration in Africa is not 
modelled on the presence of strong supranational institutions that can assert 
coercive authority in the integration process. 
2.1 Factors that induce compliance  
The managerial approach suggests that, since government leaders and 
ministers devote so much time to negotiating and drafting treaties, it is 
inconceivable that they put in so much effort ‘except on the assumption that 
entering into a treaty commitment ought to and does limit their own freedom 
of action, and in the expectation that the other parties to the agreement will 
feel similarly constrained’.7 Therefore, the logical inference that can be drawn 
from the efforts made to create treaties is that states, as a general rule, 
                                                          
6
 Andrew Guzman ‘A compliance-based theory of international law’ (2002) 90(6) California 
Law Review 1831. 
7
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes The New Sovereignty (note 4) 3. 
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acknowledge that there is an obligation to comply with the provisions of the 
treaty.8 The managerial approach identifies three factors that lend credence 
to the inherent propensity of states to comply with their treaty obligations: 
efficiency, national interest, and regime norms.9  
2.1.1 Efficiency  
Efficiency as a factor for enhancing compliance is based on the fact that 
compliance saves transactions costs. In the absence of convincing evidence 
that circumstances have changed since the original decision to enter into the 
treaty was made, states try to comply with their treaty obligations in order to 
avoid the continuous recalculation of costs and benefits of non-compliance.10 
This is because deploying governments’ resources for policy analysis is 
expensive, and usually the resources are not readily available. It is therefore 
cheaper to comply so as to avoid the cost of non-compliance. The efficiency 
factor is influenced by standard economic analyses and assumes that states 
are rational actors that take into account the cost of their actions.11  
 In other words, in the absence of factors that justify non-compliance, 
African states will most likely comply with their integration obligations since 
non-compliance will result in the continued existence of the economic and 
development challenges which they seek to resolve through the use of 
integration treaties. This point of view assumes that when African leaders 
collectively meet, either at AU level or RECs level, to discuss strategies for 
overcoming the continent’s economic and development challenges, there is 
an inherent understanding that it will be economically beneficial for states to 
adhere to the collective agreements in order not to defeat the purpose for 
which the agreements were concluded. In this regard, the preambles of all 
the integration treaties usually re-emphasise previous collective efforts that 
have been made to achieve integration.12 
                                                          
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Ibid.  
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Henry Mutai Compliance with International Trade Obligations: The Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands, 
2007) 12. 
12
 See Preamble of the Treaty  Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja 
Treaty), signed 3 June 1991, 30 ILM 1241 (1991); Constitutive Act of the African Union 
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2.1.2 Interest 
Interest plays a decisive role in enhancing a state’s propensity to comply with 
its treaty obligations.13 States enter into treaties consensually. This raises an 
assumption that the process by which the treaty was formulated took into 
account the interest of the state parties.14 The treaty-making process usually 
involves a series of negotiations between the states during which each state 
tries to ensure that its interest is protected in the treaty. Consequently, 
consenting to the treaty serves to indicate that the interest of the state has 
been protected.15 The managerial approach admits that there may be 
instances where the negotiation process results in a treaty falling short of a 
state’s expectations. In situations of this nature, compliance problems are 
likely to be manageable if the treaty is designed so that it takes into practical 
consideration the ‘probable patterns of conduct and interaction’ of the 
states.16 Furthermore, where issues of non-compliance are endemic, rather 
than as a result of deliberate defiance on the part of a state, it is most likely 
that the process of negotiating the treaty did not succeed in incorporating a 
broad range of states’ interests.17  
In applying the interest principle to economic integration at the 
regional level, one challenge is the design of the Abuja Treaty, which failed 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(Constitutive Act); Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA Treaty), 5 November 1993, 33 ILM 1067; Revised Treaty Establishing the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS Treaty), 24 July 1993, 35 ILM 660; 
Treaty Establishing the East African Community (EAC Treaty), adopted 30 November 1999, 
entered into force 7 July 2000, 2144 UNTS 255; Treaty Establishing the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC Treaty), adopted and entered into force 17 August 1992, 
amended 14 August 2001; and Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS Treaty), 19 October 1983, 23 ILM 945 (1984). 
13
 Rational choice theorists suggest that states generally engage in international law to 
protect their interests. See Duncan Snidal ‘Coordination versus prisoners’ dilemma: 
implications for international and regimes’ (1985) 79 American Political Science Review 
923–942; Duncan Snidal ‘The game theory of international politics’ (1985) 38(1) World 
Politics 25–57; Kenneth Abbott ‘Modern international relations theory: a prospectus for 
international lawyers’ (1989) 14 Yale Journal of International Law 335–411; John Setear ‘An 
iterative perspective on treaties: a synthesis of international relations theory and 
international law’ (1996) 37 Harvard International Law Journal 139–230. 
14
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes The New Sovereignty (note 4) 4. 
15
 Richard Bilder ‘Beyond compliance: helping nations cooperate’ in Dinah Shelton (ed) 
Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal 
System (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000) 69. Oran Young International 
Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society (Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, New York, 1994) 24, 38–46, 81. 
16
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes The New Sovereignty (note 4) 7. 
17
 Ibid. 
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to provide a platform for RECs to properly negotiate their interests. As will be 
discussed in detail in chapter 3, the RECs were not part of the negotiation 
process or the drafting process of the Abuja Treaty, yet the Abuja Treaty 
hinges the entire process of regional integration on the RECs.18 Not all the 
RECs had trade liberalisation as their primary goal, as provided for in the 
Abuja Treaty. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), for 
example, was created to combat drought, while the Community of Sahel-
Saharan States (CENSAD) was more concerned with developing capacity in 
the agricultural sector. This variation in core areas of interests definitely plays 
a role in how well each REC complies with the obligations created in the 
Abuja Treaty. Although the RECs cannot be classified as states, their 
participation in the integration process is germane to African integration 
because the overall goal is to harmonise the activities of the RECs to create 
the African Economic Community (AEC). Therefore, it would have been ideal 
for the various RECs to participate in the treaty negotiation process in order 
to create a well-designed treaty which accounts for the interests of all the 
parties.19  
2.1.3 Norms 
The managerial approach suggests that the last factor that enhances the 
propensity of states to comply with their treaty obligations is the ‘norm 
consideration’. Norms as used in the context of the managerial approach 
refers to principles, rules, directives, standards and any other prescriptive 
statements.20 Norms are deemed to generate compliance based on the 
                                                          
18
 Article 88 Abuja Treaty. 
19
 Two Protocols were subsequently adopted to incorporate the RECs into the plan of the 
Abuja Treaty but the Protocols covered only the responsibilities of the RECs towards the 
development of the AEC. The first Protocol adopted was the 1998 Protocol on Relations 
between the African Economic Community and the Regional Economic Communities 
(reprinted in (1998) 10 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 157.  
The 1998 Protocol has been replaced by the 2007 Relations between the African Union and 
the Regional Economic Communities (available at 
http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/AU-RECs-Protocol.pdf [accessed 24 January 
2012]). See chapter 3 for a discussion of the relationship between the RECs, the African 
Economic Community and the African Union.  
20
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes The New Sovereignty (note 4) 113. Friedrich 
Kratochwil also uses norms and rules interchangeably but distinguishes between different 
forms of norms. See Friedrich Kratochwil Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of 
Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 1989) 10, 69–129. See also Edna Ullmann-Margalit The 
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legally binding nature of treaties and the fundamental principle of ‘pacta sunt 
servanda – treaties are to be obeyed’.21 Once treaties are ratified by states 
they become legally binding and states have an obligation to obey the law.22 
In the absence of strong countervailing conditions, the legal obligation to 
obey usually ‘translates into a presumption of compliance’.23 For the norm to 
induce compliance there has to be intersubjectivity among states as to the 
meaning of the norm.24 Ota Weinberger suggests that ‘[t]he practical efficacy 
of a norm…is usually bound up with the intersubjective communication of 
norms. Such communication is a process in which as a rule several different 
people take part and which is carried on by means of linguistic utterances, 
the goal being that the recipients of the message understand the norm’.25 If 
parties fail to understand the norm, compliance may be unlikely. This is 
because there would be a divergence of opinion as to the meaning of the 
norm.26 
For the norm to be clearly understood by states, it needs to be 
elaborated in order to identify behaviour which is either consistent or 
inconsistent with the norms. Once an acceptable level of behaviour is 
determined, there is an inherent understanding that the obligations are 
binding. Therefore, in instances where a state’s behaviour is inconsistent 
with the acceptable behaviour, the state tries to justify its action either by 
arguing that the conduct in question does not fall within the ambits of the 
norm, or that the norm had not been properly interpreted.27 This justificatory 
process that the non-compliant state embarks upon to defend its action 
indicates that the state is aware of its inherent obligation to comply.   
                                                                                                                                                                    
Emergence of Norms (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977); HLA Hart The Concept of 
Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961) 2–3; Ronald Dworkin ‘The model of rules’ (1967) 35 
University of Chicago Law Review 45; John Raz ‘Legal principles and limits of law’ (1972) 
81(5) Yale Law Journal 823–854. 
21
 Article 26 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 1969, 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331. Every treaty in force is binding upon states and 
states must perform in good faith.  
22
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes The New Sovereignty (note 4) 8. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid 113.  
25
 Ota Weinberger,’ The norm as thought and as reality’ in Neil MacCormick and Ota 
Weinberger (eds) An Institutional Theory of Law: New Approaches to Legal Positivism (D. 
Reidel Publishing Company, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1986) 34.    
26
 See section 2.2.1 on the discussion on ambiguity.  
27
 Ibid 119. 
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The obligation to obey the norms created in African integration treaties 
is expressly provided for in almost all the African integration treaties. In 
article 5 of the Abuja Treaty member states undertake to refrain from 
unilateral acts that will impede the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty 
and they also undertake to take appropriate measures within their national 
territories to give effect to the Treaty. Article 5 of the COMESA and 
ECOWAS Treaties, article 8 of the EAC Treaty and article 6 of the SADC 
Treaty all have similar provisions that place an obligation on member states 
to give effect to the objectives of the treaties. This is a positive indication that 
member states do recognise that the norms created within these treaties are 
meant to be adhered to. In the absence of any reason that warrants a 
deviation from these objectives, it is likely that states will comply with these 
obligations because of the inherent normative content that is generated by 
the treaties.  
 This sense of obligation and inherent commitment to treaty norms 
may be adduced as the reasons why states usually do not blithely ignore 
treaty norms and, when they do, they often try to justify their actions. This 
indicates that states do not want to be viewed negatively by other parties to a 
treaty. The unwillingness of states to be classified as violators of treaty 
norms is exemplified by the Republic of Zimbabwe’s conduct when it failed to 
comply with the SADC Tribunal’s decision in the Mike Campbell case.28 
Zimbabwe’s Government made frantic efforts to argue that the SADC 
Tribunal’s decision was incorrect, and that the Zimbabwean government had 
not violated the norms of the SADC Treaty. This to a large extent signals that 
even when states violate a treaty norm, they rarely openly admit to such 
violation because of the inherent understanding that treaty norms are meant 
to be complied with.  
It is a notorious fact that states do not always comply with their treaty 
obligations. This means that efficiency, interest and norms may not always 
severally or collectively induce compliance. However, these factors need to 
be identified to allow for a better understanding of the real problems of non-
                                                          
28
 Mike Campbell & Another v Zimbabwe SADC (T) Case No 2/2007. 
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compliance and how they can be resolved.29 To a large extent, an 
understanding of these factors that induce compliance also helps to reverse 
an implicit belief that states ignore their treaty obligations when it becomes 
inconvenient to uphold them.  
Now that the factors that induce compliance have been identified, the 
various factors that warrant non-compliance are discussed in the next 
section.  
 2.2 Factors that warrant non-compliance  
The managerial approach contends that non-compliance with treaty 
obligations rarely stems from the deliberate and flagrant violation of treaty 
obligations; instead, instances of such deliberate violations are exceptions 
rather than the general rule.30 In explaining the prevalence of non-
compliance, Chayes and Chayes identify three factors which they regard as 
the root causes of non-compliance: the ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty 
language; limitations on the capacity of states to carry out their obligations; 
and the temporal dimension of the social, economic and political changes 
contemplated by treaties.31  
2.2.1 Ambiguity in treaty language 
The degree of specificity of any legal language usually varies,32 and this also 
applies to the language used in drafting a treaty.33 Sometimes, the lack of 
specificity or ambiguity in the text of a treaty may be a deliberate act of the 
treaty drafters.34 In instances where the ambiguity is deliberate, ‘ambiguity is 
often based on the premise that vagueness is required to bring treaties to 
                                                          
29
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes The New Sovereignty (note 4) 4. 
30
 Ibid 9–10. 
31
 Ibid 10. 
32
 Ronald Dworkin (note 20) 14–16. 
33
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes ‘On compliance’ (note 4) 175 at 189.  
34
 This is often referred to as ‘constructive ambiguity’ and is attributed to Henry Kissinger. 
Constructive ambiguity is defined as ‘the deliberate use of ambiguous language on a 
sensitive issue in order to advance some political purpose.’ See David Mitchell ‘Cooking the 
fudge: constructive ambiguity and the implementation of the Northern Ireland Agreement, 
1998-2007’ (2009) 24(3) Irish Political Studies 322; Anthony D’Amato ‘Purposeful ambiguity 
as an international legal strategy: the two China problem’ in Jerzy Makarczyk (ed) Theory of 
International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, Netherlands, 1996) 109–121.  
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closure and that the resulting ambiguity can be clarified at some time in the 
future’.35 Other than instances of deliberate ambiguity, treaty drafters are 
usually unable to foresee all the possible contextual situations in which the 
treaty would be applied in the governance of the future conduct of states.36 
This invariably creates ambiguity in the text of the treaty and thus makes it 
difficult to ascertain precisely what conduct is permissible or prohibited.37  
Since treaty drafters cannot possibly foresee all the circumstances 
that may arise in the future, the treaty obligations are couched in broad terms 
to accommodate a variety of interpretations. While this might be good for the 
purpose of being able to cover the interests of all the parties involved, it may 
also be detrimental during the implementation of the treaty.38 During 
implementation each party may interpret the treaty in a manner that is 
consistent with its interest. This may create a situation where the meaning of 
a particular provision becomes amorphous. The broader the language used 
in a treaty, the wider the scope of permissible interpretations to which it may 
give rise.39 Inevitably, ambiguity may affect the rate of compliance with the 
treaty norms because states may adopt differing positions as to the specific 
meaning of a particular treaty norm.  
 In discussing the effect of indeterminacy or ambiguity in the language 
of a treaty, Thomas Franck suggests that ‘indeterminacy ... makes it easier to 
justify non-compliance’.40 This makes the treaty flexible and open to being 
manipulated to mean something far from what it was originally intended to 
mean.41 In domestic legal systems, such interpretation dilemmas are easily 
addressed through the use of judicial interpretation.42 In the international 
arena, more particularly in Africa, this is not always the case as formal 
adjudication is not as prominent as it is in the domestic arena. Unlike the 
                                                          
35
 Itay Fischhendler ‘When ambiguity in treaty design becomes destructive: a study of 
transboundary water’ (2008) 8 (1) Global Environmental Politics 111–136 at 111. 
36
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes The New Sovereignty (note 4) 10. 
37
 Ibid. See chapter 3 for a discussion of ambiguity in the decisions of the African Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government and the ambiguity in the relationship between the African 
Union, the African Economic Community and the Regional Economic Communities.  
38
 Itay Fischhendler (note 33) 112.  
39
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes The New Sovereignty (note 4) 11. 
40
 Thomas Franck The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1990) 54. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes The New Sovereignty (note 4) 11. 
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domestic legal system, which has efficient mechanisms to ensure that parties 
adhere to judicial interpretations, the international legal system often lacks 
such mechanisms. Situations of this nature may lead to a standstill in the 
treaty regime.  
Although a plethora of international tribunals exist, most inter-state 
disputes between African states are settled through diplomatic means.43 On 
one occasion when a disputed obligation was submitted to an international 
tribunal, the Republic of Zimbabwe contested the SADC Tribunal’s 
interpretation of article 6 of the SADC Treaty and the validity of the Protocol 
on the SADC Tribunal in the Mike Campbell case.44 Zimbabwe argued that 
the SADC Tribunal could not invalidate Zimbabwe’s agrarian reform policy 
made pursuant to the Constitution of the Zimbabwe on the basis of its 
incompatibility with the SADC Treaty because SADC did not have Protocols 
on human rights or agrarian reforms.45 Zimbabwe’s arguments clearly 
stemmed from issues of interpretation of the relevant provisions of the SADC 
Treaty and the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal. In line with this reasoning, 
Solomon Ebobrah takes the view that the challenge to the legality, 
competence and legitimacy of the SADC Tribunal was warranted by certain 
ambiguities in the SADC Treaty and the Protocol on the Tribunal.46 However, 
while these ambiguities are not fatal, an amendment of the treaties is 
necessary to avoid future challenges to the existence of the SADC Tribunal.  
Although the SADC Tribunal might have rightly or wrongly held that 
Zimbabwe’s act was in breach of its obligations under the SADC Treaty and 
that the Tribunal could exercise its jurisdiction over the dispute,47 the 
                                                          
43
 Tiyanjana Maluwa ‘The peaceful settlement of disputes among African States, 1963–
1983: some conceptual issues and practical trends’ (1989) 38 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 299–320. 
44
 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v The Republic of Zimbabwe (note 26).  
45
 Supra 23. 
46
 Solomon Ebobrah ‘Tackling threats to the existence of the SADC Tribunal: a critique of 
perilously ambiguous provisions in the SADC Treaty and the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal’ 
(2010) 4 (2) Malawi Law Journal 199–213. 
47
 For discussions of the Campbell decision, see Precious Ndlovu ‘Campbell v Republic of 
Zimbabwe: A moment of truth for the SADC Tribunal’ (2011) 1 SADC Law Journal 63–79; 
Derek Matyszak The dissolution of the SADC Tribunal available at 
http://www.idasa.org/media/uploads/outputs/files/the_suspension_sadc_tribunal_final.pdf 
[accessed 25 January 2011]. Prof Ben Chigara argues in a succinctly articulated treatise that 
the SADC Tribunal failed to espouse a profound jurisprudence which takes into account the 
application of the prohibition on discrimination against communities in transition. He 
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subsequent suspension of the Tribunal, pending a review of its jurisdiction, 
by the SADC Summit of Heads of State seems to suggest that they 
concurred with Zimbabwe’s position on the limits of the norms created under 
the SADC Treaty. Critics might argue that the decision of the Summit of 
Heads of State was unlawful and violated the SADC Treaty.48 However, the 
inherent issue raised here transcends the lawfulness of the act of the Summit 
of Heads of State. It raises a fundamental question as to what the member 
states actually contemplated when the SADC Treaty was drafted and the 
failure to clearly express or limit those intentions in the text of the SADC 
Treaty. These issues would not arise if the wording of the SADC Treaty was 
clear and precise on the human rights jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal. 
The ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language may also go 
beyond issues of interpretation of treaty obligations. Sometimes ambiguity or 
lack of clarity results in the creation of unenforceable norms.49 Where a 
treaty is drafted to include unenforceable norms the ability to regulate the 
conduct of states or even secure compliance is weakened. Baxter notes that 
a treaty ‘may contain both provisions creating precise legal obligations and 
norms of such a vague and general character that it is clear that they were 
not intended to be enforced’.50 He identifies some treaty norms that may not 
be enforceable in the event of non-compliance, for example, norms in 
political treaties in terms of which states agree to coordinate military action, 
hortatory treaties that merely call for cooperation between states, and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
questioned the reasonableness of the Tribunal’s resort to legal transplants from 
‘incongruous courts’ when there was extensive jurisprudence from countries that had faced 
similar transitional challenges. See Ben Chigara ‘What should a re-constituted Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal be mindful of to succeed?’ (2012) 81 
Nordic Journal of International Law 341–377. See also Ben Chigara ‘The Humwe principle: a 
social re-ordering grundnorm for Zimbabwe and Africa’ in Robert Home (ed) Essays in 
African Land Law (Pretoria University Press, Pretoria, 2011) 113–133.  
48
 Southern Africa Litigation Centre et al Implications of the Decision to Review the Role, 
Functions and Terms of Reference of the SADC Tribunal, available at 
http://www.cfuzim.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1069:legal-opinion-
on-implications-on-decision-on-sadc-tribunal&catid=44:legal-cases&Itemid=91 [accessed 31 
December 2012]. 
49
 Unenforceable norms are legal norms that occupy a place in international law, even 
though they do not create rights or duties. See R Baxter ‘International law in her “infinite 
variety”’ (1980) 29 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 549. On the concept of hard 
and soft law, see Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal ‘Hard and soft law in international 
governance’ (2000) 54 International Organization 421–456.  
50
 R Baxter (note 47) 550–553.  
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treaties that call for further action (for example, a treaty calling for the future 
establishment of a common market or a free trade area).  
If we look closely at the integration treaties in Africa it becomes 
evident that they all contain elements of unenforceable norms. This is largely 
because they cover such broad areas of endeavour that it may be 
impracticable to draw up concrete legal norms in each area. A few examples 
are in the area of integration of the non-trade sectors, such as agriculture, 
fishery, livestock and forestry. While member states agree to jointly 
cooperate to develop capacity and harmonise policies in these sectors, it is 
difficult to identify the core legal norms. In these areas integration may be 
achieved only through cooperation and not the through the development of 
core legal norms. However, any cooperation in these fields of endeavour 
would be fulfilling part of the overall objectives of the integration treaty. 
Furthermore, it is doubtful that it can be argued that the failure to adhere to 
the timelines usually given for the completion of the various stages of 
integration will amount to the breach of an enforceable norm.  
Another aspect where ambiguity is evident in African integration 
treaties is the manner in which the norms created by the treaties are 
incorporated into the legal system of member states. These treaties mandate 
states to take the necessary steps required by their national constitutions to 
give effect to the provisions of the treaties. Despite this straightforward 
position, ambiguity exists if one examines the ‘necessary steps’ required to 
domesticate the integration norms. For example, article 5 (2) of the COMESA 
Treaty requires member states to ‘take steps to secure the enactment of and 
the continuation of such legislation to give effect to [the] Treaty and in 
particular’: 
(a) To confer upon the Common Market legal capacity and personality 
required for the performance of its functions; and 
(b) To confer upon the regulations of the Council the force of law and 
the necessary legal effect within its territory. 
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Article 8 (2) of the EAC Treaty has a similar wording with article 5 (2) of the 
COMESA Treaty in that both treaties require member states to confer the 
force of law on the treaty and subsequent regulations of Council.  
Under the ECCAS and ECOWAS treaties, member states are only 
required to enact legislation necessary for the implementation of the 
provisions of the treaties.51 These treaties do not specifically require 
regulations to be given the force of law. However, the ECOWAS Treaty 
requires member states ‘to abide by the decisions and regulations of the 
Community’.52 The AMU, IGAD and SADC treaties do not require member 
states to enact legislation to give effect to the treaties or regulations. Member 
states are only required to ratify the treaties.53  
The divergence in the manner in which the integration treaties are to 
be given the force of law in the member state paves a leeway for 
inconsistency in the approach taken by African states. While it may be 
argued that the absence of a provision requiring the states to domesticate 
the treaties does not necessarily preclude the states from performing their 
obligations under the treaty,54 it reduces the chances of citizens being able to 
defend the rights created by the treaties at the national level. In states that 
have a monist approach to treaty implementation, the absence of a clear 
provision requiring domestication might not be fatal because ratified treaties 
automatically become part of the applicable body of laws in the state.55 This 
is not the case in states that have a dualist approach because domestication 
is an essential requirement before the treaties can be enforced at the 
national level.56 Since all the RECs are all working towards the goal of 
                                                          
51
 Article 5 (2) of the ECCAS and ECOWAS Treaties.  
52
 Article 5 (3) ECOWAS Treaty. There is no similar provision in the ECCAS Treaty. 
53
 Article 19 AMU Treaty, article 20 IGAD Treaty and article 41 SADC Treaty. 
54
 States are bound by their treaty obligations at the international level and cannot justify 
non-performance on the grounds that it is in conflict with its national laws. 
55
 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2000)146. For discussions on the origin of monism and dualism, see JG Starke, ‘Monism 
and dualism in the theory of International Law’ (1936) 17 British yearbook of International 
Law 66-81 
56
 Anthony Aust, (note 55) 150-151. Quite a significant number of African states regard 
international agreements as part of their national laws only upon domestication. See  section 
231 (4) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, section 12 (1) Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, section 9 (4) of the Ethiopian Constitution, section 211 
Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, section 2 (6) Kenya Constitution, section 144 
Namibia Constitution, section 238 Swaziland Constitution, section 111B Zimbabwe 
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creating an African Economic community, there ought to be consistency in 
term of the manner in which the norms of economic integration are given the 
force of law.  
The above discussion highlights some of the challenges that 
ambiguities might pose in the implementation of integration treaties in Africa. 
To ensure that the overall integration objectives are met, it is important to 
develop a process to resolve these ambiguities before they result in full 
blown disputes or outright non-compliance.  
2.2.2 Capacity limitations 
The managerial approach identifies capacity limitations as a factor that 
warrants non-compliance with treaty obligations.57 Capacity constraints may 
arise when the treaty requires a positive or affirmative obligation on the part 
of a state.58 Studies show that wealth countries with administrative capacity 
(such as having a properly trained bureaucracy with financial resources) are 
more likely to comply with their treaty obligations.59 A lack of capacity has 
generally proven to be a serious problem for developing countries because 
they often lack the necessary technical, scientific, bureaucratic and financial 
resources to develop effective domestic mechanisms to give effect to their 
treaty obligations.  
In the context of African integration, the absence of technical and 
bureaucratic capacity largely inhibits compliance with the obligations created 
under the integration treaties. Trade liberalisation is one aspect of economic 
integration in which the absence of capacity is particularly clear. All the 
African integration treaties envisage trade liberalisation occurring through the 
creation of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions. In the case of a customs 
union, this invariably necessitates the removal of customs duties for goods 
traded within the region and the adoption of a common external tariff. Since 
many African states rely heavily on customs duties to generate revenue for 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Constitution. See also PF Gonidec, ‘The relationship of international law and national law in 
Africa’ (1998) 10 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 244-249. 
57
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes The New Sovereignty (note 4) 14. 
58
 Ibid 13. 
59
 Edith Brown Weiss ‘Rethinking compliance with international law’ in Eyal Benvenisti and 
Moshe Hirsch (eds.) The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation 
(Cambridge University Press: New York 2004)143. 
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their economies, the removal of tariffs would impact on the revenue-
generating capacity of African states and would result in revenue loss.60 
Therefore, a complex and efficient compensatory mechanism is required to 
cushion the effect of the revenue loss. However, the required technical and 
financial capacity to establish such compensatory mechanisms does not 
exist.61 
Also, the creation of an effective Free Trade Area requires competent 
customs administration authorities to implement the rules of origin and other 
customs procedures adopted by member states. Not all African states have 
highly trained customs officials and this impacts on the efficiency with which 
goods are cleared at the border posts or ports. Furthermore, poor transport 
and ports infrastructure also impedes trade liberalisation efforts.62 Taking all 
these factors into account, if compliance in the area of trade liberalisation is 
to be achieved, it will be important to ensure that states that rely on customs 
duties, that lack efficient customs administration, and that have poor 
transport infrastructure have the adequate capacity to meet their obligations 
under the integration treaties. 
 If capacity is indispensable in ensuring that states fulfil their 
obligations, this means that legal norms alone are not sufficient to secure 
compliance with treaty obligations. Extra efforts are needed to establish 
structures that will create an enabling environment which facilitates 
adherence to legal rules. African integration treaties were entered into to 
resolve certain economic and development challenges. The existence of 
these challenges over time has inhibited the technical, financial and 
bureaucratic capacity of African states in so many areas. In order to ensure 
that the process of integration runs smoothly and that states comply with 
their obligations, adequate mechanisms need to be established to boost the 
                                                          
60
 See T Rajhi and JM Marchat The Short Term Impact of a CET on the Manufacturing 
Sector in Nigeria: Preliminary Results From a Firm Level Analysis (World Bank, Washington, 
2003); C Soludo et al ‘Potential impacts of harmonised UEMOA-ECOWAS common external 
tariff on revenue and trade balance in Nigeria’ 2003 Research Report presented at the 
ECOWAS Committee on Integration Affairs, Abuja, Nigeria.  
61
 C Agu ‘Obstacles to regional integration: the human factor challenge to trade facilitation 
and port reforms in Nigeria’ (2009) 2 (4) International Journal of Private Law 447.  
62
 Ibid 447–457. N Limao and AJ Venables ‘Infrastructure, geographical disadvantage and 
transport cost’ (2000) 15 (3) The World Bank Economic Review 451–479. 
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capacity of m member states. If we fail to boost the capacity of African states 
both collectively and severally, compliance with the integration treaties might 
be elusive.  
2.2.3 Temporal dimension of treaties  
Time plays an important role in assessing compliance with treaty 
obligations.63 Part of the reason for this is that it takes some time for the 
norms created by treaties to be internalised by member states,64 and for the 
impact of changes which are required by the treaty to be felt. Furthermore, a 
treaty may be crafted so as to initiate a process which seeks to bring the 
actual behaviour of states in line with the prescribed behaviour, and therefore 
states may not instantly respond or adapt to the changing conditions 
necessitated by the treaty.65 If all these conditions are taken into 
consideration, it becomes apparent that the impact of the treaties may be felt 
only after a long period of time.66  
The temporal dimension of treaties may explain why African states fail 
to adhere to the specified timelines for integration. Given that integration 
requires positive action by African states, the performance of which is 
dependent on multiple factors, one has to question how specific timelines 
were arrived at during the treaty-drafting process. 
Other than the issue of adherence to timelines, African integration 
treaties create a plethora of norms, some of which are gradually being 
entrenched into the normative structure of member states. For example, the 
free movement of citizens of RECs has gradually become a norm that is 
being internalised by member states. In ECOWAS and the EAC, in particular, 
citizens of each of these RECs no longer require visas to travel within the 
respective RECs. In other RECs, like COMESA and SADC, varying levels of 
implementation of this norm are observed, because of the various integration 
initiatives geared at creating a single bloc in each of these regions. The fact 
that these citizens might not yet have the automatic right of establishment 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid 17. 
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within these RECs might not be sufficient to support the argument that the 
process of removing barriers to the freedom of movement of persons has not 
commenced. Therefore, a misleading conclusion may be reached if the state 
of compliance with the norm pertaining to the free movement of persons is 
assessed when this norm is still in the formative stage.  
2.3 Securing compliance with African integration treaties 
After identifying factors that warrant non-compliance, the next logical step is 
to resolve the challenges that arise from non-compliance. This is necessary if 
the objectives of the treaty are to be achieved. The managerial approach 
suggests that the use of sanctions as an enforcement mechanism to secure 
compliance is not always the best strategy because it often does not resolve 
the problem and in terms of political and economic costs, it may be too 
expensive to implement.67 This position is particularly valid in the African 
context because there are instances where sanctions were imposed, and the 
use of sanctions did not necessarily lead to compliance.  
Recently, Madagascar was suspended from the AU and SADC 
because there was an unconstitutional change of government.68 Economic 
sanctions were also imposed in a bid to compel the unconstitutional 
government to hold democratic elections. So far the imposition of these 
sanctions has not resulted in the creation of a democratically elected 
government in Madagascar. Furthermore, other than in instances where an 
African state is sanctioned for an unconstitutional change in government,69 
sanctions have not been imposed for the violation of economic integration 
norms.70 
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the same grounds.  
69
 Greg Mills argues that regional integration in Africa seems to work best when there is 
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The managerial approach suggests that transparency, dispute 
settlement, capacity building and persuasion should be applied to manage 
non-compliance. The significance of these strategies is that, if properly 
applied, they should prevent non-compliance from occurring. In other words, 
they secure compliance ex ante. 
2.3.1 Transparency  
In the context of securing compliance transparency is defined as the 
availability and accessibility of knowledge and information about ‘(1) the 
meaning of norms, rules, and procedures established by the treaty and 
practice of the regime, and (2) the policies and activities of parties to the 
treaty and of any central organs of the regime as to matters relevant to treaty 
compliance and regime efficacy.’71 Treaties facilitate transparency by 
providing mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the treaty norms, 
resolving disputes and providing access to information to reassure a state 
that others are complying with the treaty norms, thereby reinforcing 
adherence to the rule of law.72 In the context of the World Trade 
Organisation, Robert Wolfe has suggested that transparency enables both 
civil societies and small states to participate in the multilateral process.73  
To ensure compliance through the use of transparency, the managerial 
approach draws from regime theory, economics and game theory to suggest 
that, in order to resolve collective action problems, generating and 
disseminating information about the requirements of the treaty and the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the decision of the SADC Summit to suspend the SADC Tribunal. See Southern Africa 
Litigation Centre ‘African Human Rights Court asked to rule on legality of SADC Tribunal’s 
suspension’ Online Press Release 26 November 2012, available at 
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 Jose Alvarez International Organizations as Law-Makers 339; Ronald Mitchell ‘Sources of 
transparency: information systems in international regimes’ (1998) 42(1) International 
Studies Quarterly 109–130 at 110–113; Oran Young ‘The effectiveness of international 
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Governance Without Government: Change and Order in World Politics (Cambridge 
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performance of states under the treaty is essential to secure compliance.74 In 
this regard, transparency enhances treaty compliance in three ways: 
(1) It facilitates coordination converging on the treaty norms between 
independent actors. 
(2) It reassures actors that they are not being taken advantage of when their 
compliance with the norms is contingent on similar action by other 
participants. 
(3) It deters actors contemplating non-compliance.75 
A system that combines the coordination of treaty norms, reassures m 
member states that each party to the treaty is fulfilling its obligations, and has 
the capacity to deter m member states contemplating non-compliance is 
highly likely to influence the behaviour of the states. 
To facilitate transparency the availability of data on the performance of 
states on key treaty norms is necessary. This data can be generated through 
a process of self-reporting and data collection by states.76 Self-reporting is 
achieved by creating a means by which each state can frequently report to 
other m member states the steps it has taken to implement the treaty norms. 
To ensure the authenticity of the data supplied, organs or institutions of the 
treaty regime can either verify the data themselves or use non-state actors 
such as non-governmental organisations to determine the authenticity and 
accuracy of the information provided.77 The information gathered will also 
help member states to embark on strategic policy reviews and assessments 
of the treaty regime.78 Engaging in policy reviews and assessments of the 
performance of member states is essential because such engagement 
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 See GJ Stigler ‘The economics of information’ (1961) 69(3) Journal of Political Economy 
213–225; James Boyle ‘A theory of law and information: copyright, spleens, blackmail and 
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enables states to actively discuss what works and what does not. It also 
creates a space for states to assess other states’ performance with the aim 
of developing future strategies to improve overall performance. Furthermore, 
the engagement creates an enabling environment for non-state actors to 
engage with states in the process of review and assessments.79  
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is discussed in 
detail in chapter 4, provides an opportunity for transparency to be used as a 
tool for securing compliance with African integration treaties, because it 
makes use of all the above-mentioned processes in evaluating the 
performance of African states. More interestingly, the APRM adopts a non-
adversarial approach in its review and assessment of the extent to which 
African states comply with their treaty obligations. Additionally, the APRM 
process enables the participation of non-state actors in the process of 
objectively assessing the performance of states in all the sectors in which are 
reviewed. This gives it the added advantage of being able to obtain 
information not only on the extent to which states have implemented 
legislation to give effect to their treaty obligations, but also on the extent to 
which such treaty obligations have actually changed the behaviour of states. 
Transparency as a strategy for managing compliance is beneficial for 
integration both at the AU level and the REC level. At the level of the RECs, 
the transparency strategy provides an opportunity for RECs to update each 
other about steps that are being taken to realise the formation of the African 
Economic Community. Establishing a forum of this nature would mean that 
each REC could learn about what strategies are being adopted by other 
RECs in each of the integration sectors. This will ensure that the RECs are 
not working at cross-purposes and that their policies fit into the broader 
picture of continental integration.  
At the level of the AU, the African Union Commission could also utilise 
the transparency mechanism to coordinate the activities of the various 
RECs.80 If the departments of the African Union Commission work closely 
with the various RECs in addressing the challenges faced in each of the 
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integration sectors, issues of coordination among the RECs would be easier 
to address. Such coordination would allow for direct interaction between the 
RECs and the African Union Commission. Since the RECs represent the 
member states this would also be a more efficient way of generating synergy 
between the AU and the member states. The departments of the African 
Union Commission would then serve to facilitate integration by collating the 
necessary information required for the exchange of ideas between the RECs 
and the AU.  
An important aspect of the transparency strategy is that it takes into 
account the necessity of restating the norms of the treaty regime. Sharing of 
information among member states about the  performance that is required, 
helps to clarify and reaffirm the content of the norms. At the level of the AU, a 
constant reaffirmation of the integration norms would help to imbue the 
integration norms into the policy framework of the RECs. A transparency 
process for instances which directly involve all the RECs would facilitate 
better coordination and implementation of the objectives of the Abuja Treaty. 
This process would enhance integration and enable each REC to identify 
areas where they have difficulty in meeting the objectives of the Abuja 
Treaty. Furthermore, in instances where non-compliance results from 
ambiguity in the language of the Abuja Treaty, the RECs in conjunction with 
the AU could make proposals to clarify such ambiguity through an 
amendment or an interpretation of the treaty. The transparency strategy 
would also enable the African Union, the RECs and member states to 
identify areas where capacity is lacking and to have a clearer picture of 
milestones that have been achieved in order to project realistic expected 
outcomes.  
The same process could be replicated within each region: the 
Secretariats of the RECs could collectively meet with the representatives of 
member states to generate and disseminate information about steps that 
have been taken to achieve the integration objectives. At this level, member 
states would have the opportunity to report on their level of compliance and 
the necessary steps they have taken to secure compliance. In instances 
where they have been unable to comply as a result of lack of capacity or 
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ambiguity as to what is required of them, the Secretariat, in conjunction with 
the  member  states, can then develop strategies to resolve the challenges. If 
the non-compliance results from a lack of capacity, assistance could be 
provided in the relevant areas. Where non-compliance results from 
ambiguity, an interpretation of the ambiguous norm could be sought: the 
Secretariat or member states could request an advisory opinion from the 
regional court or any other available interpretative organ. 
2.3.2 Dispute settlement 
Disputes arise in any system; what is important is how these disputes are 
resolved. In a treaty regime, the treaty creates norms with which the states 
are expected to comply, but non-compliance may arise as a result of the 
ambiguous language of the treaty text. Where this occurs, it is important to 
have a dispute settlement mechanism that resolves the ambiguity and serves 
as an authoritative mechanism for the interpretation of the norms. The 
managerial approach suggests that, instead of using a conventional formal 
dispute settlement procedure like an international tribunal, it might be more 
effective to use a plenary body of the treaty regime, the secretariat, or 
another designated interpretative organ such as a legal committee.81  
These informal dispute settlement bodies are less contentious and in 
many cases have a preventive or anticipatory value.82 This means that these 
bodies could be used to forestall the non-compliance. The non-adversarial 
nature of these bodies provides a favourable atmosphere for states to 
resolve their differences and reach an amicable solution.83 Since this process 
is less contentious, having an institutionalised informal dispute settlement 
mechanism may be more attractive to member states. Unlike formal dispute 
settlement mechanisms, which are mainly concerned with the strict 
application of legal rules,84 an informal dispute settlement mechanism is 
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more likely to effectively resolve issues that have a political, economic and 
social undertone– a common feature of economic integration treaties.  
In the context of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, Kofi Kufuor suggests 
that the inflexibility of formal adjudicatory bodies makes them an unattractive 
mechanism for states to settle their disputes, because international disputes 
often have political and legal aspects and states would rather opt for face-
saving negotiations.85 If we consider the fact that the objective of having a 
dispute settlement mechanism is not necessarily to punish non-compliant 
behaviour but rather to ensure that states conform with the prescribed 
behaviour, then an informal dispute settlement mechanism might be an 
effective tool in achieving this goal since, at this level, both the political and 
legal aspects of the dispute can be properly addressed. 
Also, a significant number of disputes between states are usually 
settled informally through negotiations and sometimes with the assistance of 
some form of intermediation.86 This approach to dispute settlement could be 
of great significance to the integration process in Africa because African 
states have rarely used the existing regional courts or formal dispute 
settlement mechanisms on the c ntinent to settle their inter-state disputes. 
Even when formal dispute settlement is provided for, it is suggested as the 
last resort. For example, the dispute settlement clause in article 32 of the 
SADC Trade Protocol, only suggests formal adjudication as the last resort in 
the event that mutual cooperation, consultations and referral to trade experts 
fail.  
The poor record of the use of formal dispute settlement mechanisms 
by African states also strengthens the argument for the use of informal 
dispute settlement mechanisms. In the era of the OAU, the OAU Charter 
provided for the settlement of disputes through the use of a Commission on 
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.87 Tiyanjana Maluwa has observed 
that, in the first two decades of the existence of the OAU, no dispute was 
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submitted to the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.88 
During this era, over 30 intra-African disputes were neither settled by the 
Commission nor was there an invocation of the dispute settlement clause of 
the OAU Charter.89 Rather, African states resorted to political and diplomatic 
means, using ad hoc Committees to resolve these disputes. Similarly, the 
post-OAU era has not witnessed any formal adjudication between African 
states either at AU level or at REC level. This evidence undeniably 
strengthens the argument for the use of informal dispute settlement 
mechanisms.  
Be that as it may, the call for informal dispute settlement mechanisms 
should not be regarded as a call for the eradication of formal adjudicatory 
mechanisms, nor does it mean that formal dispute settlement mechanisms 
serve no purpose or are ineffective. Formal dispute settlement mechanisms 
are still necessary, particularly because African integration treaties 
sometimes confer rights on private citizens that need to be protected. As will 
be shown in chapter 5, formal dispute settlement mechanisms play an 
important role in shaping and inculcating norms among member states and 
citizens alike. However, entrenching the habit of using informal dispute 
settlement mechanisms could also enable African states to settle disputes or 
to clarify the ambits of their integration obligations. 
2.3.3 Capacity building 
Where non-compliance stems from a deficit in technical and bureaucratic 
capability or a lack of financial resources, developing mechanisms to build 
capacity in these areas will enhance overall compliance.90 The lack of 
technical know-how often affects the ability of a state to comply with its treaty 
obligations even when there is an earnest desire to meet the treaty 
obligations. A state might simply lack the basic technical know-how or the 
administrative capacity to meet the requirements of the treaty. In such 
instances, compliance may be increased if the treaty has a framework that 
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offers technical assistance to states in need. Most African states are plagued 
by technical, institutional, bureaucratic and human incapacity in various 
sectors. In order to improve the performance of states, strategies need to be 
put in place to develop competence. In this regard, initiatives such as the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which is discussed in 
chapter 4, can play an important role in building human, financial, institutional 
and infrastructural capacity to enable African states to reach their 
development goals and consequently achieve integration objectives. 
2.3.4 Persuasion  
Transparency, dispute settlement and capacity building may all be used to 
influence a state’s behaviour through a process of discourse between states, 
the institutions created by the treaty, and other non-state actors.91 In this 
context, the concept of persuasion depicts an iterative process whereby 
states, institutions of the treaty, and the public are involved in a continuous 
discourse about acceptable levels of compliance.92 The essence of this 
discursive process is to facilitate an atmosphere whereby non-compliant 
behaviour can be mutually analysed and resolved rather than punished.93 If 
states are periodically required to report on their policies and programmes 
pertinent to the attainment of the objectives of the treaty, the Secretariat 
could analyse the report and submit it to the member states for discussion. 
The state in question is given the opportunity to present and defend the 
report. The process of reviewing and assessing the performance of the state 
helps to specify the required behaviour.94  
Furthermore, the interactions between all the actors help to expound 
the meaning of the treaty norms by identifying the performance required in 
particular circumstances.95 The treaty norms thus serve as coordination 
points around which states can harmonise their actions and the interactions 
about the content of the treaty norms provide leverage for securing 
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compliance.96 The application of a combination of these strategies would 
induce compliance, and instances of non-compliance would be the exception 
rather than the rule.  
2.4 Criticisms of the managerial approach 
No theory of law is flawless and the managerial approach is no exception. 
The managerial approach has been criticised for the following reasons:  
(1) Its approach to enforcement is rather weak because it downplays the role 
of sanctions in inducing compliance. 
(2) It creates the impression that the managerial approach and the use of 
enforcement are two alternatives, rather than looking at them as 
complementary. 
(3) It does not examine how member states internalise the constraining 
norms which prevent non-compliance within their domestic constituencies. 
(4) It focuses too much on the process of compliance and thus pays too little 
attention to the substance of the rules that must be enforced. 
(5) It does not consider in sufficient detail the role of international institutions 
in securing compliance. 
(6) It does not discuss how to secure compliance when states deliberately 
flout their treaty obligations on the basis of national interest.97  
These criticisms are addressed in four categories in order to justify the 
application of the managerial approach and to show that the criticisms do not 
affect the validity of the use of the managerial approach in securing 
compliance with African integration treaties. The four categories are: (1) state 
interest and the internalisation of treaty norms in the domestic arena; (2) the 
value of enforcement through the use of sanctions; (3) emphasis on process 
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rather than the substance of the rules; and (4) role of international institutions 
in securing compliance. 
2.4.1 State interest and the internalisation of treaty norms in the 
domestic arena 
 As mentioned earlier, integration treaties in Africa are adopted to create 
norms that will enable African states to resolve their economic and 
development challenges and as such they address issues of common 
interest to all member states. It is therefore member state highly unlikely that 
violations of the treaty norms would be deliberate acts. Since integration 
treaties are meant to protect the interests of states and place an obligation 
on states to take the necessary steps within their national domain to give 
effect to the treaties, we can assume that states will internalise the 
integration norms in order to improve their overall position.  
Furthermore, the direct process of internalising treaty norms may not 
be effectively regulated within the framework of the treaty because African 
states have different legal systems. However, with the creation of national 
focal points in each state, strategies for the internalisation of treaty norms 
can be achieved state by state.98 In essence, the integration treaties serve as 
coordination points for creating the norms and place an obligation on the 
state to internalise the norms. The means by which the norms are 
internalised is left open to member States. A practical example is the 
obligation in article 5(3) of the ECOWAS Treaty, which requires member 
states to abide by the decisions and regulations of the Community. However, 
there is no direction as to how it should be internalised in a member state’s 
national domain. Therefore, a member state is free to decide whether it will 
enact domestic legislation that will give effect to such decisions or 
regulations, or whether such decisions will be incorporated through judicial 
pronouncements. The most important thing is complying with the decisions.  
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2.4.2 The value of enforcement through the use of sanctions 
Regional integration is still in its formative stage in Africa. Most African states 
lack the capacity to implement most of the integration objectives and 
therefore the use of sanctions will not help to improve the status of 
integration. For instance, in a bid to facilitate the free movement of persons 
in the ECOWAS region, in 2000 member states agreed to issue common 
international passports to all ECOWAS citizens by the end of 2005. By May 
2005 only four member states had met the deadline.99 Most states had failed 
to meet this deadline due to financial and logistical challenges. Sanctioning 
these errant states would neither generate the required finances nor boost 
their technical capacity, and would therefore not be most pragmatic solution. 
The managerial theory does not argue that the use of sanctions or 
enforcement in general has no value whatsoever; rather, it suggests that the 
use of sanctions may not always result in states conforming to the prescribed 
behaviour. 
2.4.3 Emphasis on process rather than the substance of the rules 
This critique is based on the fact that treaty rules may sometimes be unfair or 
may have been generated by coercive bargains that invariably challenge the 
legitimacy of the rules.100 This situation does not necessarily arise in the 
context of African integ ation. All the integration treaties were mutually 
agreed upon and were negotiated on an equal basis by Heads of States and 
governments. Furthermore, most African integration treaties have adopted 
the variable geometry principle (discussed in chapter 3) to ensure that all 
states do not integrate at the same pace, taking into account the different 
stages of development of each state. This takes care of any inequalities that 
may arise from the process of integration.  
2.4.4 The role of international institutions  
The managerial approach acknowledges that the impact of transparency, 
capacity building and dispute settlement will be meaningful only if an 
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effective institutional setting is deployed.101 The interactive process between 
states and non-state actors occurs within the institutional framework of the 
treaty regime. The managerial approach goes beyond exploring the role of 
international institutions and includes non-state actors, such as non-
governmental organisations, in the process of securing compliance. All these 
actors form part of a discursive process that helps to secure compliance. In 
the context of African integration, the African Union Commission and the 
Specialised Technical Committees are responsible for coordinating and 
harmonising various integration projects between all the actors involved in 
the integration process.102 At the regional level, the Secretariat or the 
Commission of the various RECs play the same role.103 These institutions 
are important for managing the entire process of integration. 
2.5 Some other theories of compliance in international law 
The subject of compliance with international law has been the focus of 
enormous legal scholarship. An attempt to examine even a fraction on the 
debate would derail the focus of this thesis. However, this section gives an 
overview of two contemporary schools of thought: the legitimacy theory and 
the transnational legal process theory. The legitimacy theory supports the 
view that compliance with international legal obligations can be achieved 
without the use of enforcement mechanisms. The transnational legal 
process, on the other hand, contends that domestic legal institutions play a 
prominent role in ensuring that states comply with their international 
obligations by entrenching international norms in the domestic arena. 
Various elements of these theories validate the use of the managerial 
approach in securing compliance with African integration treaties.  
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2.5.1 Legitimacy theory 
Thomas Franck is the major proponent of the legitimacy theory.104 The 
theory posits that states will comply with rules that they perceive to be 
legitimate. Legitimacy in this context means the ‘quality of a rule which 
derives from a perception on the part of those to whom it is addressed that it 
has come into being in accordance with [the] right process’.105The legitimacy 
theory suggests that determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence and 
adherence to normative hierarchy are the elements of legitimacy which 
determine whether a state will comply with its obligations.106 A rule that 
exhibits these elements will secure compliance even in the absence of 
coercive measures because states will regard the rule as being legitimate. 
Determinate rules secure compliance because they are easily 
ascertainable; states understand the rule and know exactly what is expected 
of them.107 Clarity is important because the treaty must send a clear 
message as to the expected normative standards. An indeterminate rule 
makes it difficult for states to know what level of conformity is required and 
thus enables non-compliance.108 Determinacy therefore depends on the 
ability of a rule to clearly ‘communicate its intent and shape that intent into a 
situational command’.109  
Symbolic validation as a determining factor for legitimacy gives rules a 
‘cultural and anthropological dimension’.110 It serves as a cue to elicit 
compliance by situating the rule as part of the normative structure of those 
states whose conduct the rule seeks to govern. In other words, the rule 
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symbolises a part of ‘the overall system of social order’.111 This makes the 
rule part and parcel of the system of the governed, thereby generating 
compliance with the rule. Symbolic validation helps to reinforce the 
legitimacy of a rule since it is usually viewed as an expression of a 
recognised and validated process.  
A coherent rule helps to treat like situations in the same manner, thus 
establishing general principles that are applied by the rules.112 Where a rule 
establishes general principles, it creates predictability and consistency in the 
system. Consistency and predictability ensure that there is uniformity in the 
application of a rule. An incoherent rule would fail to generate consistency 
and predictability, thereby generating non-compliance. 
The final factor that affects the legitimacy of a rule is its adherence to 
a normative hierarchy, that is, the connection ‘between a single primary rule 
of obligation and a pyramid of secondary rules governing the creation, 
interpretation, and application of such rules by the community.’113 A rule will 
be able to secure compliance if the rule is supported by a canon of rules 
recognised by the community, or if it operates within an institutional 
framework in which the community organises itself.114 To put it differently, for 
a rule to enjoy legitimacy, it must derive its source of authority from other 
recognised principles. In the absence of this, the ability of the rule to secure 
compliance may be brought into question. Franck’s position on the 
consistency and predictability of rules reinforces the Chayes theory on the 
ambiguity of treaty rules as a key reason for non-compliance. Furthermore, 
Franck’s juxtaposition of legitimacy and normative hierarchy strengthens the 
argument for the need for a process that constantly iterates the contents of 
the integration norms among states. 
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2.5.2  Transnational legal process theory 
Harold Koh is a recent proponent of transnational legal process, and he uses 
it to explain how states comply with their international legal obligations.115 
Transnational legal process is described as the ‘theory and practice of how 
public and private actors – nation-states, international organisations, 
multinational enterprises, non-governmental organisations, and private 
individuals – interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and 
international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalise the 
rules of transnational law.’116 The theory suggests that the legal institutions of 
the states play a prominent role in ensuring that a state complies with its 
international law obligations. 
The transnational legal process has four unique characteristics.117 The 
first is that it dissolves the dichotomy between national and international law, 
and between public and private law. Secondly, the actors in the process 
include state and non-state actors. Thirdly, the process is dynamic, because 
it oscillates between national and international law, and between public and 
private law. Fourthly, it is normative because the process of interactions 
creates new rules which are internalised and enforced by the state. 
Transnational legal process posits that ‘[s]tates internalise international law 
by incorporating it into their domestic and political structures, through 
executive action, legislation and judicial decisions which take account of and 
incorporate international norms.’ 118     This process of internalisation of 
international norms by domestic institutions eventually leads to compliance in 
the international arena. Thus compliance occurs not as a result of the fear of 
sanctions but through the incorporation of the international rules into the 
domestic legal system of the state.119 
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 Harold Koh ‘Why do nations obey international law?’ (note 88) 2599–2659; Harold Koh 
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Koh’s theory has been criticised for failing to explain why and when 
states comply with international rules. Instead, the theory explains how 
states incorporate international norms into their domestic legal systems. The 
theory has also been criticised for not comparatively examining compliance 
and non-compliance so as to determine the appropriate response when non-
compliance occurs.120 However, Koh’s theory is relevant to this thesis 
because of its emphasis on the incorporation of international norms into the 
domestic arena. This is particularly necessary for entrenching regional norms 
into the domestic legal systems of African states to secure compliance with 
integration treaties. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Anyone involved in the study of regional integration in Africa will readily admit 
that there are several endemic problems that need to be addressed if 
integration is to succeed.121 We will be oversimplifying the problem if we 
place the blame for the poor levels of economic integration solely on African 
states’ wilful disregard of integration obligations. Although the problems of 
economic integration are well documented and evident for all to see, lawyers 
often find it difficult to clearly articulate solutions for resolving these problems 
without ignoring the practical realities.  We are often quick to examine the 
challenges of economic integration in Africa from a purely legalistic 
perspective and tend to provide dry legal analyses of the problems. 
It is true that ‘integration is not a simple exercise in power sharing, but 
goes deeper and aims at a fundamental restructuring of society and of 
societal attitudes, and these changes are reflected in and promoted by the 
law’.122 However, the laws regulating integration have to be aligned with the 
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existing realities of the societies for which they were made if they are to be 
effective and achieve their purpose. Economic integration laws must be 
certain enough to clearly prescribe the behaviour that is permitted and yet 
dynamic enough not only to proscribe non-permissible behaviour but also to 
address the root causes of non-permissible behaviour. Thus, in developing 
strategies to secure compliance with African integration treaties, one must 
not only consider methods that would proscribe non-compliant behaviour; 
one must also explore possible mechanisms to address the root causes of 
non-compliance albeit within a legal regulatory environment. 
To this end, this chapter has identified in broad terms the factors that 
affect the ability of states to comply with their treaty obligations and has also 
identified mechanisms that could be adopted within the treaty framework to 
mitigate the high levels of non-compliance. The key p ints that have 
emerged from the discussion in this chapter are the following: 
(1) Ambiguity and indeterminacy in the language of a treaty, lack of capacity, 
and the temporal aspects of treaties may affect a state’s ability to comply 
with its treaty obligations. 
(2) Where a state fails to comply with its treaty obligations on the basis of 
these factors, the use of sanctions will not necessarily lead to the state 
complying with the prescribed behaviour. 
(3) In order to improve compliance or mitigate non-compliance, an iterative 
process which facilitates transparency, capacity building, dispute settlement 
and persuasion should be used. 
This is not a claim that the use of the managerial approach will 
completely eliminate all forms of non-compliant behaviour. However, the 
approach could certainly mitigate the existing levels of non-compliance if 
used over time. In light of the above, the next chapter examines economic 
integration in the context of the African Union to determine how the 
managerial approach could be used to improve integration at the continental 
level.
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Chapter 3: Coordinating economic integration 
through the African Union 
 
3.0 Introduction 
Most efforts at international cooperation take place within an institutional 
setting and international institutions such as the African Union (AU) play an 
important role in coordinating cooperation between African states.1 
International institutions help to facilitate cooperation between states by 
reducing uncertainty and transaction costs.2 They also manage interstate 
relations and it has become practically ‘impossible to imagine contemporary 
international life’ without international institutions.3 The use of international 
institutions to manage the objectives of a treaty makes compliance possible 
and more likely.4 They make compliance possible by creating ‘a stable 
environment for mutually beneficial decision-making as they guide and 
constrain behaviour’.5 They also facilitate iteration, reduce transaction costs, 
establish self-reinforcing behaviour, increase access to information, monitor 
behaviour, mediate disputes, and impose sanctions.6 
In the context of economic integration in Africa, the AU is the primary 
international institution vested with the responsibility of managing the 
interstate relations of African states. This chapter examines how the AU can 
manage economic integration in order to mitigate the existing levels of non-
compliance with African integration treaties. As stated in chapter 2, the 
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various mechanisms (transparency, dispute settlement, capacity building, 
and the use of persuasion) for managing non-compliance occur within an 
institutional setting deployed by the member states, and the success of the 
process is largely dependent on the efficiency of the institutional 
arrangement.7 
 At this juncture, it is important to clarify the approach used in 
examining the AU as the international institution for managing economic 
integration. A significant number of studies have been carried out on the 
composition and functions of and theoretical approaches to international 
institutions.8 This chapter does not examine these issues. Rather, the AU is 
examined from the perspective of its ability to elaborate upon and facilitate 
the implementation of integration norms at the regional and national levels. In 
this regard, the chapter begins with a historical analysis of the AU in order to 
provide background to economic integration at the regional level. The next 
section proceeds to examine the role and functions of the principal organs of 
the AU with a view to determining how they can contribute to managing 
economic integration on the continent. The last section examines the 
relationship between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs) in order to clarify the relationship between both set of institutions.  
3.1 Historical analysis of the African Union and the political 
will to integrate 
Before delving into the discussion of the AU’s role in fostering economic 
integration on the continent, it is important to give a brief summary of the 
historical origins of the AU. Such a summary is necessary because it 
highlights the institutional and normative reforms that have occurred over the 
years. In addition, it helps to properly locate the discussion on African 
economic integration.  
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The AU was created in 2001 and comprises 54 member states.9 It 
succeeded the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was the previous 
organisation responsible for integrating the continent.10 The OAU was 
established in 1963 to promote unity and solidarity between the newly 
independent African states and also to achieve a better life for the people of 
Africa.11 As part of its objectives, the OAU fought to eradicate all forms of 
colonialism in Africa by acting as the collective medium for defending the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of African states.12 In a bid 
to promote unity and international cooperation within the OAU, the member 
states agreed to coordinate and harmonise their national policies in various 
areas. The areas of cooperation included politics and diplomacy, economic 
policies, education and culture, health and sanitation, science and 
technology, defence and security.13 In order to reinforce the commitment of 
member states to integrate the continent through the harmonisation of 
policies in the areas listed in the OAU Charter, subsequent declarations and 
resolutions were passed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
of the OAU (the highest decision-making body).14  
 However, it was only in 1991 that member states could finally adopt a 
treaty to serve as the framework for continental economic integration. In this 
                                                          
9
 South Sudan is the newest member of the African Union. Morocco is the only African state 
that is not a member of the African Union. It withdrew from the OAU (predecessor to the AU) 
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 Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU Charter) (1963) 3 ILM 766. 
11
 For a history of the OAU, see Z Cervenka The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the 
OAU  (Friedmann, London, 1977); AF Addona The Organization of African Unity (World Pub 
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 Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU 
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Declaration of Commitment of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU on 
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Development for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order AHG/ST.3 (XVI) 
Rev 1; Resolution on Holding an Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Heads of  
States and Government on Economic Problems of Africa AHG/ST.4 (XVI) Rev 1; Final Act of 
Lagos 1980; and the Lagos Plan of Action 1980.  See also Jeggan Senghor ‘The Treaty 
Establishing the African Economic Community: An introductory essay’ in AA Yusuf (ed) 
African Yearbook of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, Netherlands, 
1993) 183–194.  
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regard, the OAU adopted the Treaty Establishing the African Economic 
Community (Abuja Treaty) as part of its strategy for continental economic 
integration.15 The Abuja Treaty laid out guidelines for economically 
integrating Africa through the creation of an African Economic Community 
(AEC).16 The Abuja Treaty was also deemed an integral part of the OAU 
Charter and therefore its objectives were performed by the OAU.17  
The adoption of the Abuja Treaty was insufficient to enable Africa to 
improve the living conditions of her citizens and give her prominence in the 
international polity. Therefore, member states decided to structurally 
reposition the OAU ‘in order to reinvigorate the project of African integration 
in response to the forces of globalisation’.18 The decision to restructure the 
OAU was made at the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government of the OAU, and a declaration that called for 
the establishment of an African Union was adopted.19  
In addition to the call for the establishment of an African Union, a 
decision was also reached to accelerate the economic integration process 
laid out in the Abuja Treaty by shortening the implementation timetable. 
There was also a call for the rapid establishment of all key organs of the AEC 
that had yet to be created. On 11 July 2000 the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union (Constitutive Act) was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government of the OAU,20 and the African Union was established 
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pdf [accessed 30 July 2010]. 
19
 Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 8–9 
September 1999, Sirte, Libya, EAHG/Draft/Decl (IV) Rev 1, available at http://www.africa-
union.org/Docs_AUGovernment/decisions/Sirte_Declaration_1999.pdf [accessed 30 July 
2010]. 
20
 Assembly of Heads of  State and Government, Thirty Sixth Ordinary Session/Fourth 
Ordinary Session  of the African Economic Community, 10–12 July 2000, Lome, Togo, 
AHG/Decl.1-6 (XXXVI)’available at 
 http://www.africa-union.org/Special_Programs/CSSDCA/cssdca-solemndeclaration.pdf 
[accessed 30th July 2010]. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
76 | P a g e  
 
in 2001.21 The Constitutive Act became operational on 26 May 2001, after it 
had been ratified by two-thirds of the member states, thereby replacing the 
OAU Charter.22  
The transformation of the OAU into the AU represented a symbolic 
shift in the institutional and legal architecture of integration in Africa.23 In 
terms of the institutional shift, the AU created new institutions (the Pan-
African Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Permanent Representatives’ 
Committee’, the Specialised Technical Committees, the Economic, Social 
and Cultural Council and the Financial Institutions) to coordinate integration 
on the continent.24 These new institutions all have specialised and technical 
functions necessary for giving effect to the integration agenda. Furthermore, 
the creation of the Court of Justice had both legal and symbolic significance. 
It was an indication that African states were willing to submit their disputes to 
a judicial organ whose decisions are binding and final. This change in 
attitude represents an important shift from the previous approach under the 
OAU, where disputes were settled by a Commission on Mediation, 
Conciliation and Arbitration.  
In terms of the normative change in the transformation, the AU 
expanded its principles and objectives to include the participation of African 
people in the activities of the AU and the right of the AU to intervene in the 
internal affairs of a member state where war crimes, genocide or crimes 
against humanity have been committed. It also included the respect for 
human rights, the rule of law, democratic principles and good governance; 
promoting social justice to ensure balanced economic development; the 
rejection of unconstitutional changes in governments; and the coordination 
and harmonisation of policies between RECs.25 These changes undoubtedly 
reflected a change in the attitude of African states towards creating an 
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 Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Fifth Extraordinary Session, 1–2 March 
2001, Sirte, Libya, EAHG/Dec.1 (V), available at 
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/sirterep.htm [accessed 30 July 2010]. 
22
 T Maluwa (note 18) 56. 
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 Ibid 77. 
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 Article 5 Constitutive Act. These institutions did not exist under the OAU. Some of them 
were provided for in article 7 of the Abuja Treaty but they were not operational during the 
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organisation to oversee the conduct of member states in certain areas of 
endeavour.  
While it has been commonly argued that African states are unwilling to 
cede sovereignty to regional institutions, some of these changes, indicate the 
contrary.26 The debate on sovereignty always takes the centre stage in any 
discussion of African integration.27 Undoubtedly sovereignty as a primary 
attribute of a state is an expression of ‘the independence and the autonomy 
of the state, and the possibility to exercise its powers within its borders’.28 
Picciotto suggests that sovereignty may be regarded ‘as a particular way of 
distributing political power within and between states’.29 This distribution of 
powers involves the ability of a state to decide its internal relations within its 
national domain and its external relations with other members of the 
international community.  
The default position is that every state tries to keep its sovereignty 
intact even in instances where it may have expressly (through treaties) or 
implicitly (through the acceptance of customary rules of international law) 
limited the exercise of its sovereign powers.30 This attitude is not peculiar to 
African states.31 Article 3 (b) of the Constitutive Act, which lists the defence 
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University Press, New York, 2002) 524. 
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of sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states as one of the 
objectives of the African Union, is a clear expression of this default position.32 
However, the contemporary international system has become interdependent 
and states cannot act independently at all times. The interdependence of 
states is also listed as one of the principles of the African Union.33 Chayes 
and Chayes write that state ‘sovereignty no longer consists in the freedom of 
states to act independently, in their perceived self- interest, but in 
membership in reasonably good standing in the regimes that make up the 
substance of international life’.34 In other words, while states may enter into 
treaties to protect their self-interest, the treaties may have provisions which 
curtail some aspects of that interest to protect the overall interests of all the 
parties to the treaty. The state will therefore be compelled to accept such 
curtailment in order to benefit from the treaty. This curtailment can be 
regarded as concessions which states are required to make in order to reach 
an agreement that is beneficial to all the parties to the treaty – this is the 
essence of regional integration.  
In the context of the transition of the OAU to the AU, some key 
principles incorporated into the Constitutive Act, such as the right of the AU 
to intervene in cases of crimes against humanity, signify that states 
recognise interdependence and also accept the curtailment of their unilateral 
powers to violate the rights of their citizens. These provisions were not part 
of the OAU Charter and their inclusion in the Constitutive Act not only goes 
beyond strengthening human rights norms, but also adds a jurisprudential 
value to the manner in which we conceptualise the sovereign powers of 
African states in relation to the AU.  
Another way of looking at sovereignty in relation to regional integration 
in Africa is to consider the compromises or concessions made by states as 
acts of ‘sovereign bargains’.35  In explaining the concept of sovereign 
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bargains, Litfin posits that the core elements of state sovereignty are 
‘autonomy’, ‘control’ and ‘legitimacy’, and that these elements all operate 
within the territorial space of the state and may be varied in order to achieve 
the common objectives of the integrating regime.36 This variation does not, 
however, deprive the state of its sovereign attributes. She suggests that 
‘states engage in sovereign bargains in which they voluntarily accept some 
limitations in exchange for certain benefits. The cumulative effect of these 
trade-offs, however, may be to alter the norms and practices of sovereignty 
by reconfiguring expectations regarding state autonomy, control and 
legitimacy’.37 Mattli, in adopting the concept of sovereign bargains, argues 
that sovereign bargains reconfigure state sovereignty but do not diminish it, 
thereby keeping regional integration within the legal understanding of state 
sovereignty.38 Therefore, expanding the objectives and principles of the AU 
to cover areas which were traditionally deemed to be within the exclusive 
domain of African states may be regarded as a trade-off that member states 
needed to make in order to create an organisation that would be relevant 
within and outside the continent. This trade-offs were voluntarily made in the 
creation of the AU. 
Since the interdependence of states has become a fact of life, states 
will always have to make trade-offs. For example, a state that does not 
uphold the protection of human rights or the rule of law may still be 
compelled to join the AU because it does not want to be viewed by other 
African states as a gross violator of human rights and thus be deprived of the 
benefits that flow from being an AU member. However, joining the AU 
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significantly curtails the extent to which it can violate the human rights of its 
citizens because gross violations may trigger intervention in terms of article 4 
of the Constitutive Act. So while the state has the sovereign right to conduct 
its internal affairs, it has voluntarily limited the manner in which it can conduct 
its internal affairs in exchange for membership of the AU. 
Balancing the principle of sovereignty and the interdependence of 
states is not new in the discourse on regional integration. In addressing a 
similar question, the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Customs 
Regime case was of the opinion that: 
[a] State would not be independent in the legal sense if it was 
placed in a condition of dependence on another Power, … if it 
lost the right to exercise its own judgment in coming to the 
decisions which the government of its territory entails. 
Restrictions on its liberty of action which a State may agree to 
do not affect its independence, provided that the State does not 
thereby deprive itself of its organic powers …The difference 
between the alienation of a nation's independence and a 
restriction which a State may agree to on the exercise of its 
sovereign power … is clear. This latter is, for instance, the 
position of States which become Members of the League of 
Nations. It is certain that membership imposes upon them 
important restrictions on the exercise of their independence, 
without it being possible to allege that it entails an alienation of 
that independence. Practically, every treaty entered into 
between independent States restricts to some extent the 
exercise of the power incidental to sovereignty. Complete and 
absolute sovereignty unrestricted by any obligations imposed 
by treaties is impossible and practically unknown.39 
In essence, since integration treaties are wilfully entered into by African 
states and the obligations that may curtail some of their individual actions are 
collectively agreed upon, one may argue that states do not necessarily lose 
their sovereignty by entering into integration treaties, but rather allocate 
some aspects of it to the regional institutions to exercise on their behalf. Just 
as states in exercise of their sovereignty cannot be bound by treaties they 
have not consented to, a state also has the capacity, in the exercise of its 
sovereignty, to consent to a treaty that cedes some of the state’s authority to 
institutions vested with powers to implement the common interest of the 
                                                          
39
 Customs Regime between Germany and Austria Advisory Opinion [1931] PCIJ Rep, 
series A/B, no 41 paras 160–163, available on 
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1931.09.05_customs.htm [accessed 20 June 
2011]. 
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states.40 To this end, the next section examines the extent of powers ceded 
to the principal organs of AU to implement, monitor and coordinate the 
objectives of economic integration in Africa. 
3.2 The principal organs of the African Union 
This section examines the role and functions of the principal organs of the 
AU. The capacity of the principal organs of the AU to coordinate and give 
effect to the objectives expressed in the economic integration treaties is 
explored. The organs which are examined are the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government, the Executive Council, the African Union 
Commission (AUC), and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. The 
AU has other institutions (namely, the Pan-African Parliament, the 
Permanent Representatives’ Committee’, Special Technical Committees, the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Council, and Financial Institutions) however 
emphasis is placed on the former four institutions because they are 
responsible for developing, monitoring, implementing and interpreting 
continental economic integration policies.41  
3.2.1 The Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government (the Assembly) is the 
supreme policy organ of the AU and consists of the Heads of State and 
Governments of member states.42 The Assembly is headed by a chairperson 
who is elected for a period of one year.43 The Assembly meets at least once 
a year in ordinary sessions but may hold an extraordinary session at the 
                                                          
40
 Bruno de Witte ‘Sovereignty and European integration: the weight of legal tradition’ (1995) 
2 Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative Law 146. Jose Alvarez suggests that 
‘sovereignty has never been an absolute but an accordion of powers subject to degrees of 
sovereign control’ because throughout history, states have shared, pooled or delegated 
some of their sovereign powers depending on the interest at stake. He further suggests that 
in understanding the relationship between global governance and sovereignty, both 
concepts should not be viewed as binary opposites or products of zero sum games. See 
Jose Alvarez, ‘State sovereignty is not withering away: a few lessons for the future’ in A 
Cassese (ed) Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012) 31. 
41
 Article 5 Constitutive Act. 
42
 Article 6 Constitutive Act and article 8 Abuja Treaty. 
43
 Article 6 (4) Constitutive Act and article 9 (2) Abuja Treaty. 
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request of a member state.44 The powers and functions of the Assembly are 
stated in article 8 of the Abuja Treaty and article 9 of the Constitutive Act. 
The Assembly generally determines the common policies of the AU. 
Specifically, in terms of economic integration, the Assembly determines the 
policies for the continent and gives directives as to how these policies are to 
be coordinated and harmonised by member states and RECs. The Assembly 
also monitors the implementation of these policies and ensures compliance 
by all member states and RECs. 
 In instances of non-compliance with the economic integration policies 
or where an institution of the AU exceeds its limits of authority, the Assembly 
may refer such dispute to the Court of Justice for a decision.45 The referral of 
such disputes must be confirmed by an absolute majority vote of the 
members of the Assembly.46 In order to perform its functions properly, the 
Assembly may delegate its powers and functions to any institution of the 
AU.47 The Assembly acts through decisions, and its decisions are reached 
through consensus, failing which, a two-thirds majority carries the vote.48 The 
decisions of the Assembly are binding on all member states, institutions of 
the AU, and RECs.49 They are automatically enforceable 30 days after the 
chairperson of the Assembly signs and publish the decisions in the official 
journal of the AU.50 The decisions of the Assembly are categorised into 
                                                          
44
 The request for an extraordinary session has to be supported by a majority of two-thirds of 
member states. Article 6 (3) Constitutive Act and article 9 (1) Abuja Treaty. 
45
 Article 8 (k) Abuja Treaty. 
46
 Article 8 (k) Abuja Treaty. There is, however, no indication as to what constitutes an 
absolute majority since the phrase ‘two-thirds majority’ is used in some instances. 
47
 Article 9 (2) Constitutive Act and article 8(4) Abuja Treaty. 
48
 Article 7 Constitutive Act. 
49
 Article 10(2) Abuja Treaty; rule 34(2) Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the African 
Union. 
50
 Rule 34 Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the African Union; article 10 Abuja Treaty. 
Ferreira-Snyman and Heyns et al erroneously argue that the African Union does not have 
powers to issue directives which are legally binding on member states. See Anel Ferreira-
Snyman ‘Regional organisations and their members: the question of authority’ (2009) XLII 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 200; C Heyns et al ‘The 
African Union’ 2003 German Yearbook of International Law 263. Ferreira-Snyman and 
Heyns’ position may have been informed by the absence of a clear position in the 
Constitutive Act. However, since the Constitutive Act gives the Assembly the power to make 
its rules and also makes it the supreme organ of the African Union, provisions of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Assembly are binding on member states. Furthermore, the Abuja Treaty, 
which is an integral part of the Constitutive Act by virtue of the OAU transformation into the 
AU, also makes Assembly decisions legally binding on Member States. 
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regulations, directives, recommendations, declarations, resolution and 
opinions.51  
 Regulations and directives are binding because non-implementation 
attracts a sanction from the Assembly.52 Resolutions, declarations, 
recommendations and opinions are not binding because they are intended to 
guide the actions of member states.53 Regulations are applicable in all 
member states and member states are required to take the necessary 
measures to implement them.54 Directives are also applicable in all member 
states but they bind member states only as to the objectives to be 
achieved.55 They give member states the discretion to determine the means 
through which the objectives will be implemented. 
 One issue that arises in the implementation of the decisions of the 
Assembly is that there is no indication in the Constitutive Act, the Rules of 
Procedure of the Assembly, or the Abuja Treaty as to how decisions become 
automatically enforceable. It is not clear if this means that the decisions will 
automatically have the force of law within the member states and will 
therefore create a basis for a right of action within the national legal systems. 
This ambiguity or uncertainty about the nature of automatic enforcement of 
Assembly decisions is further compounded by article 5 (2) of the Abuja 
Treaty. Article 5 (2) requires a member state ‘in accordance with its 
constitutional procedures, [to] take all necessary measures to ensure the 
enactment and dissemination of such legislation as may be necessary for the 
implementation of the provisions of this Treaty’. 
 This could be interpreted to mean that decisions of the Assembly 
made pursuant to the Abuja Treaty need to be enacted in domestic 
legislation in order to have the force of law in member states. This literal 
interpretation is in accordance with the ‘ordinary meaning rule’ provided for in 
article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.56 The implication 
of this interpretation is that the obligation to enact the necessary legislation to 
                                                          
51
 Rule 33 (1) Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the African Union. 
52
 Rule 33 (2) Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the African Union.   
53
 Rule 33 (1)(c) Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the African Union. 
54
 Rule 33 (1) (a) Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the African Union. 
55
 Article 33(1) (b) Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the African Union. 
56
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. 1155 UNTS 331. 
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give effect to the decisions of the Assembly is subject to the constitutional 
procedures of member states. So, where a decision of the Assembly has not 
been effected through domestic legislation, such a decision would be without 
legal effect within the national domain.57 This interpretation would clearly be 
at variance with the rule that requires the decisions of the Assembly to be 
automatically enforceable.  
 An interesting point to note is that the equivalent provision of article 5 
(2) of the Abuja Treaty is omitted in the Constitutive Act and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Assembly. Therefore, we can question the compatibility of 
article 5 (2) of the Abuja Treaty with article 33 (2) of the Constitutive Act, 
which gives the Constitutive Act precedence over the Abuja Treaty. Does 
article 33 (2) of the Constitutive Act extinguish the norm created in article 5 
(2) of the Abuja Treaty? Unfortunately, the Assembly has neither clarified this 
point nor has any member state sought an interpretation. This question 
needs an urgent authoritative interpretation in order to clarify how economic 
integration norms are to be implemented in member states. 
 The norms created at the continental level should have the requisite 
authority to influence the domestic policies of member states, thereby 
compelling national institutions to pursue the norms.58 The uncertainty about 
how to proceed with making Assembly decisions a part of national policies 
requires re-examination. If member states are expected to uniformly comply 
with the decisions of the Assembly, then it is important to clarify how such 
compliance is to be obtained.  
 Other than the question of clarity as to how the norms are to be 
entrenched in the national legal systems of member states, the ability of the 
                                                          
57
 This interpretation of article 5 (2) is in line with the dualist approach to the application of 
international legal rules in the national domain. Dualist scholars contend that international 
legal rules and domestic law are two separate bodies of laws and that domestic law takes 
precedence over international law in the national domain. In order for international law to 
become effective in the national domain, international law has to be domesticated. Monists, 
on the other hand, suggest that international law and domestic law are part of the same 
body of law and that international law takes precedence over national law. See JG Starke 
‘Monism and dualism in the theory of international law’ (1936) 17 British Yearbook of 
International Law 74–75. 
58
 Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White ‘The future of international law is 
domestic’ in Andre Nolkaemper and Janne Nijman (eds) New Perspectives on the Divide 
between International and National Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) 111. 
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Assembly to perform its functions as the supreme policy body ensuring that 
member states implement the integration norms is questionable. The 
Assembly meets twice a year and its meetings usually last for about two to 
three days. Since economic integration is only one of the numerous areas 
that fall under the jurisdiction of the Assembly, it appears that not enough 
time is spent on properly deliberating all the issues on the agenda.59 A close 
look at the decisions of the Assembly since 2002 reveals that the Assembly 
has made very few decisions on core issues of economic integration. Rather, 
its decisions have been focused on ‘recurrent issues which have no direct 
bearing on the integration process’.60 Since the inauguration of the AU, the 
Assembly has made over 200 decisions, but only ten of these decisions 
relate to any of the stages of economic integration outlined in the Abuja 
Treaty.61  
 The importance of the Assembly to the process of economic 
integration cannot be over-stated. As the supreme political organ of the AU, it 
serves as the platform for exchanging commitments between states through 
its deliberations on issues placed on its agenda.62 A constant exchange of 
commitments between member states at the highest level would increase the 
credibility of commitments between states because it raises the ‘cost of 
deception and irresponsibility’.63 It would serve as a forum for promoting the 
iteration of regional norms. At this level, a state that constantly flouts the 
norms of integration stands the chance of having its reputation damaged 
                                                          
59
 The High Level Panel Audit of the African Union (2007) 25 para 67. 
60
 The High Level Panel Audit of the African Union (2007) xxii. 
61
 The decisions are Decision on Economic Integration Doc. EX.CL/378 (XII) 
Assembly/AU/Dec. 58 (IV);  Decision Granting Accreditation to the East African Community 
as one of the Regional Economic Communities of the African Union Assembly/AU/Dec. 58 
(IV); Decision on the Protocol to the Treating Establishing the African Economic Community 
Relating to the Pan-African Parliament Assembly/AU/Dec. 4 (IV) Assembly/AU/Dec.17(II); 
Decision on the Specialised Technical Committees (STCS) Doc. EX.CL/496 (XIV); Decision 
on the Protocol on Relations between the African Union and the Regional Economic 
Communities Doc. EX.CL/348 (IX); Decision on the Specialised Technical Committees Doc. 
EX.CI/666/ (XIX); Decision on African Integration Doc. EX.CL/693/(XX) Assembly/AU/Dec. 
392 (XVIII); Decision for Boosting Intra-African Trade and Fast-Tracking The Continental 
Free Trade Area Doc. EX.CL/700 (XX) Assembly/AU/Dec. 394. Decision for Boosting Intra-
African Trade and Fast-Tracking The Continental Free Trade Area Assembly /AU/Dec.426. 
62
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (note 2) 272. 
63
 Robert Keohane After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984) 97. 
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among its peers.64 Heads of states would therefore ensure that economic 
integration policies were implemented to avoid being regarded as the state 
that does not comply. Therefore, it is imperative that issues of economic 
integration are frequently placed on the agenda of Assembly in order to 
create a platform for states to exchange their commitments continually, and 
to restate or clarify the regional norms when necessary.   
 A frequent restatement or clarification of the regional norms is further 
necessitated by the fact that, in practice, the decisions of the Assembly are 
not categorised as regulations or directives. They are all regarded as 
decisions. Given the inherent difference between regulations and directives, 
it is important for Assembly decisions to be distinguished. Where a decision 
is intended to be a regulation, no discretion is given to the member states as 
to the manner in which the regulation is to be implemented. Directives do not 
have the same effect because they give states the freedom to adopt different 
approaches in implementing the decision. What is required is that the 
objectives of the decision should be achieved. Where this distinction is not 
drawn, issues of implementation of the decisions arise because states and 
RECs are at liberty to implement the decisions in a manner that is most 
convenient for them. 
 Furthermore, if article 3(e) of the Abuja Treaty, which requires 
member states to observe ‘the legal system of the Community’, is to be 
properly complied with, it is necessary for the rules created by the Assembly 
to be precise. A precise rule should unambiguously define the conduct that is 
required, authorised or proscribed.65 The failure of the Assembly decisions to 
distinguish between regulations and directives creates ambiguity and lacks 
the element of precision that is necessary for the purposes of securing 
                                                          
64
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (note 2) 110. Andrew Guzman suggests that 
states tend to comply with their international obligations so as to develop a good reputation 
for compliance ‘because it makes promises more credible and, therefore, makes future 
cooperation both easier and less costly’. Therefore, even in instances where a state is better 
off if it violates its obligations, it tends to comply because it tries to protect it reputation to 
secure future commitments from other states. He further argues that the loss of reputation 
serves as informal sanctions because they tend to deter states from violating established 
rules. See Andrew Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory 
(Oxford University Press, New York 2008) 33-38. Andrew Guzman, ‘A compliance-based 
theory of international law (2002) 90(6) California Law Review 1823-1887. 
65
 K Abbot et al ‘The concept of legalization’ (2000) 54(3) International Organization 401. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
87 | P a g e  
 
compliance. For example, paragraph 6 of the Decision of African Integration 
requires member states to internalise the relevant legal instruments and take 
into account regional and continental programmes.66 If this is a regulation, it 
may be inferred that the obligation to internalise ‘the relevant legal 
instruments’ requires member states to domesticate the relevant integration 
instruments. On the other hand, if it is a directive, what will be required of 
member states is to ensure that integration objectives are achieved with or 
without passing the necessary legislation. While the above descriptions look 
similar, they generate different legal effects for private citizens who seek to 
enforce a right created pursuant to the decision of the Assembly. Where a 
member state has internalised the decision of the Assembly through 
domestic legislation, private citizens may seek to enforce that right through 
the national judicial process. In the absence of such domestic legislation, the 
national courts may be reluctant to grant such rights.  
 The Assembly as the supreme policy organ needs to be more 
proactive about addressing the core substantive issues on economic 
integration. It needs to ensure that other institutions of the AU periodically 
report back to it on steps that have been taken to implement its decisions. 
Given the busy schedule of the heads of states that constitute the 
membership of the Assembly, it might be prudent for the Assembly to 
delegate the decision-making powers on issues of economic integration to 
another institution of the AU. What will then be required of the Assembly is to 
give the necessary political support that is required to drive the process. The 
Assembly will still retain its powers to make the decisions on political issues 
and heads of state will be briefed by their representatives to the institution 
vested with making policy decisions for economic integration, since 
economic integration issues are highly technical and need detailed attention. 
Furthermore, the bulk of the responsibility for economic integration lies with 
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 Decision on African Integration Doc.EX.CL/693/(XX) Assembly/AU/Dec. 392 (XVIII), 
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNION, Eighteenth Ordinary Session 29-30 January 2012, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY%20AU%20DEC%20391%20-
%20415%20(XVIII)%20_E.pdf [accessed 10 March 2012]. 
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the RECs,67 and therefore the integration process would not be adversely 
affected if the decision-making powers were taken away from the Assembly.  
3.2.2 The Executive Council 
The Executive Council (Council) is composed of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
or any Minister designated by the government of a member state.68 The 
Council meets twice a year in ordinary sessions but may have an 
extraordinary session at the request of the chairperson of Council or any 
member state.69 The Council elects its chairperson after consultations 
between members. Decisions of the Council are reached on the basis of a 
consensus, failing which, a two-thirds majority is required.70 The Council’s 
decisions are made by means of regulations and, after approval by the 
Assembly, they are binding on member states, organs of the AU, and 
RECs.71 
  If a regulation is adopted in the exercise of delegated authority from 
the Assembly, subsequent approval from the Assembly is not required.72 
Council decisions are also automatically enforceable 30 days after they have 
been signed by the chairperson of Council and published in the official 
journal of the African Union.73 Under the Rules of Procedure of the Executive 
Council adopted under the Constitutive Act, the decisions of the Council are 
classified as regulations, directives and recommendations.74 They have the 
same effect as the r gulations and directives of the Assembly. As in the case 
of the Assembly, the decisions of the Councils are in practice not classified 
as either regulations or directives. The discussion about the automatic 
enforceability of Assembly decisions is also applicable to the decisions of the 
Council. 
                                                          
67
 See chapter 4 for a discussion of the RECs. 
68
 Article 10(1) Constitutive Act. However, practice shows that states are rarely represented 
by ministers other than their foreign affairs ministers.  
69
 Article 10 Constitutive Act and article 12 Abuja Treaty. A request for an extraordinary 
session has to be supported by a two-thirds majority of member states. 
70
 Article 11 Constitutive Act and article 13(4) Abuja Treaty. 
71
 Article 13(2) Abuja Treaty. 
72
 Article 13(2) Abuja Treaty. 
73
 Rule 35 Rules of Procedure of the Executive Council; article 10(3) Abuja Treaty. 
74
 Rule 34 Rules of Procedure of the Executive Council. 
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  The function of the Council is to coordinate and take decisions on 
policies in areas of common interest to member states. These areas include 
foreign trade; energy, industry and mineral resources; food, agricultural and 
animal resources; livestock production and forestry; water resources and 
irrigation; environmental protection, humanitarian action and disaster 
response; transport and communication; insurance; education, culture, 
health and human resources development; science and technology; 
nationality, residency and immigration matters; and social security.75 The 
policies made in these areas are then submitted to the Assembly for 
deliberation and approval. Since the Council comprises the foreign affairs 
ministers of member states, their ability to coordinate and take decisions in 
these broad areas of interest is questionable.  
 Most of these areas are traditionally not within the sphere of influence 
of foreign affairs ministers. This effectively reduces the capacity of the 
Council to make informed decisions and properly coordinate the process of 
economic integration in all the sectors listed. Furthermore, the Council meets 
only twice a year and therefore it is difficult to see how they can effectively 
address core issues. This challenge is not alleviated by the fact that the 
Constitutive Act creates Specialised Technical Committees (STCs) and the 
Permanent Representatives’ Committee’ (PRC) to assist the Council with its 
functions.76  
 The STC consists of national ministers or senior officials responsible 
for each of the sectors of integration, and its functions include the 
preparation and submission of programmes to the Council. These STCs 
have so far not been fully operational and therefore have not had any effect 
on the work of the Council.77 The common practice now is for ministers in 
charge of the different sectors to meet to discuss issues of common concern. 
However, they do not meet as the STC of the AU, but as the Sectoral 
Conference of Ministers, reporting to the Executive Council. The challenge 
with this arrangement is that there have been instances where the Council 
                                                          
75
 Article 13 Constitutive Act. 
76
 The Specialised Technical Committees are provided for in article 25 of the Abuja Treaty 
and article 14 of the Constitutive Act. The Permanent Representatives’ Committee’ did not 
exist under the Abuja Treaty. It was established under article 21 of the Constitutive Act. 
77
 The High Level Panel Audit of the African Union 39 para 100.  
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has tried to modify the recommendations and decisions of the Sectoral 
Conference of Ministers without having recourse to the ministers.78 This is 
rather absurd because the ministers are more informed about the problems 
facing their sectors. Any recommendation made by them in respect of their 
sectors should be given preference. 
 The PRC, on the other hand, comprises permanent representatives of 
member states of the AU.79 Its functions include acting as a liaison between 
member states and the AUC, and supporting the Executive Council in 
executing its powers and functions.80 The PRC has eleven sub-committees, 
but none of these sub-committees directly covers issues of economic 
integration. Instead, they focus on organisational issues.81 The PRC 
therefore has no technical input into the policy decisions made by the 
Executive Council. 
 The Council’s lack of technical capacity to develop effective policies in 
all areas of economic integration is a matter of grave concern and needs to 
be remedied if continental economic integration is to proceed. This absence 
of technical capacity will impede the Council’s judgement when formulating 
policies or programmes for the various areas of economic integration. The 
policies created might either be unrealistic or might fail to take into account 
pertinent issues. The chances of non-compliance are increased when these 
policies do not address the real concerns of the sectors. 
3.2.3 The African Union Commission  
Article 20(1) of the Constitutive Act establishes the African Union 
Commission (AUC). The AUC is headed by a chairperson who is assisted by 
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 The High Level Panel Audit of the African Union 35 para 85. 
79
 Article 21 Constitutive Act. 
80
 Rule 4 African Union Rules of Procedures for the Permanent Representatives’ 
Committee’. 
81
 The Sub-Committees are the Sub-Committee on Administrative, Budgetary and Financial 
Matters; the Sub-Committee on Programmes and Conferences; the Sub-Committee on 
Refugees; the Sub-Committee on Contributions; the Sub-Committee on Structural Reforms 
and Policy; the Sub-Committee on the Special Emergency Assistance Fund for Drought and 
Famine in Africa; the Sub-Committee on the Review of the Scale of Assessment; the Sub-
Committee on Headquarters and Host Agreements; the Sub-Committee on NEPAD; the 
Sub-Committee on Economic and Trade Matters; and the Sub-Committee on Multilateral 
Cooperation. See The High Level Panel Audit of the African Union 36–37 paras 92–93. 
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a deputy chairperson and commissioners.82 The AUC is the administrative 
hub of the process of economic integration. Unlikely the Assembly and the 
Executive Council, the officials of the AUC are not representatives of 
member states and therefore the AUC is relatively independent from the 
member states. The functions of the AUC include representing the AU and 
defending its interests under the guidance of the Assembly and Executive 
Council, initiating proposals for consideration by other institutions of the AU, 
implementing decisions of the institutions of the AU, and coordinating and 
monitoring the implementation of the decisions of the AU.83 The AUC has 
eight departments which are headed by commissioners.84 Each department 
is further subdivided into divisions. On paper, the AUC has been granted 
enough powers to coordinate economic integration but its impact has not 
really been felt.  
 The audit report of the AU suggests that the AUC lacks an adequate 
internal chain of command that is required for the effective coordination of 
the integration process.85 There has not been adequate synchronisation of 
functions between the various departments. The AUC is also understaffed 
and therefore lacks the necessary manpower to monitor the implementation 
of the various integration programmes. Furthermore, the classification of 
divisions that fall under each AUC department also shows incoherence in its 
efforts to coordinate economic integration. The economic integration division 
falls under the Department of Economic Affairs, while issues of trade, 
customs, and immigration are divisions under the Department of Trade and 
Industry. Trade and customs are integral parts of economic integration and 
should fall under the department responsible for economic integration. The 
Department of Trade and Industry is responsible for developing a common 
African position in the multilateral trading system but does not oversee 
economic integration. Labour, employment and migration fall under the 
Department of Social Affairs when in fact these issues are also vital to 
economic integration, particularly when there is a plan to create a continental 
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 Article 20(2) Constitutive Act. 
83
 Article 3(2) Statute of the African Union Commission 2007, as amended. 
84
 See table 1 below. 
85
 The High Level Panel Audit of the African Union 47 para 122. 
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common market. These classifications clearly reflect poor coordination within 
the structures of the AUC and a lack of understanding of the needs of 
economic integration. All these areas fall under the purview of economic 
integration. Splitting them between three departments does not support 
effective coordination.  
Table 1: Departments and divisions of the AUC (compiled from the AU 
website) 
Department Divisions  
Economic Affairs Economic Integration and Regional Cooperation; Economic Policies 
and Research; Private Sector Development/Investment and 
Resource Mobilisation; Statistics 
Human Resources, 
Science and 
Technology 
Education; Human Resources and Youth; Science, Technology and 
ICT 
Infrastructure and 
Energy 
Energy and Infrastructure 
Peace and Security Defence and Security; Conflict Management; Peace and Support 
Operations 
Political Affairs Democracy, Governance, Human Rights and Elections; 
Humanitarian Affairs, Refugees and Displaced Persons 
Rural Economy and 
Agriculture 
Agriculture and Food Security; Environment and Natural 
Resources; Rural Economy 
Social Affairs Health, Nutrition and Population; HIV/AIDS, Malaria and 
Tuberculosis; Labour, Employment and Migration; Social Welfare, 
Vulnerable Groups and Drug Control; Culture and Sport 
Trade and Industry Trade, Customs and Immigration; Industry 
 
The AUC also lacks specific structures to monitor the implementation 
of integration objectives because it does not have a hands-on presence in 
the RECs or the member states. While the AUC has representational offices 
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in New York (the United Nations), Geneva (the World Trade Organisation), 
Washington (the World Bank), Brussels (the European Union) and Cairo (the 
Arab League), it has no representational offices in the RECs. The only 
representational office it has is in SADC, and the office is not in Gaborone, 
where the SADC headquarters are located, but in Lilongwe, Malawi. If the 
AUC is to coordinate the economic integration policies of the RECs and 
member states effectively, it must have a hands-on presence. While it might 
be impossible for the AUC to have offices in all the member states, it can 
work towards having offices situated in the headquarters of RECs. In this 
way it will be able to verify the implementation reports that the RECs and 
member states submit. 
 
3.2.4 The Court of Justice 
Articles 18 of the Constitutive Act and the Abuja Treaty provide for a Court of 
Justice. Pursuant to article 18 of the Constitutive Act, a Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR Protocol) 
was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on 1 July 
2008. Annexed to the ACJHR Protocol is the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights (Statute of the ACJHR). The ACJHR Protocol is 
billed to replace the earlier Protocol of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African 
Union.86 The ACJHR Protocol creates a single court referred to as the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR).87 The ACJHR has not 
commenced operation because ACJHR Protocol is not yet in force. 
The ACJHR has 16 judges who are nationals of member states.88 The 
jurisdiction of the ACJHR includes disputes arising from the interpretation of 
the Constitutive Act; disputes arising from decisions and regulations of the 
Assembly and Council; and disputes arising from the interpretation, 
application or validity of treaties entered into under the AU and all subsidiary 
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 Article 1 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 2008. 
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 Article 2 ACJHR Protocol. 
88
 Article 3 Annex to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights. 
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instruments adopted within the framework of the AU or the OAU.89 This 
broad jurisdiction can be interpreted to include disputes that arise from the 
Abuja Treaty. 
 Article 29 of the Statute of the ACJHR lists the entities that are entitled 
to submit cases to the court: state parties to the ACJHR Protocol; the 
Assembly, the Parliament and other organs of the AU as authorised by the 
Assembly; and staff of the AU appealing against a decision relating to staff 
rules and regulations. Member states that have not ratified the ACJHR 
Protocol are expressly prohibited from submitting cases to the court.90 This 
provision creates a challenge to the efforts to achieve economic integration. 
The ACJHR is meant to carry out the functions of the Court of Justice 
created by article 18 of the Abuja Treaty. Member states that have not 
ratified the ACJHR Protocol cannot be sued in the ACJHR even if they have 
ratified the Abuja Treaty and the Constitutive Act.91 This invariably means 
that where a member state fails to honour its obligations under the Abuja 
Treaty or a protocol adopted pursuant to the Abuja Treaty, the chances of 
getting the ACJHR to decide on the non-compliance will be dependent on 
whether the member state is a signatory to the ACJHR Protocol. This places 
the integration process under pressure, particularly if the ACJHR is being 
relied upon to clarify an integration norm which a member state may have 
failed to honour. The provisions requiring member states to ratify the ACJHR 
Protocol separately is also questionable since the Protocol was made 
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitutive Act. Ratifying the Constitutive 
Act should by necessary implication grant member states access to the 
court.  
 Furthermore, the merger of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR) and the Court of Justice created under the Constitutive Act 
and the Abuja Treaty might also hamper the rate of ratification of the ACJHR 
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 Article 28 Statute of the ACJHR. 
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 Article 29(2) Statute of the ACJHR. 
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 As at 10 February 2013, 53 member states had signed the Abuja Treaty, and 49 had 
ratified or acceded to it. See African Union, ‘List of countries which have signed, 
ratified/acceded to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community’, available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Treaty%20Establishing%20the%20AEC_0.pdf 
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Protocol. The impact of the inclusion of the human rights component in the 
jurisdiction of the ACJHR is clear from the number of states that have ratified 
the ACJHR Protocol. As at January 2013, only 28 member states had signed 
the ACJHR Protocol and only Benin, Burkina Faso, Libya, Congo and Mali 
had ratified it.92 On the contrary, the previous Protocol on the Court of Justice 
of the African Union which had no express human rights jurisdiction had 43 
signatories and 16 ratifications.93 While the protection of human rights is 
essential for the development of any state, a more viable approach at this 
stage might have been to leave the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights as a separate court distinct from the Court of Justice of the African 
Union.  
3.3 The relationship between the African Union, the African 
Economic Communities and the Regional Economic 
Communities 
The process of economic integration in Africa is rather complex because it is 
simultaneously pursued at two levels (the AU level and the REC level). On 
one hand, the AU aims to integrate the economies of all the African states by 
building on the achievemen s of the RECs. On the other hand, the RECs 
intend to integrate the economies of their member states. Since the 
preferences, needs and economic configuration of each REC are relatively 
different, the AU strives to harmonise the programmes drawn up by the 
RECs to integrate the economies of their member states by developing 
common policies for the entire continent. This is no easy task and requires 
proper coordination in order to exchange information between the AU and 
the RECs successfully, and also to ensure that the agreed policies are 
implemented.  
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 See African Union, ‘List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the Protocol 
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights’, available at 
ihttp://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol%20on%20Statute%20of%20the%20African
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 This section examines the relationship between the AU and the RECs 
in order to identify areas where clarity is needed and where better 
coordination can be achieved. For economic integration to succeed, the AU 
and the RECs must be able to reduce uncertainty in the system by collecting, 
verifying and exchanging data between the different actors involved in the 
process.94 The process of collecting, verifying and exchanging data helps to 
build transparency in the system by reassuring actors that they are not the 
only ones complying with the rules. To facilitate the free flow of information, 
the functions and role of the AU and the RECs need to be clarified in order 
not to create confusion in the system as to the responsibilities of the AU and 
the RECs. In this regard, coordination between the AU and the RECs is 
important to ensure transparency through the exchange of information about 
their roles. Furthermore, clarifying the functions of the AU and the RECs will 
prevent the duplication of efforts in various areas of integration. First, the 
relationship between the AU and the AEC is discussed, followed by a 
discussion of the relationship between the AU and the RECs. 
3.3.1 The African Union and the African Economic Community 
Does the AEC have legal personality? Is there in fact an AEC? What is the 
relationship between the AU and the AEC? These are questions that often 
trouble anyone who studies economic integration in Africa. The 
transformation of the OAU into the AU did not help to answer these 
questions. Prior to the creation of the AU, the AEC was deemed an integral 
part of the OAU.95 Since the AU effectively took over from the OAU, it 
inherited the functions of the AEC.96 While the relationship between the AEC 
and the AU may look simple and straightforward, since the AEC is an integral 
part of the AU, the relationship is fraught with ambiguities that have raised 
both normative and institutional challenges. 
 Firstly, a cursory look at article 2 of the Abuja Treaty creates the 
impression that the AEC exists has legal personality. Article 2 provides that 
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 Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern International Economic Organisations in the International Legal 
Process (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1995) 76; Barbara Koremenos et al ‘The rational 
design of international institutions’ (2001) 55(4) International Organization 766. 
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 Article 98 Abuja Treaty. 
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‘[t]he High Contracting Parties hereby establish among themselves an 
African Economic Community’. However, article 6(1) provides that ‘[t]he 
Community shall be established gradually in six (6) stages … over a 
transitional period not exceeding thirty-four (34) years.’ Article 6(2) then sets 
out the different stages for the gradual establishment of the AEC.  
The first stage requires the strengthening of existing RECs and the 
establishing of new ones in regions where they do not exist. In the second 
stage, RECs are required to stabilise their tariff barriers and non-tariff 
barriers and strengthen sectoral integration in the fields of trade, agriculture, 
finance, communications, industry and energy. The third stage requires the 
creation of free trade areas and a customs union in each of the RECs. In the 
fourth stage, RECs are to coordinate and harmonise tariff and non-tariff 
systems with the view of establishing a continental customs union. The fifth 
stage requires the establishment of an African Common Market. The sixth 
and final stage requires the strengthening of the African Common Market to 
ensure the free movement of persons and factors of production, and the 
creation of a single domestic market, a Pan-African Economic and Monetary 
Union, an African Central Bank, an African currency and a Pan-African 
Parliament.  
The stages outlined above suggest that the AEC will come into 
existence only at the end of the 34-year transitional period. Before the end of 
the transitional period, what actually occurs are efforts by the RECs to 
harmonise their activities with the aim of creating an AEC at the end of the 
process. This point is strengthened by the fact that article 6(f) (vii) of the 
Abuja Treaty provides that, in the final stage of the transitional period, the 
executive organs of the AEC will be created. This clearly suggests that at 
present there is no AEC. 
 Assuming the above analysis is wrong and that the AEC was created 
instantly by virtue of the Abuja Treaty, the legal personality of the AEC is also 
questionable. Article 98 of the Abuja Treaty makes the AEC an integral part 
of the AU. Scholars have suggested that the AEC was not intended to have a 
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legal personality distinct from that of the AU.97 In determining when an 
international organisation has legal personality, the International Court of 
Justice in the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United 
Nations case made its decision partly based on the functions entrusted to the 
organisation and the attendant duties and responsibilities placed on the 
organisation to effectively discharge its functions.98 If the legal personality of 
the AEC is to be assessed by this standard, it definitely falls short of having a 
legal personality of its own, because while member states have entrusted it 
with the function of ensuring economic integration on the continent, the 
attendant duties and responsibilities are vested in the institutions of the AU. 
Furthermore, the capacity to enter into contracts is expressly vested in the 
Secretary General of the OAU (now the chairperson of the AUC).99 The 
implication of this is that the AEC exists only in title and can at best be 
considered to be a division of the AU.100 
The objectives of the AU and the AEC undoubtedly share a certain 
level of commonality and as such a merger is justifiable. However, in some 
areas their objectives differ. The objectives of the AEC are geared directly 
towards economic integration through the promotion of economic, social and 
cultural development.101 The AU, on the other hand, has economic 
integration as one of its objectives, but also includes other objectives such as 
the defence of the sovereignty of member states, protecting human rights 
and democracy, promoting peace and security, promoting democracy, good 
governance and the rule of law, adopting a common defence policy, and 
eradicating preventable diseases on the continent.102 The objectives of the 
AU are broader in scope and more politicised, while those of the AEC are 
specific, highly technical and less political. Requiring one institution to 
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perform all these functions simultaneously might be asking for too much, 
given the poor economic and political infrastructure in most African states.103 
From an institutional perspective, scholars have queried the rationality 
of the merger of the OAU with the AEC. The argument was that the 
institutions of the OAU did not have the capacity to effectively discharge the 
technical responsibilities associated with economic integration.104 The OAU 
always operated as a highly political organisation and its transformation into 
the AU has not changed its inherent political nature. Much to its credit, the 
AU has empowered the African Union Commission (AUC) and created some 
other institutions to handle technical and bureaucratic processes, but their 
capacity to perform their functions effectively in a highly politicised 
environment needs to be reconsidered.  
Given the broader political mandate of the AU (such as its powers to 
intervene in the affairs of member states where there are gross human rights 
violations), the danger of the process of economic integration falling prey to 
issues of politics is increased. This fear is not unfounded, given the history of 
the OAU, which practically came to a halt in the mid-1980s when the OAU 
recognised the statehood of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western 
Sahara).105 Also, the recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council 
(NTC) in the recent Libyan crisis placed South Africa and Nigeria on 
opposing sides, which almost resulted in an impasse in the AU.106 This 
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 See Clement Ng’ong’ola ‘Regional integration and trade liberalization in Africa: the Treaty 
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system’ (1999) 33(1) Journal of World Trade 145–171. 
104
 Clement Ng’ong’Ola (note 103) 150; SKB Asante Regionalism and Africa’s Development: 
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shows how easily friction can occur within the structures of the AU when 
highly political issues are involved. 
Since politics cannot be divorced from economic integration, it would 
be naïve to assume that it is possible to create institutions that are 
completely non-political. However, given the convergence of the objectives of 
the AU and the AEC in terms of economic integration, it is suggested that 
there needs to be a functional delimitation of responsibilities within the 
structures of the AU. The implementation of the objectives of economic 
integration should be allocated to specific institutions under the auspices of 
the AU, while the overall political process necessary for integration should 
remain with institutions such as the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government. The specific institutions in charge of economic integration 
should be given the responsibility of coordinating the modalities for economic 
integration specified in article 6 of the Abuja Treaty, and should not be 
involved with other issues that are not related to economic integration. The 
benefit of this sort of delimitation is that in the event that there is a political 
stalemate (as there was in the OAU) at the level of the political organs of the 
AU, the process of economic integration will not be adversely affected.  
Presently, the merger of the AU and the AEC has successfully eroded 
the distinction between economic integration and political integration, and 
this has had a very negative effect on economic integration. This merger has 
effectively relegated economic integration to the backburner because the AU 
by default is a political organisation. To put this issue into proper perspective, 
the practice of the Assembly and the Council is illustrative. Since the 
functions of the AEC are carried out by the institutions of the AU, the practice 
in the OAU was that the ordinary sessions of the Assembly and the Council 
would reconvene as ordinary sessions of the Assembly and the Council of 
the AEC. However, since 1999, the Assembly and the Council have 
convened only twice as the Assembly and the Council of the AEC. The 
practice now is that matters of economic integration are discussed during the 
regular sessions of the Assembly and the Council. The problem here is that 
economic integration no longer gets that extra attention that it deserves. As 
noted earlier, since the inception of the AU, the Assembly has made over 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
101 | P a g e  
 
200 decisions, but only nine of these decisions relate to any of the stages of 
economic integration outlined in the Abuja Treaty.107 Given the deplorable 
state of African economies, issues of economic integration ought to be given 
more attention and deliberated upon by states.  
The next sub-section discusses the relationship between the AU and 
the RECs. An understanding of this relationship is vital to the integration 
process because the whole idea of continental integration is built upon the 
RECs. Proper coordination is therefore necessary to adequately link the 
development plans of the RECs and the AU.  
3.3.2 The African Union and the Regional Economic Communities 
Economic integration in Africa is primarily dependent on the development of 
the RECs. Article 88 (1) of the Abuja Treaty expressly provides that ‘[t]he 
Community shall be established mainly through the co-ordination, 
harmonization and progressive integration of the activities of regional 
economic communities’. In other words, the RECs are required to serve as 
building blocks for integrating the economies of African states. Therefore, the 
success or failure of the RECs will invariably affect the entire integration 
process.  
Although the RECs are a vital component of the integration process 
they are autonomous and may develop their own integration programmes 
without reference to the AU.108 Presently, each of the RECs has its own 
objectives and programmes for integrating the economies of its member 
states. In order to create synergy between the RECs, the AU facilitates the 
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 The decisions are Decision on Economic Integration Doc. EX.CL/378 (XII) 
Assembly/AU/Dec. 58 (IV);  Decision Granting Accreditation to the East African Community 
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Communities Doc. EX.CL/348 (IX); Decision on the Specialised Technical Committees Doc. 
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Free Trade Area Doc. EX.CL/700 (XX) Assembly/AU/Dec. 394.  
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coordination of integration programmes so as to avoid duplication of efforts 
by the RECs. 
The role of the AU in coordinating the activities of the RECs is 
particularly important because the RECs were not part of the negotiation 
process of the Abuja Treaty. This means that African states agreed on a 
strategy for economic integration which was based on the activities of the 
RECs, but failed to give the RECs an opportunity to participate in the 
process. Although the RECs cannot be classified as states, their participation 
in the integration process is vital to African integration because the overall 
goal is to harmonise their activities within a specified time period to create 
the African Economic Community (AEC).109 It was therefore only logical that 
the RECs should have been involved in negotiating the Abuja Treaty. The 
omission of the RECs from the process of negotiating the Abuja Treaty was a 
major flaw both on legal and technical grounds.  
From a technical point of view, since each REC is created to address 
the specific problems of its member states, the priorities of the REC are 
different, and any process that requires them to harmonise policies or 
programmes would have benefited from their input. Furthermore, not all the 
RECs initially had trade liberalisation as provided for in the Abuja Treaty as 
their primary goal. Therefore, requiring the RECs to hurriedly develop 
strategies for liberalising trade within the timeframes specified in the Abuja 
Treaty might not have been realistic. As discussed in chapter 2, one factor 
that generates a propensity for compliance is the protection of the interests 
of the parties to the treaty. When a treaty is negotiated, each party ensures 
that its interest is protected in the treaty regime. However, because every 
party’s interest cannot always be catered for without affecting the interest of 
another party, parties need to compromise or give concessions. The 
discursive process of reaching a compromise not only helps to ensure that 
the interests of parties are covered but it also helps parties to agree on the 
norms of the treaty regime. A treaty that fails to consider the interests of all 
the parties or totally excludes some parties from the discursive process is 
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less likely to be complied with.110 These vital points seemed either to have 
been overlooked or not given adequate consideration when the RECs were 
left out of negotiation process of the Abuja Treaty.  
From a legal perspective, since the RECs, which are deemed to be 
the pillars of economic integration, were not signatories to the Abuja Treaty, 
they were not bound by the obligations created in the treaty. The RECs have 
separate legal identities from those of their member states and could not 
automatically be bound by agreements entered into by their member 
states.111 Therefore, it could be argued that the obligations created for the 
RECs in the Abuja Treaty had no standing in law. For the RECs to be bound 
by the obligations created under the Abuja Treaty there had to be a legal 
connection between the Abuja Treaty and the RECs.  Fortunately, efforts 
were subsequently made to draw the legal connection.  
As part of its remedial strategy, in 1998 the AU adopted a Protocol on 
the Relations between the African Economic Community and the Regional 
Economic Communities.112 The 1998 Protocol was signed by AMU, 
COMESA, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC. The 1998 Protocol was 
subsequently replaced by a 2007 Protocol on the Relations between the 
African Union and the Regional Economic Communities.113 The 2007 
Protocol was signed by CENSAD, COMESA, the EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, 
IGAD and SADC. These Protocols have helped to create a legal nexus 
between the continental economic integration strategy of the African Union 
and that of the RECs. For the purposes of this thesis, only the provisions of 
the 2007 Protocol will be examined, since it has replaced the 1998 Protocol. 
 The Preamble of the 2007 Protocol recites the Abuja Treaty and the 
Constitutive Act as the basis for defining the role of the AU and the RECs in 
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the process of African economic integration.114 Article 2 stipulates that the 
Protocol applies ‘to the mechanism established by Parties … to fulfil the 
responsibilities placed on them by the Constitutive Act, [Abuja] Treaty and 
[2007] Protocol.’ Clearly, these provisions were drafted on the assumption 
that the Abuja Treaty and the Constitutive Act create a binding obligation on 
the part of RECs to coordinate and harmonise their programmes with the 
view to creating an AEC in the future. While the RECs were not originally 
signatories to the Abuja Treaty and the Constitutive Act, the subsequent 
signing of the 2007 Protocol, which recites the Abuja Treaty and the 
Constitutive Act, can be regarded as having created the required legal 
connection.  
Oppong has questioned the legal basis for assuming that the RECs 
will integrate to create the AEC as suggested in article 88 (1) of the Abuja 
Treaty and whether there is a basis for the RECs to be bound by the 
decisions of the AEC.115 His reasoning is based on the fact that the RECs 
have separate legal personalities and were not parties to the Abuja Treaty.116 
Therefore, the RECs have no legal obligation to integrate for the purpose of 
creating the AEC because they are not organs, members or agents of the 
AEC.117 While this contention looks plausible at first glance, it is doubtful 
whether the RECs can validly question the existence of a legal obligation to 
integrate under the Abuja Treaty. So far, no REC has challenged the validity 
of the Abuja Treaty or the Constitutive Act on the basis that they were not 
signatories to the Abuja Treaty and were not involved in the drafting process. 
Rather, they have sought to act within the dictates of the Abuja Treaty. Some 
RECs have amended their constitutive instruments to acknowledge the 
adoption of the Abuja Treaty.118 Furthermore, article 36 (1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that ‘[a] right arises for a third 
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state from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the 
provision to accord that right either to the third state, or to a group of states 
to which it belongs [RECs] … and the third state assents thereto. Its assent 
shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated …’119 
Article 36 (1) of the Vienna Convention is important to this discussion 
because it permits states to create rights for a group of states to which they 
belong, provided that the group of states assent to those rights. Similarly, 
article 36 (2) requires the state in whose favour a right has been created to 
comply with the conditions for exercising the right. The implication of article 
36 (1) (2) is that not only is a third party right created but also, a concomitant 
obligation is placed on the beneficiary of the right.  In this regard, the 
adoption of the 2007 Protocol, which clearly recites the Abuja Treaty and the 
Constitutive Act, would be a basis for deeming that the RECs have assented 
to the rights created under the Abuja Treaty and the Constitutive Act. The 
argument that they are not signatories to the Abuja Treaty will thus be 
defeated. Therefore, the legal limbo in the relationship between the AU and 
the RECs has been adequately addressed by the 2007 Protocol and the 
failure of the RECs to merge in the future to create an AEC would give rise to 
a cause of action. 
The 2007 Protocol creates two institutions to coordinate intra-REC 
policies and activities.120 These institutions are essential for the attainment 
economic integration because they can facilitate the exchange information 
about the policies and programmes of the RECs. Since each REC acts 
independently of the others, the exchange of information is necessary to 
keep track of progress made and to ensure that the programmes do not 
conflict with the objectives of the Abuja Treaty and the Constitutive Act.  
The institutions created by the 2007 Protocol are the Committee on 
Coordination and the Committee of Secretariat Officials. The Committee on 
Coordination consists of the chairperson of the AUC, the chief executives of 
the RECs, the executive secretary of UNECA, the president of the ADB, and 
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Communities 2007. See the Preambles of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, Amended EAC 
Treaty and COMESA Treaty. 
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the chief executives of the financial institutions of the AU (which are yet to be 
created). The functions of the Committee on Coordination include 
coordinating and harmonising the policies of the RECs in all areas of 
integration, and monitoring and reviewing the progress made by each REC 
towards implementing the stages of integration listed in article 6(2)(b)–(d) of 
the Abuja Treaty.121  
Given that the function of the Committee on Coordination is to 
coordinate and harmonise the policies of the RECs, it is surprising that the 
commissioners of the AUC who oversee the various aspects of integration 
are not members of the Committee. Although the chairperson of the AUC is 
the administrative head of the Commission, it is unlikely that he or she will 
have a complete knowledge of all the integration sectors. The membership of 
the Committee on Coordination should include the AUC commissioners so 
that the RECs and the AUC can synchronise their policies or programmes. 
The AUC commissioners would be able to provide detailed insight into the 
planned programmes of the AU and how the RECs could either benefit from 
them or adapt their policies where necessary.  
The Committee of Secretariat Officials (CSO) is the administrative arm 
of the Committee on Coordination. The CSO consists of representatives of 
the AUC chairperson responsible for coordinating the activities of the RECs, 
the representative of chief executives of the RECs responsible for 
coordinating integration with the AU, the representative of the executive 
secretary of UNECA responsible for economic integration, the representative 
of the president of the ADB responsible for economic integration, and 
representatives of the chief executives of the AU financial institutions.122 The 
CSO prepares and submits reports to the Committee on Coordination about 
the implementation of policies pertaining to the Protocol, and about policies 
for coordination and harmonisation.123 The CSO basically gives 
administrative support to the Committee on Coordination. 
                                                          
121
 Article 7(2) 2007 Protocol. In article 6 (2) (b)–(d) of the Abuja Treaty, RECs are expected 
to go through three stages of integration: the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, the 
creation of free trade areas, and the creation of a continental customs union. 
122
 Article 9 (1) 2007 Protocol. 
123
 Article 9 (2) 2007 Protocol. 
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While it is important to have a means of coordinating the activities of 
the RECs and the AU, the creation of these Committees seems to be a 
duplication of efforts because the Constitutive Act already creates institutions 
which should be able to manage the integration process. The entire process 
seems to be riddled with bureaucracy and the duplication of duties. For 
example, the Specialised Technical Committees (STCs) that are created 
under the Constitutive Act are vested with the responsibility for preparing 
integration programmes for the AU and ensuring that projects are 
harmonised and coordinated.124 These committees are composed of 
ministers responsible for all the integration sectors in member states.125 So, 
rather than creating new institutions with all the attendant costs of 
administration and bureaucracy, it would have been more prudent to enlarge 
the membership of the STCs to include the heads of the RECs and the other 
development institutions. In that way, the RECs would also have formed part 
of the institutional design of the AU. Presently, a direct institutional 
connection seems to be missing.  
Another reason for suggesting that the STCs should harmonise the 
continental integration policies is that the 2007 Protocol presently requires 
the RECs to submit progress reports to the STCs about their achievements 
and difficulties in implementing the provisions of the Protocol.126 Therefore, 
the RECs’ challenges will be reported to the STC. Instead of duplicating the 
reporting process, the STC with an enlarged membership would be most 
suitable. Such an arrangement would be cost-effective and easier to manage 
because member states, the RECs and the AU would be jointly responsible 
for coordinating the entire integration process. Another advantage of such an 
arrangement is that it would allow for regional norms to be constantly re-
stated between all the actors. This arrangement would also create an avenue 
for all the actors to collectively resolve the difficulties that the RECs face in 
implementing the objectives of the AU.  
                                                          
124
 Article 15 Constitutive Act. 
125
 Article 14 (3) Constitutive Act. 
126
 Article 17 (2) Protocol on Relations between the African Union and the Regional 
Economic Communities 2007. 
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Another challenge in the relationship between the RECs and the AU is 
that responsibilities have not been concretely allocated between the RECs 
and the AU. The objectives of the AU, as listed in article 3 of the Constitutive 
Act, cover areas in which the RECs also have integration programmes. To 
avoid the duplication of activities, the 10th Preambular paragraph of the 2007 
Protocol defines the relationship between the AU and the RECs as one 
based on the principle of subsidiarity. However, apart from this reference, 
nothing in the text indicates how the principle of subsidiarity is to be applied 
to the relationship between the RECs and the AU. The principle of 
subsidiarity helps to balance power relations between various actors within 
an integrating unit.127 It enables decisions to be taken on specific problems 
within the sphere that can best address the problem, and determines at what 
level the powers to make decisions on specific problems should reside.128 In 
theory, the principle of subsidiarity would allow the RECs and the AU to 
embark on integration in specific areas to avoid overlapping responsibilities. 
It would also help to distribute functions between the RECs and the AU. In 
practice, the principle of subsidiarity has not been adequately applied to the 
relationship between the AU and the RECs. 
Although the 2007 Protocol recognises the principle of subsidiarity, 
the Protocol does not indicate the areas where either the RECs or the AU 
have exclusive competence. Given the broad objectives of the AU in article 3 
of the Constitutive Act, a clear indication as to the RECs’ areas of 
competence is necessary. Presently, the institutions of the AU have the 
power to develop continental policies in almost all the areas of human 
endeavour. This has inevitably led to a situation where integration is pursued 
on all fronts, but without a structured approach. For example, the Executive 
Council of the AU is vested with the responsibility for taking decisions in the 
areas of foreign trade, transport and communications, insurance, education, 
culture, human resource development, nationality, residency and immigration 
                                                          
127
 Ademola Oyejide Policies for Regional Integration in Africa Economic Research Paper 
No 62, (ADB, Abidjan, 2000) 16; Henkel Christoph ‘The allocation of powers in the European 
Union: A closer look at the principle of subsidiarity’ (2002) 20(2) Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 359–386. 
128
 Joel Trachtman ‘L’Etat, c’est nous: sovereignty, economic integration and subsidiarity’ 
(1992) 33 (2) Harvard Journal of International Law 469.   
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matters.129 These are areas where the powers to make decisions also fall 
within the area competence of the RECs. Given the difference in 
development in each of the regions, it is practically impossible for the 
Executive Council of the AU to determine the proper policies in all the RECs. 
Furthermore, it is difficult for the Executive Council (which is made up of 
foreign ministers) to have a proper understanding of the challenges facing all 
the RECs. A call for these functions to be exclusively delimited to the RECs 
is not unfounded if the provisions of the Abuja Treaty are taken into 
consideration. Article 6(2) of the Abuja Treaty, requires the RECs to have 
common policies in these areas only at the fifth stage of integration. 
Assuming the timetable set out in article 6 (2) of the Abuja Treaty is 
rigorously followed, the fifth stage of integration will start only in 2019.130 
Given this timeframe, it is only logical that, at this stage, these functions 
should lie exclusively with the RECs. The Executive Council can use its time 
and resources to make policies for other areas that require urgent attention. 
The scope of the functions of the AU in relation to the RECs needs to 
be delimited to provide adequate coordination in the integration process. This 
is essential to achieve compliance with the objectives of the integration 
treaties. Where this key element of coordination is lacking, the ability of the 
RECs to comply with the norms created in the process may be limited, 
because the norms may not address the specific concerns or challenges of a 
particular REC. In addition, the lack of proper coordination between the AU 
and the RECs may lead to the creation of imprecise norms that are difficult to 
implement. In calling for the delimitation of the functions of the institutions of 
the AU vis-a-vis the RECs, it is not being argued that the objectives of the 
AU should be streamlined. While the objectives of the AU can still be as 
broad as possible, the specific responsibility of creating policies in some 
areas should lie within the exclusive province of the RECs. In this regard, the 
function of the AU would be to assist the RECs in developing the required 
capacity to implement the policies that have been created. 
                                                          
129
 Article 13 Constitutive Act. 
130
 The Abuja Treaty entered into force in 1994. The treaty required the first stage to be 
completed in five years (1994–1999), the second stage in eight years (1999–2007), the third 
stage in 10 years (2007–2017), the fourth stage in two years (2017- 2019), the fifth stage in 
four years (2019–2023), and the sixth stage in five years (2023–2028). 
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Other than defining the relationship between the AU and the RECs, 
the AU as the body in charge of monitoring the process of economic 
integration in Africa could also address the issue of overlapping 
memberships of RECs and the progressive realisation of the stages of 
integration stipulated in article 6 of the Abuja Treaty. The AU could adopt the 
principle of variable geometry to regulate the realisation of the provisions of 
article 6, thereby enabling RECs that are at a more advanced stage to 
progress with the goal of continental integration. Variable geometry as a 
principle of integration permits states within an integration regime to progress 
with the implementation of integration objectives as different speeds.   
The use of variable geometry as a principle of regional integration was 
first applied in the context of European governance to enable different 
member states of the European Union to integrate at varied speed and 
extent.131 It was adopted as ‘a method of differentiated integration which 
acknowledges that there are irreconcilable differences within the integration 
structure and therefore allows for a permanent separation between a group 
of member states and a number of less developed integration units’.132 
Variable geometry was adopted in the European Union to enable flexibility in 
the process of integrating the economies of member states of the European 
Union.133  
                                                          
131
 Alex Mills, ‘Towards a public international perspective on Private International Law: 
Variable Geometry and Peer Governance’ March 2012 Faculty of Law, University College 
London Working Paper, 15, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2025616&download=yes [accessed 4 
September 2012].  
132
 See http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/variable_geometry_europe_en.htm 
[accessed 4 September 2012].  
133
 For a detailed discussion on the institutionalization, adaptation and emergence of flexible 
integration in the European Union, see Alexander Stubb, ‘Negotiating flexible integration in 
the Amsterdam Treaty’ in Karlheinz Neunreither and Antje Wiener (eds) European 
Integration after Amsterdam: Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2000) 154-174. Neil Walker, ‘Sovereignty and differentiated 
integration in the European Union’ (1998) 4 (4) European Law Journal 355-388. Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann, ‘How flexible is Community Law? An unusual approach to the concept of “two 
speeds” (1984) 82 (5/6) Michigan Law Review 1274-1293. Robert Harmsen, ‘A European 
Union of variable geometry: problems and perspectives’ (1994) 45 Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 109-133. Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Flexible Integration: 
Towards a More Effective and Democratic Europe (CEPR, London, 1995) 9-14. JA Usher, 
‘Variable geometry or concentric circle: patterns for the European Union’ (1997) 46 (2) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 243-273.  
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Variable geometry has been applied in the European Union through 
an ‘opt-out’ and ‘opt-in’ mechanism which enables member states, subject to 
certain conditions set out in the Treaty of the European Union to either opt-
out  or opt-in to certain aspects of the integration policy.134 Based on the 
principle of variable geometry, the United Kingdom and Ireland were able to 
opt-out of the 1990 Schengen Convention which required members of the 
European Union to remove internal border controls on the movement of EU 
and non-EU nationals. It also enabled the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Denmark to opt-out of the European Economic and Monetary Union. 
 In the context of African integration, variable geometry though 
not formally adopted as a continental principle of integration, it has 
been applied by some RECs. For instance, the principle has been 
implicitly used in SADC to grant some member states permission to 
proceed at a different speed in terms of SADC trade liberalisation 
scheme. 135 In East Africa, variable geometry is expressly adopted as 
a principle of integration. The EAC Treaty defines variable geometry 
as ‘the principle of flexibility which allows for progression in co-
operation among a sub-group of members in a larger integration 
scheme in a variety of areas and at different speeds’.136  
 The principle has received the support of the East African Court 
of Justice (EACJ). In a request for an advisory opinion brought before 
the EACJ by the Council of Ministers of the EAC,137 the EACJ was 
called upon to determine the scope of application of the principle of 
                                                          
134
 Alex Mills, ‘Towards a public international perspective on Private International Law: 
Variable Geometry and Peer Governance’ (note 131)15-16. 
135
 The principle has been implicitly applied within the SADC Free Trade Area to gradually 
phase down tariffs. See SADC FTA Brochure, 7, available on 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5813/3095/9803/FTA_Brochure_English.pdf  [14 September 2011], 
See also Ashimizo Afadameh-Adeyemi, A Survey of Trade Governance Legislations in 
Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda, 2011 Unpublished Report of the 
Labour & Enterprise Policy Research Group, Institute of Development and Labour Law, 
University of Cape Town,  20. SADC, Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
(RISDP) (2003) 3, 84. Letlhokwa George Mpedi and Mathias Nyenti, ‘Perspectives towards 
the development of the social protection dimension of the SADC regional integration agenda’ 
2012 (2) (2) SADC Law Journal 43. 
136
 Article 1, 7 (1) (e) EAC Treaty. 
137
 In the matter of a request by the Council of Ministers of the East African Community for 
an Advisory Opinion, Application No. 1 of 2008, East African Court of Justice, First Instances 
Division. 
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variable geometry and the consistency of the application of the 
principle in light of the requirement for consensus in decision –
making.138 The EACJ held that the variable geometry is a recognised 
principle of integration and its application is not in conflict with the 
principle of consensus in decision-making.  
 James Gathii defines variable geometry in the African context 
to mean: 
Rules, principles and policies adopted in trade integration treaties 
that give member states, particularly the poorest members: (i) policy 
flexibility and autonomy to pursue at slower paces timetabled trade 
commitments and harmonisation objectives; (ii) mechanisms to 
minimize distributional losses by creating opportunities such as 
compensation for losses arising from implementation of region-wide 
liberalization commitments and policies aimed at the equitable 
distribution of the institutions and organizations of regional integration 
to avoid concentration in any one member; and (iii) preferences in 
industrial allocation among members in an RTA and preferences in 
the allocation of credit and investments from regional banks .139 
From the above definition, it is apparent that the application of variable 
geometry in Africa would give poorer states the flexibility to progress 
with economic integration at a pace which is not necessarily 
detrimental to their national econ mies. Also, taking into consideration 
the fact that distributional losses may be incurred in trade liberalisation 
schemes as a result of trade deflection, variable geometry also 
enables integration regimes create compensatory mechanism to 
account for any distributional loss that may occur.140  
 In addition to this point, integration regimes in Africa which 
focus primarily on trade liberalisation often encounter the obstacle of 
resolving the challenge of unequal benefits that accrue to some 
members of the integration regime.141 The experience from the 
previously defunct East African Community shows that economic 
integration fails when states are of the opinion that they are unable to 
                                                          
138
 Supra 1. 
139
 James Gathii, African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Regimes (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2011) 35.  
140
 Ibid 41-46. 
141
 O Saasa, ‘Economic cooperation and integration among developing countries’, in O 
Saasa (ed.) Joining the Future: Economic Integration and Co-operation in Africa 1991 
(African Centre for Technology Studies Press: Nairobi) 14-15. 
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maximise the benefits that accrue from integration. Putting it 
differently, economic integration in Africa fails when a state(s) feel that 
other member states benefit at its own expense. While member states 
may agree to the broad idea of economic integration because of the 
inherent benefits that accrue from such arrangements, member states 
would often factor in the overall cost before implementing economic 
integration policies. Where there is no concrete arrangement for the 
adjustment of such costs, states may be tempted to deflect on their 
commitment. Finally, since the industrial base of a significant number 
of African states is low, variable geometry would enable the 
preferential allocation of credit to less industrialised countries – a 
mechanism which would have otherwise been deemed 
discriminatory.142 A significant difference between the manner in 
which variable geometry has been applied in Europe and Africa lies in 
the fact that while in Europe, it has been primarily used to give 
member states the flexibility to either opt-in or opt-out of certain 
regional policies, in Africa, variable geometry enables the minimisation 
of distributional losses and permits preferential allocation of credit for 
the purpose of industrialisation. The ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’ permitted by 
variable geometry could also be adopted by AU so as to speed up the 
economic integration process. 
 The ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’ approach could also be strategically 
applied to resolve the challenge of non-compliance that emanates 
from multiple memberships of RECs.  Presently, out of the 53 African 
states, 26 belong to two RECs, 20 belong to three RECs, 1 belongs to 
four RECs and only 6 states belong to one REC.143 Several reasons 
have been adduced for African states belonging to multiple RECs.144 
One of such reason is that multiple memberships enables states to 
                                                          
142
 James Gathii, ‘African regional trade arrangements as flexible legal regimes’ (2009-2010) 
35 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 609. 
143
 UNECA, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (Economic Commission for Africa, 
Addis Ababa, 2004) 40. 
144
 James Gathii suggests that African states belong to multiple RECs because that African 
states belong to several RECs because of the benefits they derive from each of the RECs. 
For a detailed discussion on benefits derived from multiple memberships, see James Gathii 
(note 139) 67-75. I Zartman, ‘Africa as a subordinate state in international relations’, (1967) 
21 (3) International Organization  549-550. 
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derive different benefits specific to each REC.145 Belonging to more 
than one REC creates challenges such as high administrative costs 
and conflicting obligations particularly in the area of trade 
liberalisation.146  
 The main drawback with multiple memberships arises when a 
state belongs to different RECs with conflicting trade liberalisation 
policies. This is because conflict would arise in the implementation of 
the rules of origin of the different RECs. To resolve the problem of 
conflicting trade obligations, the ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’ approach could be 
used by states. In this regard, a state may decide to opt-out of the 
trade liberalisation scheme of a particular REC and join that of another 
REC it belongs to.  Although the state opts out of the trade 
liberalisation scheme, it would continue to be a member of the REC 
and as such it would derive all the other non-trade benefits that the 
REC has to offer. For example, Tanzania may decide to opt out of the 
SADC Trade Protocol and yet belong to SADC. This way, it will still 
enjoy the benefits SADC has to offer in other areas of economic 
integration (such as mining and energy). 
The efficacy of variable geometry as a principle for facilitating 
compliance with integration norms lies in the fact that it gives states that are 
less enthusiastic about opting in to certain aspects of the integration regime 
the latitude to participate in the integration regime albeit at a slower pace 
compared to those states that are willing to progress at a faster pace. The 
intrinsic value of this flexible arrangement is found in its ability to permits 
states to operate within a policy framework that carefully pays attention to the 
interest of member states without jeopardising the overall goal of integration. 
States can use it as a basis to decide the areas of integration that are of 
specific interest to them on the basis of national policy interest. It thus serves 
as a basis for accommodating different interests among member states.147  
This is important because an integral component of the discourse on 
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 James Gathii (note 139) 67-68. 
146
 UNECA, (note 143) 41. 
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 Peter Lloyd, ‘The variable geometry approach to international economic integration’ 51, 
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compliance with integration treaties can be attributed to the commitment of 
member states to implement integration norms at the national level.  
Implementation at the national level is carried out by enacting appropriate 
national legislations or regulations to give effect to the norms created at the 
regional level.148   
Although states have an obligation to implement and give effect to 
these integration treaties, implementation may not always occur for various 
reasons. Other than ambiguity in the text of a treaty,149 states may the face 
the challenge of implementation while trying to align their national legislations 
with the regional norms. One factor that may warrant non-implementation of 
the integration norms is the inability of states to efficiently align their interest 
with specific aspects of the integration agenda.150 While in the long-term it 
might be in the interest of the state to accede to the overall integration 
agenda, there may be certain aspects of the agenda that might not be 
beneficial to the state in the short-term. For instance, in the absence of 
avenues to create alternative means of revenue, a member state that relies 
heavily on customs tariffs for generating national revenue may not be able to 
promptly eliminate customs tariffs under a regional trade liberalisation 
framework. In this scenario, while it may be beneficial for a state to 
reciprocate the elimination of customs tariffs in order for its goods to have 
duty-free access in the markets of other member states, it may be practically 
impossible to eliminate those tariffs within the allocated timetable for the fear 
of governmental bankruptcy. 
 Given the short-term effect that the removal of customs tariffs might 
have on the state, it becomes imperative for the state to carry out a cost-
benefit analysis on the impact of trade liberalisation on its national 
economy.151 The cost-benefit analysis of a legislation or regulation plays a 
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 Most of the treaties establishing the RECs and the AEC require Member States to pass 
national legislation to give effect to the provisions of the enabling treaties. Article 5 (1) (2) 
Abuja Treaty, article 5 (1)(2) COMESA Treaty, article 8 (2) EAC Treaty, article 5 (2) ECCAS 
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vital role in the decision to implement a legislation or regulation.152 Therefore, 
while the state makes the decision on whether it can afford to implement the 
trade liberalisation scheme in its entirety on the basis of its national interest, 
states that do not face the same challenge would be permitted under the 
variable geometry principle to proceed with all aspects of the trade 
liberalisation scheme. If we thus concede that a state’s propensity to comply 
or implement its treaty obligations is increased when its interest is affected 
positively,153 it becomes essential to ensure that steps are taken to 
progressively balance the interest of states and at the same time put in place 
a framework that ensures that the integration objectives are met. This is what 
the principle of variable geometry seeks to achieve. 
Apart from the impact of national interest on propensity to comply with 
an integration norm(s), a state might also genuinely lack the ability to 
implement certain integration norms as a result of capacity constraint.154  
When capacity constraints arises in the implementation of regional economic 
policies, creating a flexible integration regime that permits member states to 
progressively move at different rate in the implementation of the common 
policies becomes necessary to prevent the entire integration process from 
being stalled.  Examples can be drawn from the implementation of the SADC 
Rules of Origin which grants a special dispensation to Malawi, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Zambia (MMTZ) which permits them to export into South 
Africa and other countries in the South African Customs Union (SACU) 
apparel made from fabric imported from outside the SADC region.155 
                                                                                                                                                                    
bad effects of regulation…’  Cass Sunstein, ‘Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis’ University 
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Ordinarily, under the SADC Rules of Origin, apparel made from fabric 
imported from outside the SADC region would not qualify for SADC tariffs 
preferences. However, because of the lack of capacity in the textile industry 
in the MMTZ countries, this exemption would enable the local textile 
industries to recapitalize. In the absence of such an exemption, the MMTZ 
countries might not have been persuaded to participate in the SADC trade 
liberalization programme. 
3.4 Conclusion  
The transformation of the OAU into the AU has strengthened the institutional 
and normative framework for achieving continental economic integration. 
However, the AU has not been able to coordinate the process of economic 
integration properly. The shoddy manner in which economic integration 
issues have been handled may be attributable to the merger of the AU and 
the AEC. Issues of economic integration have been buried in the political 
structures of the AU. This needs to be addressed for regional economic 
integration to proceed successfully. This chapter has pointed out that there 
are issues of ambiguity and capacity within AU structures that reduce the 
AU’s ability to coordinate the implementation of continental economic 
integration properly.  
The above discussion has shown that the Assembly of Heads of State 
as the supreme organ of the AU is an inherently political institution which has 
paid insufficient attention to issues of economic integration. Clarity about the 
nature of the Assembly’s decisions and how they are to be implemented is 
also required. It has been suggested that, given the busy schedule of Heads 
of State and the extensive deliberations needed for issues of economic 
integration, the powers to decide on economic integration policies should be 
transferred to another organ of the AU. The new organ vested with the 
responsibility would be more hands-on and solely responsible for issues of 
economic integration. The present composition of the Executive Council, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Southern African Development Community SADC FTA Brochure,  12. Available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5813/3095/9803/FTA_Brochure_English.pdf 
[accessed 14 September 2012].  
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which is meant to develop economic integration policies, does not make it 
the best institution to determine policies for economic integration. The 
structural composition of the departments of the AUC should be revised so 
that issues of economic integration are addressed by one department. The 
AU commissioner responsible for economic integration would thus be able to 
synchronise programmes and policies with all the RECs properly. In addition, 
the relationship between the AU and the RECs needs to be strengthened. In 
this regard, the areas where the RECs have exclusive competence should 
be identified while the AU assists the RECs with technical and administrative 
support. This would ensure that the AU does not waste resources on 
developing programmes in areas where the RECs might be best suited to 
operate. Finally, the AU could facilitate the fulfilment of the provisions of 
article 6 of the Abuja Treaty and the resolution of some of the challenges 
emanating from multiple memberships of RECs by adopting the variable 
geometry principle.
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
119 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 4: Securing compliance through the 
NEPAD and the APRM initiatives 
4.0 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on mechanisms that have been adopted within the 
framework of the African Union (AU) to ensure good governance and 
capacity building in African states. As was discussed in chapter 3, the AU is 
vested with the responsibility of coordinating and overseeing the 
implementation of economic integration on the continent. The AU has 
therefore adopted two initiatives, namely, the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) to improve the governance performance of African states and to 
collectively attempt to build institutional, human and infrastructural capacity.1 
This chapter examines both initiatives to explore how African states have 
used these initiatives to create a platform for securing compliance with their 
obligations under the various integration treaties and other treaties, 
compliance with which improves the lives of African people. 
Although these initiatives were not geared only towards promoting 
economic integration, the rationale for examining these initiatives is to 
emphasise the point that, even in the absence of strong supranational 
institutions, alternative mechanisms can be used by African states to foster 
compliance with their integration obligations. A close examination of NEPAD 
and the APRM will disclose the steps that have been taken to ensure that 
African states align their national policies with integration norms and, if 
practices are rigorously and consistently pursued, they have the capacity to 
change the behaviour of African states with regard to complying with their 
integration obligations. Consequently, the purpose of NEPAD and the APRM 
is not only to guarantee that regional norms affect the behaviour of states, 
                                                          
1
 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) October 2001, available at 
http://www.nepad.org/system/files/NEPAD%20Framework%20(English).pdf [accessed 5 
March 2012]; African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Base Document 2003 
NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003/APRM/MOU/Annex II. 
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but also to determine whether the norms are effective in bringing about 
change on the continent. By putting these initiatives in place, African states 
are starting to take conscious steps to bridge the gap between the behaviour 
prescribed by integration treaties and their actual practices and behaviour.  
4.1 African economic integration and the NEPAD agenda  
Upon the independence of most African states in the 1960s, disenchantment 
with the post-colonial economy led third-world countries to seek to use 
economic integration as a means of encouraging South-South trade and 
economic co-operation between developing countries.2 In Africa the role of 
economic integration was more expanded, because it was seen as a means 
of pooling resources to improve the living conditions of African people and to 
reduce the effects of Africa’s balkanisation.3 Integrating African economies 
was based on the need to improve the overall welfare of the African people 
by overcoming poverty, creating self-sustenance on the continent, and giving 
the African people a better life. Since the creation of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) and its subsequent transformation into the AU, African 
leaders have passed numerous declarations, resolutions and treaties aimed 
at improving the overall welfare of the African population.4 Therefore, in order 
                                                          
2
 Teshome Mulat ‘Multilateralism and Africa’s Regional Economic Communities’ (1998) 32(4) 
Journal of World Trade 115-138. 
3
 Rene N’Guettia Kouassi ‘The itinerary of the African integration process: an overview of the 
historical landmarks’ (2007) 1(2) African Integration Review 1. 
4
 The resolutions and declarations include Resolution CM/ST/12(XXI) on the African 
Declaration of Cooperation, Development and Economic Independence, endorsed by the 
Tenth Ordinary Session of the OAU held in Addis Ababa on 25 May 1973; 
Recommendations of the 11
th
 Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU 
on Economic Development and Cooperation held in Kinshasa in December 1976; Monrovia 
Declaration of Commitment of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU on 
Guidelines and Measures for National and Collective Self-Reliance in Social and Economic 
Development for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order AHG/ST.3(XVI) 
Rev 1; Resolution on Holding an Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Heads of 
States and Government on Economic Problems of Africa AHG/ST.4 (XVI) Rev 1; Final Act of 
Lagos 1980 and the Lagos Plan of Action 1980. Of these documents, three important 
instruments by the OAU initially reinforced the commitment of African leaders to push for 
continental integration: the 1973 African Declaration on Cooperation, Development and 
Independence, which identified economic programmes and priority sectors for development; 
the 1976 Kinshasa Declaration, which defined the strategies and stages for establishing an 
African Economic Community; and the 1979 Monrovia Declaration of Commitment of the 
Heads of State and Government of the OAU on Guidelines and Measures for National and 
Collective Self-Reliance in Social and Economic Development for the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order, which called for the creation of an African Common 
Market as a prelude to the creation of an African Economic Community. The declarations 
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to properly understand economic integration in Africa, it is has to be viewed 
as a means to an end and not as an end in itself. The end result is freeing 
African people from the shackles of poverty and underdevelopment, while 
economic integration is the means by which this goal will be achieved.  
 As part of the AU’s goal of improving African people’s quality of life, 
the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) was launched on 23 
October 2001.5 NEPAD is the AU’s economic programme of action, which 
promised to be a ‘long term vision of an African-owned and Africa-led 
development programme’.6 The primary goal of NEPAD is to eradicate 
poverty, and to put Africa on the path of sustainable growth and development 
in order to participate actively in the world economy.7 To achieve this goal, 
the NEPAD document sets out a programme of action which identifies the 
conditions necessary for sustainable development in Africa. These conditions 
are identified as peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights 
and sound economic management.8 Furthermore, capacity building features 
as a central theme in NEPAD’s strategy for combating underdevelopment. 
The strategy highlights the fact that most African states lack the capacity to 
meet the conditions necessary for sustainable development. The NEPAD 
document emphasises capacity building in various sectors of African 
economies. Priority is given to bridging the existing gaps in infrastructure, 
education, information communications and technology, agriculture, and 
science and technology.9 NEPAD also provides strategies for facilitating 
capital flow initiatives and market access initiatives. As a strategy for 
enhancing capital flows in African economies, NEPAD advocates an 
increase in domestic resource mobilisation and debt relief, increased flows of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and resolutions are available at http://www.au.int/en/decisions/assembly [accessed 5 March 
2012]. See Jeggan Senghor ‘The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community: an 
introductory essay’ in AA Yusuf (ed) African Yearbook of International Law 183.  
5
 NEPAD was initially named the New African Initiative (NAI). The NAI was a merger of two 
previous economic strategies: the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery 
Programme (MAP) and the OMEGA Plan. See African Union Background on the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), available at 
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/nepad.htm, http://www.nepad.org/history 
[accessed 5 March 2012]. 
6
 The NEPAD Framework Document, October 2001, para 60. 
7
 Ibid para 1. 
8
 Ibid para 71. 
9
 Ibid part V. 
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Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), and private capital flows.10  In 
respect of market access, NEPAD advocates the removal of tariff and non-
tariff barriers, diversifying production, promoting private sector participation, 
promoting African exports, and boosting the capacity of states in the services 
sector.11 
Given the range of policy areas that NEPAD covers, one may 
question how NEPAD can be used to facilitate compliance with integration 
objectives. As discussed in chapter 2, non-compliance with treaty obligations 
may sometimes arise as a result of lack of capacity to meet the required 
obligations under the treaty. In Africa, capacity constraints are evident in 
several sectors, and these inhibit the ability of African states to meet their 
integration obligations.12 An essential component of the NEPAD agenda that 
can foster compliance with integration treaties, particularly in the area of 
intra-regional trade integration, is its emphasis on building capacity in 
regional infrastructures. The availability of sound infrastructures contributes 
to economic growth and poverty reduction.13 It is an incontrovertible fact that 
having adequate infrastructures, such as transnational highways, good 
seaports and efficient railway networks, plays an essential role in facilitating 
the production of goods and services, thus reducing the cost of production.14 
Poor infrastructure in the areas of transport and communications has been 
identified as a major impediment to intra-African trade integration.15 
Research indicates that although tariff levels have decreased in recent years 
as a result of various regional and multilateral trade agreements, transport 
costs still remain a restrictive trade barrier in Africa.16 Limao and Venables 
have shown that ‘[p]oor infrastructure accounts for 40 per cent of predicted 
transport costs for coastal countries and up to 60 per cent for landlocked 
                                                          
10
 Ibid paras 144–152. 
11
 Ibid paras 153–170. 
12
 Soumana Sako ‘Challenges facing Africa’s Regional Economic Communities in capacity 
building’ African Capacity Building Foundation Occasional Paper No 5 (2006) 8–12. 
13
 NEPAD document (note 6) paras 96–102.  
14
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) Assessing Regional Integration 
in Africa IV: Enhancing Intra-African Trade (UNECA, Addis Ababa, 2010) 295. 
15
 V Ancharaz, K Mbekeani and Z Brixiova ‘Impediments to regional trade integration in 
Africa’ (2011) 2(11) Africa Economic Brief 3. 
16
 Ibid. 
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countries’.17 This invariably increases market prices and makes intra-African 
trade unattractive. The correlation between transport costs and the existing 
restrictions on intra-African trade, despite the reduction of tariffs between 
African states, highlights the fact that mere compliance with trade rules such 
as the elimination of tariffs will not suffice to achieve trade integration on the 
African continent. It is this challenge that NEPAD seeks to address.  
  The capacity-building mechanism incorporated into the NEPAD 
initiative makes it an essential tool for securing compliance with integration 
treaties because it tries to bridge the infrastructural gap which hitherto has 
served as an impediment to the implementation of some of the economic 
integration norms. An example of NEPAD’s infrastructural drive is the north–
south corridor project: Durban in South Africa to Dar-es-salaam in Tanzania. 
So far, through this initiative, 157 infrastructural projects have been 
embarked upon, including 59 road projects, 38 rail projects and 6 bridge 
projects.18 As part of the larger Cape-to-Cairo project, a 350-kilometre road 
between Dar-es-salaam and Cairo is presently under construction and will be 
completed in 2015.19 Furthermore, preparatory work is in place for the 
construction of the Kazungulu Bridge linking Botswana and Zambia.20 These 
efforts may look insignificant or minimal considering the dearth of existing 
infrastructure. However, they represent a starting point in the journey 
towards improving the overall welfare of African people. Furthermore, in 
order to achieve the goal of integrating all the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) into an African Economic Community (AEC), it will be 
                                                          
17
 N Limao and AJ Venables ‘Infrastructure, geographical disadvantage, transport costs, and 
trade’ (2001) 15 (3) The World Bank Economic Review 452. 
18
 Jacob Zuma Address delivered at the 27th Meeting of the NEPAD Heads of State and 
Government Orientation Committee AU Summit, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 14 July 2012, 
available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?id=461&sid=29019&tid=76067 [accessed 15 
July 2012]. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Kazungulu Bridge Project: available at http://www.trademarksa.org/news/kazungula-
bridge-project [accessed 20 July 2012]; Arthur Simuchoba ‘Kazungula bridge construction to 
begin soon’ Mmegi online vol 29 no 105 (19 July 2012), available at 
http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=1&aid=1773&dir=2012/July/Thursday19 [accessed 20 
July 2012]. 
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necessary to create adequate transport linkages between the various 
RECs.21   
4.1.1 NEPAD: A soft law approach 
 
The NEPAD document is not a treaty between African states and as such is 
not binding. It could at best be described as soft law. However, its value lies 
in the fact that it creates a platform for strengthening the norms of 
integration. In chapter 1, it was pointed out that integration treaties in Africa 
contain both legal and non-legal norms. This is partly necessitated by the 
fact that integration treaties in Africa are viewed as platforms for ‘integrated 
development and functionally specific projects’.22 Adopting a combination of 
legal and non-legal norms is therefore necessary for the objectives of the 
integration treaties to be met. Generally speaking, legal and non-legal norms 
are often classified as hard law and soft law respectively.23 However, 
defining the boundary between hard law and soft law is often difficult.24 A 
simple distinction would be that hard law creates legally binding obligations, 
while soft law does not on its own create legally binding obligations.25  
 In broad terms, treaties such as the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union and the Abuja Treaty are categorised as hard law because they create 
legally binding obligations. However, as Baxter argues, there are instances 
where soft law could find its way into the text of hard law. Thus, within a hard 
law framework, it is not unusual to find ‘norms of various degrees of cogency, 
persuasiveness, and consensus which are incorporated in agreements 
                                                          
21
 James Gathii African Regional Trade Agreements as Legal Regimes (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2011) 376. 
22
 James Gathii ‘African regional trade agreements as flexible legal regimes’ (2009–2010) 35 
North Carolina Journal of International and Commercial Regulation 572–597. 
23
 Dinah Shelton ‘Introduction: law, non-law and the problem of “soft law”’ in Dinah Shelton 
(ed) Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International 
Legal System (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 1–18; K Abbot and D Snidal ‘Hard 
and soft law in international governance’ (2000) 54 (3) International Organization 421–456; 
Michael Bothe ‘Legal and non-legal norms–a meaningful distinction in international relations’ 
(1980) 11 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 65–95. 
24
 S Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen ‘Global regulation through a diversity of norms: comparing hard 
and soft law’ in D Levi-Faur (ed) Handbook on the Politics of Regulation (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 2011) 605. 
25
 Ibid 607. 
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between States but do not create enforceable rights and duties’.26 This is 
exemplified in the embodiment of both legal and non-legal norms in the text 
of African integration treaties. In line with Baxter’s suggestion, Boyle and 
Chinkin argue that there are instances where the norms created in a hard 
law instrument may be so ‘obscurely worded’ that it becomes difficult to 
determine if any binding obligation has been created.27  
 The use of the term ‘soft law’ has been criticised because soft law 
cannot be classified as one of the sources of international law enumerated in 
article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.28 Soft law falls 
short of the elements of hard law in that it is regarded as non-legally binding. 
Handl points out that soft law has been criticised by international lawyers 
because ‘the concept has been used in reference to international 
prescriptions that are deemed to lack the prerequisite characteristics of 
international normativity, but which, notwithstanding this fact, are capable of 
producing certain legal effects’.29 In her analysis of soft law, Dinah Shelton 
posits that ‘non-binding norms have a complex and potentially large impact in 
the development of international law … In recent years, non-binding 
normative instruments sometimes have provided the necessary statement of 
legal obligation (opinio juris) to evidence the emergent custom and have 
assisted to establish the content of the norm’.30 Furthermore, when soft law 
is adopted in furtherance of a widely accepted hard law instrument, it yields 
better commitment and thus produces greater compliance.31  
Shaffer and Pollack argue that the existing literature on hard and soft 
law can be viewed from the perspective of three schools of thought, namely, 
                                                          
26
 R Baxter ‘International law in “her infinite variety”’ (1980) 29(4) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 549. 
27
 A Boyle and C Chinkin The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2007) 220. 
28
 Article 38(1) list the sources of international law as: (a) international conventions, whether 
general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting states; (b) 
international customs, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general 
principles of law recognised by civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, 
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law. 
29
 Gunther Handl ‘A hard look at soft law’ (1988) 82 American Society of International Law 
Proceedings 371. 
30
 Dinah Shelton (note 23) 1. 
31
 Ibid 14. 
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legal positivist, rationalist and constructivist.32 Legal positivists regard hard 
law as legal obligations that are of a formally binding nature, while soft law, 
though not formally binding, could lead to binding hard law.33 Rationalist 
consider hard and soft law as having separate attributes that states adopt for 
different contexts.34 Constructivists view hard and soft law as facilitating the 
socialisation process of interstate interactions.35 
Some scholars are opposed to the idea of classifying some form of 
law as ‘soft’.36 Klabbers, for instance, completely rejects the notion of soft law 
and regards it as an attempt to create a category of law which cannot be 
used to compel states’ behaviour.37 He posits that ‘if it could be claimed that 
soft law leads, in its application, to either hard law (hard responsibility, hard 
sanctions) or to non-law (no responsibility and no sanctions), soft law loses 
its distinctiveness, and there with its reason of existence’.38 His argument is 
based on the fact that to refer to an instrument as soft law is to imply that it 
has a legal character which is however different from hard law. This in his 
view raises questions as to the legal consequences that may arise from the 
violation of the principles provided for in the soft law instrument.39 In 
addressing the divide between hard and soft law, Schaffer and Pollack argue 
that hard and soft law ‘serve not only as alternatives or complements, but 
often as antagonist’.40 This invariably means that the desirability or 
appropriateness of the use of either soft or hard law will largely depend on 
how states choose to use these instruments in a particular situation.  
                                                          
32
 G Shaffer and M Pollack ‘Hard vs. soft law: alternatives, complements, and antagonists in 
international governance’ (2010) 94 Minnesota Law Review 707. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Ibid 708. 
36
 S Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen ‘Global regulation through a diversity of norms: comparing hard 
and soft law’ (note 24) 607. Thurer argues in favour of the maintenance of the distinction 
between law and non-law. In this regard there is no middle ground and therefore a norm can 
be either binding or not binding: D Thurer ‘Soft law’ in R Bernhardt (ed) Encyclopaedia of 
Public International Law vol 4 (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2000) 452–60. Bilder, on the other 
hand, argues that the potency of the law is reduced when the term ‘soft law’ is used: R Bilder 
‘Beyond compliance: helping nations cooperate’ in Dinah Shelton (ed) Commitment and 
Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System 65–73. 
37
 Jan Klabbers ‘The redundancy of soft law’ (1996) 65 Nordic Journal of International Law 
167–182. 
38
 Ibid 169. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 G Schaffer and M Pollack (note 32) 708. 
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While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to argue either for or against 
the desirability of the use of soft law instruments in the international arena, 
soft law instruments can be used to clarify or restate obligations created 
through hard law.41 The NEPAD document does not create new legally 
binding obligations; rather, it proposes a programme of action which could be 
used by African states to ensure development on the continent – thereby 
fulfilling their obligations to improve the general well-being of African 
people.42 The NEPAD document identifies areas in which the continent is 
deficient and proposes methods that should be adopted by African states to 
remedy the deficiencies. The NEPAD document is significant because it 
restates the individual and collective will of African states to create a self-
sustaining and globally competitive continent as mandated in the Abuja 
Treaty, the AU Constitutive Act and other constituent treaties establishing the 
RECs. It serves as a basis for boosting the capacity of member states in 
sectors where individual state efforts have been insufficient. The NEPAD 
document on its own will not bring about compliance with African integration 
treaties, but when applied in combination with other continental efforts, it will 
help to reduce some of the problems (such as poor  infrastructure and lack of 
institutional capacity) that often impact on the ability of states to comply with 
their integration obligations. 
4.1.2 Criticism of NEPAD 
Prominent African scholars like James Gathii and Nsongurua Udombana 
have expressed some doubt about NEPAD’s ability to extricate Africa from 
                                                          
41
 Ulrich Fastenrath ‘Relative normativity in international law’ (1993) 4 European Journal of 
International Law 339. For more discussions of soft law, see Matthias Goldmann ‘We need 
to cut off the head of the king: past, present, and future approaches to international soft law’ 
(2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 335–368; JJ Kirton and MJ Trebilcock 
‘Introduction: hard choices and soft law in sustainable global governance’ in JJ Kirton and 
MJ Treilcock (eds) Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, 
Environment and Social Governance  (Ashgate, Cornwall, 2004) 3–29; CM Chinkin ‘The 
challenge of soft law: development and change in international law’ (1989) 38(4) The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 850–866; J d’Aspremont ‘Softness in 
international law: a self-serving quest for new legal materials’ (2008) 19(5) European Journal 
of International Law 1075–1093; H Hillgenberg ‘A fresh look at soft law’ (1999) 10(3) 
European Journal of International Law 499–515. 
42
 See Preamble to the Abuja Treaty, paras 1, 2, and 3. 
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poverty and make her globally competitive.43 For Udombana, the legitimacy 
of the NEPAD document can be questioned because it was unilaterally 
decided upon by African leaders without prior consultation with the African 
people.44 He argues that, since the Constitutive Act of the AU and the 
NEPAD document acknowledge that for social cohesion to be created, the 
African people need to participate in the process of building partnerships with 
the government, Africans ought to have been consulted before the NEPAD 
document was adopted.45 In his view, the failure to actively involve African 
people in the process of adopting the NEPAD document reflects the inherent 
autocratic nature of African leaders at the municipal level.46 The effect of 
such exclusion is that the majority of African people and the private sector, 
which NEPAD relies heavily on, may not be aware of the benefits that the 
NEPAD initiative promises.  
Undoubtedly the process which culminated in the creation of NEPAD 
was not all-inclusive.47 While the initiative was spearheaded by a few African 
leaders, it was acknowledged that the participation of non-governmental 
organisations, socio-economic organisations, professional associations, and 
civil society organisations was vital in formulating the AU programme of 
actions.48 Therefore, after the creation of NEPAD, efforts were made to 
involve African people in the various NEPAD programmes. These 
programmes were well received and there has been no indication that 
African people view NEPAD as an alien initiative. While there may have been 
                                                          
43
 N Udombana ‘The unfinished business: conflicts, the African Union and the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development’ (2003) 35 George Washington International Law 
Review 55–106; N Udombana ‘A harmony or a cacophony? The music of integration in the 
African Union Treaty and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development’ (2003) 13 Indiana 
International and Comparative Law Review 185–236; J Gathii ‘A critical appraisal of the 
NEPAD agenda in light of Africa’s place in the World Trade regime in an era of market-
centered development’ (2003) 13 Transnational Law and contemporary Problems 179–210. 
44
 N Udombana ‘A harmony or a cacophony?’ (note 43) 219. The 7
th
 preamble of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union emphasises the need to build a partnership between 
governments and all segments of civil society, particularly women, youth and the private 
sector, so as to strengthen solidarity between African people. Article 3(g) lists the promotion 
of democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance as one 
of the objectives of the African Union. 
45
 N Udombana ‘A harmony or a cacophony? (note 43) 219. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Five African presidents were primarily responsible for the conceptualisation of NEPAD. 
48
 OAU Decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Implementation 
of the Sirte Summit Decision on the African Union AHG/Dec. 160 (XXXVII) (July 2001) para 
7(1). 
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early concerns about the manner in which the NEPAD document was 
adopted (if any), those concerns were not grave enough to undermine the 
entire initiative, since palliative measures have been taken to acquaint 
African people with the benefits of NEPAD. The legitimacy of a rule or a body 
or rules (legally binding or non-legally binding) is dependent on whether its 
recipients accept it as appropriate.49 In the case of NEPAD, there has not 
been great resistance to the initiative. In light of the above, questioning the 
legitimacy of the NEPAD document on the basis of the process through 
which it was created may be excessive.  
 In his assessment of NEPAD, Gathii expresses doubt about NEPAD’s 
ability to rescue Africa from its dependence on Western capital. He faults 
NEPAD’s market-oriented economic approach, which is dependent on 
foreign aid and capital, and thus fails to challenge the existing structures that 
sustain ‘inequality, poverty, and hierarchy, both within and without the African 
state’.50 These structures, he argues, stand in the way of Africa’s 
development and any economic strategy that fails to challenge these 
structures is bound to be ineffective.51 Gathii summarises his critique of 
NEPAD under three headings: (a) NEPAD’s failure to engage with the 
Bretton Woods-sponsored market-centred view of development, and thereby 
treating it as a non-negotiable development framework; (b) using the 
acquisition of foreign capital and donor aid as a pre-condition for NEPAD’s 
success; and (c) NEPAD’s failure to engage with the unfairness and injustice 
of the international trading rules.52  
 These criticisms of NEPAD’s approach to extricating Africa from 
poverty and underdevelopment are robust and valid. In general, ‘Africa’s 
external economic dependence and its lop-sided participation in the 
international trading system are key factors accounting for the dismal 
                                                          
49
 Steven Bernstein and Benjamin Cashore ‘Nonstate global governance: is forest 
certification a legitimate alternative to a global forest convention?’ in JJ Kirton and MJ 
Treilcock (eds) Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment 
and Social Governance (Ashgate, Cornwall, 2004) 33–64 at 41. See MC Suchman 
‘Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches’ (1995) 20(3) Academy of 
Management Review 571–610.  
50
 J Gathii (note 43) 180–181. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Ibid 187–198. 
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economic performance on the continent’.53 Therefore, developing an internal 
economic self-sustenance system will help remedy this unequal participation 
in the international arena and improve economic performance at the 
continental level. However, the NEPAD document fails to address these 
issues pragmatically, and rather relies on Western aid and capital.54 If 
NEPAD is to rescue Africa from the shackles of poverty and 
underdevelopment, African leaders must, together with non-state actors on 
the continent, re-examine the notions of primary reliance on foreign capital, 
donor funding, foreign aid and the exaggerated benefits of market access 
liberalisation. However, while the critique of the inherent contradictions in 
NEPAD’s market-oriented approach in resolving Africa’s economic woes is 
important and valid, aspects of the NEPAD programme are vital to Africa’s 
development. NEPAD’s focus on developing cross-border infrastructure is 
essential to development in Africa. Evidence suggests that a sound 
infrastructure will increase intra-African trade and improve the overall welfare 
of African people, thereby developing internal capacity on the continent.  
Furthermore, Africa’s underdevelopment and exclusion from the 
globalised economy55 cannot be solely ascribed to the unfair and unjust rules 
of the international trading system. Rather, Africa’s underdevelopment traces 
its origins partly to the inefficient and corrupt leadership that has plagued 
post-colonial Africa, both at the national and continental levels.56 As part of 
NEPAD’s strategy to remedy the leadership deficiencies that have 
contributed to Africa’s underdevelopment, under the NEPAD framework 
African leaders have adopted a self-monitoring mechanism to frequently 
assess their governance performance in key sectors. This self-monitoring 
mechanism, the African Peer Review Mechanism, could be used to remedy 
the governance deficiency in the continent and consequently to improve the 
overall performance of African states.  
                                                          
53
 J Gathii African Trade Agreements as Legal Regimes (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2011) 28. 
54
 NEPAD document para 66.  
55
 NEPAD document para 1. 
56
 N Udombana ‘A harmony or a cacophony?’ (note 43) 215. This fact is acknowledged in 
the NEPAD document (note 6) para 52. 
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4.2 The African Peer Review Mechanism 
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a voluntary peer-review 
mechanism that African states accede to in order to assess their governance 
performance. The APRM came into existence as a result of African leaders 
taking cognisance of the fact that good governance is an imperative for 
development.57 The APRM Base Document defines the APRM as ‘[a]n 
instrument voluntarily acceded to by Member States of the African Union as 
an African self-monitoring mechanism’.58  
 The function of the APRM is to foster the ‘adoption of policies, 
standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, 
sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental 
economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of 
successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing 
the needs for capacity building’.59 The APRM ensures that steps have been 
taken by states to implement the agreed integration policies. A country that 
wishes to be a member of the peer-review process signs a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) which lays out the conditions for review.60 The benefit 
of the APRM is that it indicates to African people that their leaders have 
chosen to commit themselves to, and adhere to, agreed collective 
standards.61  
 In order to express their commitment to evaluating governance 
performance, the African Heads of State and Government adopted a 
Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance.62 
                                                          
57
 NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism: Africa’s Innovative Thinking on Governance.  
58
 The African Peer Review Base Document AHG/235(XXXVIII) 1. 
59
 Article 3 APRM Base Document prepared by the APRM for the Eighth Gathering of the 
African Partnership Forum, Berlin, Germany, 22–23 May 2007, available at 
http://www.africapartnershipforum.org/dataoecd/57/8/38666393.pdf [accessed 4 August 
2012]. 
60
 The Sixth Summit of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee 
(HSGIC) of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), held in March 2003 in 
Abuja, Nigeria, adopted the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM). 
61
 N Udombana ‘Articulating the right to democratic governance in Africa’ (2002–2003) 24 
Michigan Journal of International Law 1266. 
62
 Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance AHG/235 
(XXXVIII) Annex 1, adopted on 8 July 2002 at the Thirty-Eighth Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity [African 
Union]. 
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The Declaration sets out four broad themes that are the basis upon which 
states are reviewed: democracy and political governance, economic 
governance and management, corporate governance, and socio-economic 
development.63 These four areas broadly cover the areas in which African 
states have committed to integrate and foster development under the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Treaty Establishing the African 
Economic Community, and the constituent treaties establishing the RECs.  
 The APRM is premised upon the notion that Africa does not lack ideas 
to propel development; rather, African states struggle to abide by and 
implement the principles and policies that are necessary for development.64 
The APRM process helps to ensure that states implement the regional norms 
at the national level. So while NEPAD helps to create an environment 
conducive to the implementation of regional norms, the APRM monitors the 
implementation. In order to monitor or assess each country’s performance in 
these four areas, member states have also adopted standards, criteria and 
indicators for monitoring and assessing individual performance.65 Through a 
five-stage process of review, these standards and indicators are used as the 
benchmark for evaluating a state’s performance. Since the peer review 
conducted by the APRM is broad-based, it allows for the performance of 
member states to be assessed under the various themes covered by the 
African integration treaties and as specifically classified in the Declaration on 
Democracy.66 
  By November 2011, 30 countries had acceded to the APRM by 
signing the MOU.67 Angola, Cameroon, Liberia, the Republic of Congo, 
Egypt, Gabon, Malawi, Mauritania, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Sudan 
                                                          
63
 Ross Herbert and Steven Gruzd The African Peer Review Mechanism: Lessons from the 
Pioneers (South African Institute for International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2008) 4. 
64
 Steven Gruzd (ed) Grappling with Governance: Perspectives on the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (Fanele, Auckland Park, South Africa, 2010) 9.  
65
 Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(The APRM) NEPAD/HSGIC-03-2003/APRM/Guideline/OSCI 9 March 2003. 
66
 NEPAD, Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, 
AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex I. 
67
 Available at http://www.uneca.org/aprm/CountriesStatus.asp [accessed 4 August 2012]. 
The 30 countries are Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. 
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and Togo acceded to the APRM, but had not commenced the review 
process. Tanzania and Djibouti were at the first stage of the review process, 
while Sierra Leone and Zambia were at the fourth stage of the review 
process.68 Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa and Uganda 
had completed the entire APRM process.69 
4.2.1 APRM structure 
The peer review process has both continental and national structures. At the 
continental level, the peer review process consists of the African Peer 
Review Forum (APR Forum), the African Peer Review Panel (APR Panel), 
the African Peer Review Secretariat (APR Secretariat), the African Peer 
Review Teams (APR Teams) and the African Peer Review Partner 
Institutions (APR Partner Institutions). The APR Forum is made up of the 
Heads of State and Government of the participating states. The APR Forum 
is the apex body of the review process and has the mandate to exercise 
‘constructive peer dialogue and persuasion required to make the APRM 
effective, credible, and acceptable’.70  
 The APR Panel consists of 5 to 7 eminent Africans who have 
distinguished themselves in careers relevant to the APRM process. They are 
appointed by the APR Forum and they have the mandate to oversee the 
APR process. They ensure that the APR process is independent, credible 
and carried out in a professional manner.71 The APR Secretariat provides 
technical, secretarial and administrative support for the APR process. The 
APR Secretariat carries out the analytical work for the review process and 
maintains a database and information about the four thematic areas that are 
reviewed in each country.72 The APR Teams are constituted only for the 
period a country is under review and they are approved by the APR Panel. 
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 Available at http://www.uneca.org/aprm/CountriesStatus.asp [accessed 5 August 2012]. 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 African Peer Review Mechanism Organisation and Processes NEPAD/HSGIC/03-
2003/APRM/Guideline/O&P 3. 
71
 Ibid 4. 
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The APR Teams conduct the first national self-assessment based on its 
terms of reference and guidelines produced by the APR Secretariat.73  
 Finally, the APR Partner Institutions help to conduct the technical 
assessment of the country under review. The United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) conducts technical assessments in the area 
of economic governance and the African Development Bank (ADB) provides 
technical assessments in the area of banking and financial standards. 
Organs of the AU, such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, the African Committee of the Experts on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child, the Peace and Security Council, the Pan-African Parliament, and 
the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in 
Africa conduct the technical assessments in the areas of human rights, 
democracy and political governance.74  
 At the national level, the APRM structure consists of the APR National 
Focal Point, the APR National Commission/National Governing Council, the 
National APR Secretariat and the Technical Research Institutions.75 The 
APR Focal Points usually comprise high level government officials or 
ministers and they report directly to the president.76 They liaise with the APR 
Panel and the APR Secretariat to ensure that documents and logistical 
support are provided to the review process.77 It also ensures that the 
government under review provides financial support for the institutions 
involved in the review. The APR Focal Point is critical to the review process 
because it indicates the government’s intention to support the review, 
ensures effective interaction between the government and civil society, 
enables the research institutions to obtain access to government documents, 
                                                          
73
 Ibid 8. 
74
 Ibid 8-9.. 
75
 APRM The APRM National Structure, available at http://aprm-au.org/aprm-national-
structure [accessed 5 August 2012]. 
76
 In practice, the composition of the APR Focal Point differs from country to country. For 
instance, in Ghana the Focal Point was located outside a government ministry, while in 
Nigeria, the Secretary to the Government of Federation acted as the Focal Point. However, 
a common denominator is that the Focal Point always has direct access to the president. 
Ross Herbert and Steven Gruzd (note 64) 158; APRM African Peer Review Mechanism 
Country Review Report, Federal Republic of Nigeria June 2008, 2. 
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 Ross Herbert and Steven Gruzd (note 63) 31. 
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and helps to ensure that the government effectively supports any programme 
of action that is generated from the review process.78 
 The APR National Governing Council comprises state and non-state 
actors who command the respect of the general public. This usually includes 
representatives of civil societies, the media, the private sector, academia and 
different sections of society. The Council’s function is to ensure that the 
review process is credible, technically sound and devoid of political 
manipulation.79 The National APR Secretariat provides technical and 
administrative support for the review process at the national level.80 It helps 
to organise sensitisation programmes to create public awareness, thus 
ensuring massive citizen participation in the review process. The Technical 
Research Institutions are usually highly reputable research institutions that 
have the required competence in the four thematic areas of review. They 
conduct research in these areas and administer the national self-assessment 
questionnaires that help to evaluate how citizens rate the government in the 
four thematic areas under review.81 
4.2.2 Stages of review  
The first stage after the signing of the MOU is for the country to undergo a 
national self-assessment. The significance of this process is that the state, of 
its own accord, allows its citizens and non-governmental organisations to 
scrutinise its governance strategies. The essence of the assessment is to 
study the political, economic and corporate governance of the state under 
review.82 The assessment process usually involves consultation between 
state and non-state actors. At this stage, the APR Secretariat sends 
questionnaires to the country to be reviewed.  
 The questionnaires cover the four thematic areas and form the basis 
for the national self-assessment. Based on the data or information collected 
from the questionnaires, a country self-assessment report, which includes a 
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 Ross Herbert and Steven Gruzd (note 63) 31–32. 
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 Available at http://aprm-au.org/aprm-national-structure [accessed 5 August 2012]. 
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 APRM The APRM National Structure (note 76). 
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 Ibid (note 76).  
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 APRM Base Document (note 59) para 18. 
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plan of action, is prepared and submitted to the APR Secretariat.83 At this 
stage, the APR Secretariat also prepares a background research document 
on the country under review. Finally, based on the country self-assessment 
report and the background research document, the APR Secretariat drafts an 
issue paper that indicates the main issues that should guide the Country 
Review Mission.84 
 In the second stage, the APR Secretariat and the Country Review 
Mission conduct a country review and consult with government officials, 
representatives of civil society, parliamentarians, the media, academia, trade 
unions, businesses and professional bodies.85 The goal at this stage is to 
engage in widespread consultation in order to get the view of different 
stakeholders on the way in which the country is governed. The Country 
Review Mission also verifies the integrity of the review process in the country 
and discusses the issues raised in the issue paper drafted by the APR 
Secretariat.86  
 In the third stage, the Country Review Mission prepares a draft report, 
based on the background research document and issue paper prepared by 
the APR Secretariat, the self-assessment reports and the information it 
received during its consultations with stakeholders.87 The review team 
discusses the draft report with the government in order to ensure that the 
information obtained is accurate. It also gives the government the opportunity 
to respond to the report, and comments on the shortcomings that need to be 
addressed.88 
 In stage four, the Country Review Mission submits its final report to 
the APR Panel. The APR Panel transmits the report to the APR Forum and 
the Head of State of the country under review is ‘peer reviewed’ by the APR 
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 The Process of Peer Review, available at http://www.aprmtanzania.org/the_process.html 
[accessed 6 August 2012]. 
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 African Peer Review Mechanism Country Review Report of the Republic of Ghana, para 
5, June 2005, available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-
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 African Peer Review Mechanism Country Review Report of the Republic of Ghana (note 
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Forum.89 If the government of the country under review indicates its 
willingness to rectify any identified shortcomings in its country report, the 
other participating governments pledge to provide assistance.90 The review 
by the APR Forum, coupled with public pressure, helps to accelerate the 
process of achieving public accountability and transparency.91 
 In stage five, which is the final stage, the Country Review Report is 
presented to the public and key regional and sub-regional bodies, such as 
the Pan-African Parliament, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, the Peace Security Council, and the Economic, Social and Cultural 
Council.92 The entire process is repeated every two to four years in order to 
monitor compliance and ensure consistency. The repetitive method adopted 
by the APRM indicates the use of an iterative process to monitor and secure 
compliance with African integration objectives. This is because a constant 
review of national policies through the engagement of state actors, non-state 
actors and other Heads of State enables countries to review their national 
policies repeatedly, and to ensure that they comply with the agreed 
standards. Furthermore, countries that have been reviewed are expected to 
submit an annual report on the steps they have taken to implement the 
National Programme of Action.  
4.2.3 Country Review Reports for the four thematic themes 
In assessing how the APRM process has been used to monitor compliance 
under the four thematic areas, the APRM Country Review Reports of eight 
African countries are discussed. The countries examined are Algeria, 
Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Lesotho, Nigeria and Ghana. These 
countries were selected from those that have completed the APRM process 
and represent each geographic region in the continent, namely, North Africa, 
Central Africa, West Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa. Two countries 
from West Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa are discussed. Only one 
                                                          
89
 APRM Base Document (note 59) para 23. 
90
 Ibid para 24. 
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 Adebayo Adedeji ‘NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism: Progress and Prospects’ in 
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country from North Africa (Algeria) and one from Central Africa (Rwanda) are 
examined because, at the time of writing, these were the only countries in 
these regions that had completed the APRM process. Since the indicators, 
objectives and criteria that are used for each theme and country are uniform 
across the continent, a random selection of countries is unlikely to affect the 
integrity of the subsequent analysis.  
Under each theme, a brief summary of the review of that theme is 
provided for two countries. These summaries are not exhaustive but indicate 
what factors are considered when a country is being reviewed. It is also 
important to mention that the indicators and criteria mentioned in the four 
thematic themes are not exhaustive.93 In assessing these thematic areas, the 
first goal of the review team is to determine whether the country under review 
has ratified the necessary regional instruments. In instances where the 
regional instruments have been ratified, the team determines whether the 
norms created under these instruments are being implemented and also 
checks for the existence of domestic institutions that are vested with the 
responsibility of ensuring adherence to the norms.  
 Most importantly, the review team also evaluates the effectiveness of 
these norms. A peculiar feature of the review process is that it tries to 
monitor compliance with the norms created under the various instruments 
and also reviews the effectiveness of the norms created under the regional 
instruments. In other words, the objective of the review goes beyond 
determining whether the various regional instruments have been ratified, but 
rather examines the extent to which the norms under the various regional 
instruments have been able to influence a state’s behaviour. 
4.2.3.1 Democracy and political governance 
Under the democracy and political governance theme, the objective is to 
assess how a country is performing in the area of democracy, the rule of law, 
separation of powers, and respect for human rights. The essence of the 
review in this area is to ensure that sustainable development is achieved on 
                                                          
93
 For a detailed list of objectives, criteria and indicators in the four thematic areas, see 
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the continent through the maintenance of peace and stability in African 
countries.94 In assessing a country in the area of democracy and political 
governance, its performance is benchmarked against the standards created 
under various international and African regional instruments.95 Some of the 
regional instruments used to evaluate a country’s performance in this area 
are the Constitutive Act, the Declaration on the Framework for an OAU [AU] 
Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2000), the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Conference of Security, Stability, 
Development and Cooperation (CSSDCA) Solemn Declaration (2000) and 
the NEPAD document.96 The review process must determine whether these 
instruments have been implemented and if citizens benefit from the resulting 
norms. The assessment of the performance of African states in the area of 
democracy and political governance is vital in order to entrench democratic 
values and accountability in governance.97  
 Accountability and adherence to democratic values are essential to 
the integration process in Africa because democratic governments tend to 
comply with international legal obligations.98 This assumption is based on the 
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 Since the focus of this thesis is on African integration, only African instruments will be 
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 Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(note 65) 4. In evaluating a country’s performance under the democracy and political 
governance theme, the APRM seeks to achieve the following objectives: (a) to prevent and 
reduce intra- and inter-country conflicts; (b) to ensure that constitutional democracy is 
entrenched in the country under review; (c) to promote and protect economic, social, 
cultural, civil and political rights; (d) to uphold the separation of powers and independence of 
the judiciary; (e) to ensure accountability in the public service; (f) to fight corruption in the 
political sphere; (g) to protect women’s rights; (h) to protect the rights of children and young 
persons; and (i) to protect vulnerable groups, including refugees and internally displaced 
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 Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (note 62) 5. 
98
 Beth Simmons ‘Compliance with international agreements’ (1998) 1 Annual Review of 
Political Science 83. Slaughter has examined the role the law plays in interstate relations, 
depending on whether the states in question are liberal or non-liberal states: Anne-Marie 
Slaughter ‘International law in a world of liberal states’ (1995) 6 European Journal of 
International Law 503–538. Dixon argues, using the democracy-war hypothesis, that in the 
area of managing inter-state disputes, countries that practise democracy are more likely to 
resolve their interstate disputes than those who adopt other forms of governance. However, 
Dixon accounts for extraneous effects by using a baseline model which takes into account 
prior management activity, the costs of conflict, and the power of the disputant: William 
Dixon ‘Democracy and the management of international conflict’ (1993) 37(1) Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 42–68. 
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fact that a country that adheres to the rule of law within its national domain is 
more likely to defer to the rule of law in its relations with other states.99 
Therefore, it is important for African states to establish a mechanism for 
monitoring adherence to core democratic values in order to create an 
enabling environment for the realisation of the integration objectives. This 
understanding of a direct correlation between adherence to democratic 
values and the development of Africa is reflected in the NEPAD document, 
which identifies peace, security, democracy and political governance 
initiatives as conditions precedent to sustainable development in Africa.100  
 Ghana embarked on its first peer review process in 2005 and the 
Country Review Mission comprised experts from the APRM Secretariat, the 
APR Partner Institutions, and consultants.101 In line with the independence 
requirement of the self-assessment process, the Ghanaian Government 
appointed an independent National APRM Governing Council (NAPRM-GC), 
which comprised seven non-partisan professionals and public 
personalities.102 The NAPRM-GC also appointed four independent think-
tanks and Technical Research Institutes to carry out the national self-
assessment in each of the four thematic areas reviewed.103 
 In reviewing Ghana’s performance in the area of democracy and 
political governance, the Country Self-Assessment Report and Country 
Review Mission Report showed that, while Ghana had ratified some of the 
AU conventions, a significant number of conventions had not been ratified.104 
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In order to strengthen its democratic process and its adherence to the rule of 
law, the Ghanaian Government was advised to ratify and domesticate these 
documents in order to make them part of its own enforceable standards.105  
 In reviewing Nigeria’s performance in the area of democracy and 
political governance, particularly as this performance relates to adherence to 
international obligations, the review team found that, although Nigeria had 
ratified a significant number of treaties, the complex process of 
domesticating these treaties within the federal and state structures reduced 
the efficacy of the treaties.106 Another important observation that was made 
was that most Nigerian citizens and, in some instances, government 
departments, the federal legislature and the state legislature had no 
information as to the treaties that had been signed or negotiated by the 
federal government. This failure to disseminate information about the treaties 
made implementation of the treaties very difficult.107  
 A recurring theme in the countries that have been reviewed is the 
existence of a gap between the signing or ratification of treaties at the 
international level and their domestication in national legal systems.108 The 
failure of states to domesticate these treaties means that the norms created 
in these treaties are unenforceable in national courts. In this regard, Fisher 
notes that the ‘one of the best ways of causing respect for international law is 
to make it indistinguishable from domestic law’.109 Thus the domestication of 
AU conventions is germane to creating enforceable norms within national 
frameworks, particularly in light of the fact that, in practice, regional norms 
within the African integration framework are not directly applicable in African 
states.110 In order to strengthen implementation and compliance with the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
time of the review. See APRM African Peer Review Mechanism Country Review Report of 
the Republic of Ghana (note 84) 4. 
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  African Peer Review Mechanism Country Review Report of the Republic of Ghana (note 
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  African Peer Review Mechanism Country Review Report Federal Republic of Nigeria 
June 2008, 16. 
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  Ibid 77. 
108
 Kenya’s review also indicated that the necessary steps had not been taken to entrench 
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African Peer Review Mechanism Country Review Report of the Republic of Kenya 15, 61. 
109
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norms entrenched in these treaties, Ghana and Nigeria, as part of their 
National Programmes of Action, indicated their willingness to ratify and 
domesticate all outstanding instruments.111 
4.2.3.2 Economic governance management  
In the area of economic governance and management, the objective of the 
review process is to monitor a country’s macroeconomic policies that are 
geared towards promoting sustainable development. The review process 
also examines the implementation of transparent government economic 
policies that promote sound public finance management, and guard against 
corruption and money laundering. Furthermore, it checks the measures a 
country has taken to accelerate regional integration through participation in 
the process of harmonising monetary, trade and investment policies. The 
primary documents used for this evaluation are the NEPAD document, the 
Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, the Constitutive Act of 
the African Union and the National Accounting Standards.112  
 An assessment of Algeria’s economic governance revealed that 
although Algeria showed an undeniable enthusiasm for regional integration, 
its vision in terms of regional integration was not well defined.113 The review 
also revealed that the crisis over West Sahara had also affected Algeria’s 
relationship with Morocco and had impeded cooperation in the region. 
Another issue identified was that the process of integration had been 
affected by the low level of intra-regional trade, poor regional transport 
infrastructure and the persistence of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Surprisingly, 
although the review process highlighted the lack of clarity in Algeria’s 
regional integration vision, nothing in the programme of action specifically 
indicated the steps that Algeria intended to take to ensure that its economic 
integration objectives are met. In this regard, the APR Panel recommended 
                                                          
111
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that Algeria take steps to create a transparent monitoring system to evaluate 
its commitments within regional institutions.114  
 The economic governance report for Rwanda in terms of its regional 
commitments looked promising. The review showed that Rwanda had taken 
the necessary steps to implement its regional trade obligations. In line with 
its regional obligations under COMESA, Rwanda had aligned its external 
tariffs in accordance with the COMESA rules. However, Rwanda faced a 
challenge in managing its integration commitments as a result of its multiple 
memberships of various regional configurations.115 To find a lasting solution 
to this problem, the National Programme of Action indicated that a cost-
benefit study will be carried out to determine the economic impact of multiple 
memberships of regional groupings.116 Multiple memberships of regional 
groupings have advantages and disadvantages. Not nly do they affect the 
country in question, they may also have an impact on the overall 
performance of the regional group. Therefore, a country has to evaluate its 
options properly before it participates in multiple regional groupings. 
4.2.3.3 Corporate governance 
In this area, the review process examines the ethical principles, values and 
practices adopted by a country to facilitate sound governance in the private 
sector. A country is assessed to determine if it has adopted an effective 
regulatory framework that ensures the adoption of social responsibilities, 
environmental sustainability and codes of good business ethics.117 The 
NEPAD document identifies investment in the private sector as vital to 
poverty reduction in Africa.118 In order to encourage investment in the private 
sector, the government must be able to ensure that corporate governance is 
taken seriously. Corporate governance facilitates the development of the 
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private sector, thus creating economic growth that in turn helps to alleviate 
poverty.119 
 The review of corporate governance in Uganda120 revealed that, while 
Uganda had adopted most of NEPAD’s corporate governance codes and 
standards, ‘the enactment of laws had been slow’.121  At the time of review, 
64 commercial laws needed either enactment or amendment.122 Most 
regulatory bodies vested with the authority to ensure proper corporate 
governance in the private sector lacked proper ‘institutional, financial and 
human capacity to effectively fulfil their mandates’.123  
 To remedy the gaps in the corporate governance system, Uganda in 
its National Programme of Action agreed to take steps to fast track the 
enactment of laws aimed at facilitating business in Uganda. It also undertook 
to build institutional capacity and to take steps to ensure that corporate 
governance laws are enforced.124  
In Kenya, despite its generally sound legal system, it was found that 
government policy affecting business was unpredictable, corporate 
governance laws were not properly monitored and enforced, there was 
insufficient infrastructural development, and corporate governance was 
hampered by regional and ethnic politics.125 
4.2.3.4 Socio-economic governance 
In this area, the overall goal of the review process is to determine what steps 
have been taken by the country under review to ensure the eradication of 
poverty through the promotion of policies that enhance social development in 
areas such as education, access to water, information communication 
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technology, and gender equality.126 The process also determines what steps 
have been taken by the country to facilitate the participation of stakeholders 
in the development of the country.  
 The review process in Lesotho indicated that the country had good 
socio-economic policies and had adopted, signed or ratified all the 
international instruments necessary for promoting socio-economic 
development.127 However, the implementation of these policies had been a 
major challenge, because of nepotism, insufficient human and financial 
capital, a lack of proper planning, and the absence of monitoring and 
implementation mechanisms.128  
 In South Africa, the review process found that most instruments 
necessary for the promotion of socio-economic development had been 
signed, adopted or ratified, and that the Constitution encouraged social and 
economic development. Various policies had also been put in place to 
address the socio-economic imbalances that resulted from the apartheid era. 
However, socio-economic development has not cut across all sections of 
society. Inadequate institutional and human capacity was a challenge in all 
the sectors of socio-economic development.129 A shortage of human and 
institutional capacity often militates against proper monitoring, management 
and implementation of existing socio-economic polices.  
4.2.4 The APRM: Africa’s catalyst for securing compliance 
Bad leadership, economic mismanagement and corruption partly account for 
Africa’s poverty and underdevelopment – a fact acknowledged by the 
NEPAD document.130 While external factors also influence Africa’s 
developmental woes, the poor leadership exhibited by post-colonial African 
leaders must be questioned. Post-colonial African leaders failed to regard 
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development as their primary objective; rather, their efforts were 
concentrated on acquiring personal wealth, tightening their grip on political 
power and blatantly neglecting the creation of sustainable public 
institutions.131 Today, Africa is littered with failed or failing states.  
 Acknowledging the inherent deficiency in the governance methods of 
most African states, the APRM seeks to inculcate the habit of good 
governance into the national systems of African states because, no matter 
how grandiose regional development plans are, in the absence of good 
governance, implementation may be elusive. If good governance can 
influence the implementation of regional policies, the APRM process will 
place African states in a better position to comply with the norms that 
promote integration and sustainable development.  
 To entrench the good governance culture into national systems, the 
APRM uses frequent periodic reviews to highlight the existing gaps in a 
country’s governance methods and proposes solutions to bridging these 
gaps without necessarily threatening the use of sanctions. This innovative 
process relies on a country’s desire to meet its obligations under the various 
instruments to which it has acceded. The reasoning or motivation for 
adopting this kind of approach to securing compliance can be ascribed to the 
fact that non-compliance with treaty obligations in Africa often emanates from 
factors other than the wilful violation of agreed norms. So far, reports from 
the countries that have been reviewed show that one challenge common to 
most African states has been a lack of institutional and human capacity, 
which often results in the poor implementation and monitoring of compliance 
with the requisite norms.132 The APRM process facilitates the identification of 
the challenges that plague states in the implementation of their obligations 
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and elaborates on steps that could be taken to overcome these 
challenges.133 
 The APRM also takes account of the diverse historical context and 
stages of development of African states, thereby enabling states to develop 
at their own pace albeit within a set of agreed parameters.134 This is in line 
with the variable geometry principle that has been used by some RECs in the 
African integration process. As discussed in chapter 3, adopting variable 
geometry enables less developed states to partake progressively in the 
integration process, without slowing down the overall rate of integration of 
the other states. 
 The APRM exhibits characteristics of the managerial approach to 
securing compliance with treaty obligations because it uses essential 
elements such as information sharing, performance reporting, policy 
assessment, persuasion, and data collection to facilitate compliance.135 
While the APRM in itself does not create legally binding obligations, it helps 
states to comply with the legally binding obligations they have entered into 
under other instruments.136 Compliance with African integration treaties can 
be achieved using the APRM because the various stages of country review 
bring about information sharing among states, provide a platform for 
reporting and data collection, evaluate the implementation and effectiveness 
of regional norms, involve non-governmental organisations in the 
assessment process, provide an opportunity for technical assistance to be 
given to states in areas where needed, encourage peer dialogue and 
persuasion from other states, and have the capacity to bring a state’s 
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reputation under scrutiny. These processes serve as an effective strategy for 
motivating compliance with treaty obligations.137  
 The process also means that citizens and other states can scrutinise a 
state, thereby creating transparency in governance.138 For example, during 
the review process in Ghana, the APRM was regarded as a medium ‘for 
demonstrating greater transparency and candour in public policy to various 
audiences – domestic groupings, other African states, and, not least, 
international donors.’139 In other words, the APRM not only helps to create 
transparency, it also has a reputational dimension that is important for 
securing compliance.  
4.2.4.1 The reputational pull of the APRM process 
Reputation is an essential tool in securing compliance because it increases 
credibility and makes future cooperation easier.140 With an increase in 
scepticism about the efficacy of ‘formal multilateral enforcement 
mechanisms’ there has been a call for the state’s reputational concern to 
serve as part of the principal mechanism for securing compliance with treaty 
obligations.141 Emphasis is now being placed on the effect a state’s 
reputation has on its decision to comply with its treaty obligations. From a 
rationalist point of view, states comply with treaty obligations based on the 
calculation of long- and short-term interests. However, implicit in this 
calculation is the desire to make future credible commitments with other 
states. Therefore, reputation comes into play because states want be seen 
as reliable partners who uphold their end of the bargain – an image which is 
vital for any African state that seeks to attract foreign investors. 
  In terms of the APRM, the reputational factor has both internal and 
external consequences. Internally, the APRM is essential because the 
government wants to build an internal reputation among its citizens in order 
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to entrench its legitimacy.142 Thus the APRM helps the government appear 
transparent and committed to good governance. The review process in 
Ghana revealed that President John Kuffour embarked on the APRM 
process to portray his government as committed to accountability and 
transparency with the ultimate aim of attracting foreign investors.143 
Externally, the process of defending the Country Review Report at the level 
of the APR Forum subjects the head of state to the scrutiny of his peers. At 
this level, fellow heads of state will highlight the gaps in the country’s 
governance structure, giving suggestions about the steps that could be taken 
to bridge those gaps. Since the country must submit yearly review reports 
about its implementation of the National Programme of Action, the country 
will strive to bridge the existing gaps to enhance its reputation. Herbert and 
Gruzd argue that the APRM has the potential to embarrass government 
leaders since it produces a report on national problems.144 Although the 
process is not meant to be a scorecard of a government’s performance, it 
inevitably identifies the breaching of rules, and this invariably has political 
and reputational consequences.145 
 So far, from the reports that have been presented, the APR Forum 
has been criticised for not grilling the heads of state properly about best 
practices. In the case of Ghana, it was alleged that ‘some Heads of State 
seem not have grasped the ethos of peer review, and spent time castigating 
Ghana for following (and the APR Panel for endorsing) allegedly Western-
inspired neoliberal policies’.146 It is important to note that while the peer 
review at the level of the APR Forum might not have taken the direction that 
observers expected, the fact that some members of the APR Forum could 
question the economic policies of Ghana is significant to the process. The 
overall intention of the review process is to challenge the status quo in the 
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governance structure in African states to develop a process that will bring 
about change on the continent. 
4.2.4.2 Transparency, information sharing and the participation of non-state 
actors 
The APRM is an open and participatory process that engages stakeholders 
in the process of information exchange and national dialogue on good 
governance and socio-economic development.147 The process increases 
transparency in the manner in which governments make decisions and also 
builds trust in governments’ commitment to national development goals.148 
The APRM uses transparency and information sharing as a core part of the 
review process.  
 Transparency in this context means any ‘legal, political, and 
institutional structures that make information about the internal 
characteristics of a government and society available to actors both inside 
and outside of the domestic political system’.149 Transparency in institutions 
of government is an integral part of good governance because it gives non-
state actors or other government departments access to information about 
government policies. The fundamental value of transparency is that it 
facilitates access to informa ion, which helps various actors to make 
decisions in any given situation.150 Having access to information about a 
government’s policies facilitates disclosure of that government’s 
interpretation of norms that regulate government activities. Where these 
norms are created by a multilateral treaty such as African integration treaties, 
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disclosure enables third parties to evaluate a government’s conformity with 
the norms.  
 The national self-assessment which is carried out through the 
administering of questionnaires is essential to the transparency process. The 
questionnaires usually contain vital questions about the four themes 
reviewed.151 Since the questionnaires are answered by a cross-section of 
society through a survey of public opinion, they largely reflect what the 
citizens think about the government. With the involvement of civil society in 
the APRM process, the combination of transparency and information sharing 
can pressure government to improve its governance and overall compliance. 
Given the persistent underdevelopment in most African countries, 
constructive engagement between civil society and governments is 
necessary to address existing socio-economic challenges.152 The scrutiny of 
a country’s performance by civil society gives credibility to the review 
process because it prevents the government from giving a false assessment 
of its performance.  
4.3  Conclusion 
Quite often, the integrity of Africa’s integration agenda comes under scrutiny 
because the aspirations or commitments expressed in integration treaties are 
often not in consonance with existing realities.153 For example, while treaties 
such as the Abuja Treaty and the various founding treaties of the RECs paint 
a fascinating picture of a robust approach to economic integration, the latter 
is more or less viewed as a utopia. However, if this narrative is taken as 
absolute truth without further interrogation, a great disservice would be done 
to the African people who have earnestly toiled to make economic integration 
a reality. 
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It is true that African leaders are often guilty of poor governance, 
corruption and personal aggrandisement, but initiatives such as NEPAD and 
the APRM may change the tide of events. With good governance and sound 
infrastructure, regional integration can be easily achieved. In theory, some 
essential aspects of integration have been achieved, but have failed to 
materialise into tangible benefits for African people. In West Africa, for 
example, the ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons and the 
ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme has been adopted. However, 
‘random road blocks, entrenched bribery and bloated tariffs along the Ghana-
Togo-Benin-Nigeria corridor’ seriously impede the movement of persons and 
goods.154 In SADC, delays in clearing goods at the ports as a result of slow 
customs procedures have been reported as the cause of those imported 
commodities having inflated prices.155 These kinds of factors militate against 
the attainment of integration, but NEPAD and the APRM may change these 
areas through their approach to monitoring governance. 
In the discussion about NEPAD and the APRM’s capacity to influence 
change, it is important to bear in mind that the benefits of these initiatives 
may not be felt in the short term, for a couple of reasons. Firstly, bad 
governance and corruption is ingrained in most African states and much 
advocacy and constant pressure from state and non-state actors is needed 
to change the existing paradigm.156 Secondly, building sufficient 
infrastructure and human capacity in  areas where most African states are 
deficient requires consistency over a period of time. In other words, NEPAD 
and the APRM should not be regarded as magic wands that will bring about 
instant change on the continent. Conscious efforts have to be made at all 
levels of society to ensure that NEPAD and the APRM are kept alive, to 
bridge the existing gaps between the stated objectives of economic 
integration and the actual practices of African states. Consistent and 
persistent efforts have to be made over time to ensure that the policies and 
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governance initiatives adopted at the regional level are systematically 
entrenched into the legal systems of member states. This issue is addressed 
in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5: Implementing economic integration in 
African states 
5.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter dealt with initiatives that have been put in place at the 
continental level to enable African states improve their levels of governance 
and build capacity in various areas. The success or failure of initiatives such 
as NEPAD and APRM largely depends on how states respond to these 
initiatives at the national level. For instance, the APR Process will be 
meaningless if states fail to subject themselves to periodic reviews. In 
essence, one of the most crucial tasks in the quest for economic integration 
is to ensure that the practice of member states at the national level aligns 
with the behaviour that has been prescribed at the continental level. Thus, 
the focus of this chapter is to examine how African states can ensure that 
they internalise the objectives of economic integration in such a way that 
their practices are aligned with the behaviour prescribed at the continental 
level. 
To achieve economic integration, member states enter into treaties 
that define the integration objectives. For these objectives to have a 
meaningful impact on the lives of African people, they must be able to 
‘influence the domestic policies of [s]tates and harness national institutions in 
pursuit of global objectives’.1 The ability of the integration objectives to 
influence domestic policies will be set in motion only if the appropriate steps 
are taken to internalise the integration objectives at the national level.2 The 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa notes that ‘integration 
objectives are not adequately internalized. Delays in ratifying regional 
economic community protocols hamper the timely implementation of 
decisions. And broad-based support for integration is lacking, with civil 
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society and the private sector acting largely as spectators.’3 In order to 
address the inadequate internalisation of integration objectives, it is 
necessary for member states to take steps at the national level that will 
enable African people to participate in the internalisation of integration 
objectives.  
Internalising integration objectives in member states is more complex 
than one may assume, because the regulatory environment in the domestic 
arena is often highly contested by various actors who vie for the protection of 
their interests.4 Citizens acting alone or through Parliament, organised 
labour, civil societies and corporate entities all compete to determine the 
regulatory policies of the state to ensure that their interests are not 
overlooked. Although the state oversees the regulatory environment, it does 
not have a monopoly over it, and therefore it is necessary for various interest 
groups to be included when regulations are formulated by the state.5 Clifford 
Shearing argues that the regulatory policy of a state is likely to be ineffective 
if it ‘fails to acknowledge that the regulatory space is a terrain in which the 
state must compete for control of regulation with other regulatory entities’.6 In 
applying this analysis to economic integration in Africa, it becomes evident 
that, while a state may intend to implement the integration objectives to 
which it has acceded, those objectives may conflict with the interests of 
some sections of society. Therefore, the state needs to carefully balance all 
the interests. 
For example, any move by the South African government to 
implement any policy that might expose its textile industry to external 
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competition would be severely contested by opposition parties, 
manufacturers and trade unions.7 Given the rate of unemployment,8 trade 
unions may not appreciate the reasons for opening up the national borders to 
textile imports from other countries at the expense of local industries. For 
such implementation to occur, the government would have to negotiate with 
all the actors involved. These actors would need to appreciate the reasons 
for implementing a trade liberalisation policy that may not be beneficial to 
citizens in the short term but will benefit them in the long term. Such 
contestation as to the appropriateness and benefits of the liberalisation policy 
may delay implementation and consequently impact on the state’s ability to 
comply with integration objectives. 
 In order to contend with the various forces at play at the national level, 
processes that would enhance dialogue and promote a rules-based system 
for giving effect to the integration objectives are needed. Dialogue is required 
to create awareness and enlighten all actors involved about the benefits of 
integration and possible ways of mitigating the losses that may occur. It is 
also important for the integration norms to be given the force law in the legal 
systems of member states to ensure that the rights flowing from the 
integration objectives are adequately protected at the national level. 
This chapter discusses two methods of ensuring that, through 
dialogue and the promotion of a rules-based system, the integration 
practices of African states are in line with the objectives of the integration 
treaties. The methods are (1) the creation of national focal points to ensure 
adequate linkages between regional policies and national policies, and (2) 
the creation of systemic links between regional courts and national courts. 
5.1 National focal points  
The sharing of information about the treaty norms and the performance of 
other states involved in the treaty is an essential aspect of securing 
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compliance with the obligations of a treaty.9 At the national level, information 
sharing between the various actors involved in giving effect to the treaty 
norms is also vital because the norms created by the treaty need to be 
implemented by the state. The process of implementation may require a 
collaborative effort between various government departments and/or 
branches of government. However, not all the departments or branches of 
government are involved in the treaty-making process, so it becomes 
essential to communicate the information about the country’s commitments 
to the parts of government that are required to implement the treaty norms. 
Weiss suggests that sometimes, a government may be divided as to whether 
to comply with a treaty obligation.10 While the foreign ministry may intend to 
comply when it signs the treaty, the ministry vested with the responsibility of 
implementing the treaty obligation may have no intention of complying. In 
some instances, the ministry may intend to comply but lacks the capacity. It 
is partly for these reasons that national focal points are needed to coordinate 
and to harmonise the policies of all branches or departments of government 
in order to align the state’s policies with its international commitments.  
The World Health Organisation and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity are examples of treaty regimes that make use of national focal 
points to ensure that there is adequate interaction between parties both 
locally and internationally.11 Adopting a similar mechanism for African 
integration treaties would allow for the creation of proper linkages between 
the integration policies and the domestic policies of member states. While 
some African states already have ministries of integration and cooperation 
that play the role of national focal points, this is not the usual trend in Africa. 
The last survey conducted by the Economic Commission for Africa showed 
that only 32 per cent of African states have national focal points or ministries 
                                                          
9
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes The New Sovereignty: Compliance with 
International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge University Press, Massachusetts, 1995) 
135–173. 
10
 Edith Weiss ‘Rethinking compliance with international law’ in Benvenisti, E and Hirsch, M 
(eds.) The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation (Cambridge University 
Press, New York 2004) 144. 
11
 World Health Organization (WHO) International Health Regulations (2005): Toolkit for 
Implementation in National Legislation, The National IHR Focal Point (WHO, Geneva, 2009); 
Convention on Biological Diversity Role of the CBD National Focal Point Module A-2, 
Version 2 February 2009, available on http://www.cbd.int/doc/training/nbsap/a2-train-role-
nfp-v2-2009-02-en.pdf [accessed 25 December 2012]. 
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to coordinate integration activities in the state.12 This clearly needs to 
change. Presently, only the East African Community (EAC) and the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) require all their member 
states to designate a ministry that is responsible for matters of integration.13 
However, the ministries are required to liaise only with the Secretary-General 
of the Communities. The scope of the national focal points advocated for 
here is wider than is currently provided for under the EAC and COMESA. 
National focal points could enable compliance with integration norms in the 
following ways: 
1. facilitating the harmonisation of policies between government 
departments; 
2. liaising with the legislative arm of government to ensure that treaties and 
protocols are promptly ratified and domesticated; 
3. serving as the interface between the executive arm of government and 
members of the public to create awareness about the benefits of economic 
integration; and 
4. serving as a consultative body for receiving complaints from citizens about 
non-adherence to the norms of integration. 
5.1.1 Facilitating the harmonisation of policies between government 
departments 
Why is coordination between government departments and branches of 
government important for ensuring compliance with integration treaties? In 
line with the need to accelerate economic integration on the continent, the 
African Union adopted a Minimum Integration Programme that identifies 11 
priority sectors for integration at the national level:14 free movement 
(persons, goods, services and capital), peace and security, infrastructure and 
energy, agriculture, trade, industry, investment, statistics, political affairs, 
science and technology, and social affairs. A cursory look at the way 
                                                          
12
 UNECA Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II (note 3) xviii; UNECA ‘Mainstreaming 
Regional Integration at the National Level’ Sixth Session of the Committee on Trade, 
Regional Cooperation and Integration E/ECA/CTRCI/6/7 (13–15 October 2009) 3.   
13
 See article 8(3) EAC Treaty and article 5(3) COMESA Treaty respectively. 
14
 African Union First Action Plan for the Implementation of the Minimum Integration 
Programme (MIP) (Yaounde Programme) 3. 
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governments function reveals that these sectors are coordinated by different 
ministries or departments.  
In order to ensure that the policies of the various departments that 
coordinate these sectors are in line with the overall integration goals of the 
state, the national focal point could play a facilitative role in ensuring that the 
relevant policies that affect economic integration are properly streamlined by 
the various departments. This will enable the free flow of information about 
steps that are being taken by the various departments. Such a practice 
would avoid a situation where the government policies conflict with each 
other as they relate to achieving economic integration at the national level. In 
the area of liberalisation of trade, for instance, the national focal point would 
have to work closely with the interior ministry, the finance ministry (customs 
authority), and the ministry of trade to ensure that their regulations are 
synchronised to permit the free movement of persons and goods across the 
nation’s borders. Failure to harmonise the policies of these departments may 
result in a situation where the trade liberalisation policy of the state may not 
be in consonance with the set goal of liberalising the free movement of 
persons and goods across the country’s borders. 
5.1.2 Liaising with the legislative arm of government to incorporate 
integration norms into national laws 
 
The national focal point could also liaise with the legislative arm of 
government. The challenge of internalising the integration norms is often 
complicated by the fact that most, if not all, integration treaties in Africa are 
concluded solely by the heads of states, with limited or no input from citizens, 
thus depriving citizens of the opportunity to express their views about the 
obligations that a state is about to undertake before such commitments are 
made. While the executive arm of government usually participates in the 
adoption of the integration norms, giving effect to these norms at the national 
level is not the responsibility of the executive arm alone. The ratification of 
protocols and treaties are often the prerogative of the legislative arm of 
government. Studies show that the slow ratification of protocols or treaties 
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contributes to the low levels of compliance with African integration treaties.15 
The national focal points could therefore ensure that treaties and protocols 
that have been signed by the executive branch of government are promptly 
sent to the legislature for ratification and possible incorporation into the 
municipal laws of member states.  
The incorporation of regional norms into the municipal legal systems 
of member states is essential to give effect to the norms within the territory of 
member states.16 Although the norms created at the regional level seemingly 
regulate the conduct of inter-state relations, they may also inherently confer 
rights on citizens of member states. To enable these citizens to enforce 
these rights when they are infringed by the state, other citizens or non-state 
actors, these rights must be enforceable at the national level. In the absence 
of the incorporation of regional norms into the national legal systems of 
member states, citizens may be unable to enforce the regional norms in 
national courts. The requirement to incorporate integration norms into the 
municipal laws of member states is in consonance with the general practice 
in international law of giving effect to treaty law through the domestication of 
treaties.17 This is because treaty law primarily does not have the force of law 
in the national domain until it has been incorporated into the national laws of 
a state.18 The process of domesticating treaties has been the subject of 
extensive scholarly research and would not be delved into in this thesis.19 
                                                          
15
 UNECA Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II (note 3) 77. 
16
 Richard Oppong Legal Aspects of Economic Integration in Africa (Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2011)188; AM Akiwumi ‘Judicial aspects of economic integration treaties 
in Africa’ in Hague Academy of International Law (ed) Legal Aspects of Economic Integration 
Colloquium (AW Sijthoff, Leiden, 1972) 79.  
17
 With the exception of rules of customary international law, international law usually 
requires the incorporation of treaty rules into municipal law. See Armand de Mestral and 
Evan Fox-Decent ‘Rethinking the relationship between international and domestic law’ 
(2008) 53 McGill Law Journal 573–648 at 577. Although Zamora has argued that some rules 
of international economic law should be regarded as part of customary international law, 
they are still largely regulated by treaties. See S Zamora ‘Is there customary international 
economic law?’ (1989) 32 German Yearbook of International Law 9–42. 
18
 This is not an absolute statement. In some countries, such as the United States of 
America, a distinction is drawn between self-executing treaties and non-self-executing 
treaties. For the former, domestication is not required for the provisions of the treaty to be 
enforceable in domestic courts. This is not the case for the latter. See Carlos Manuel 
Vázquez ‘Judicial enforcement of treaties: self-execution and related doctrines’ (2006) 100 
American Society of International Law Proceedings 439–448; Stephen Vladeck ‘Non-self-
executing treaties and the suspension clause after St. Cyr’ (2004) 113(8) Yale Law Journal 
2007–2014; Curtis Bradley ‘Intent, presumptions, and non-self-executing treaties’ (2008) 
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Two examples are given below to clarify the importance of the 
domestication of treaties. To protect the human rights of African citizens, 
African states adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(Banjul Charter).20 By ratifying the treaty, states are expected to domesticate 
the treaty and ensure that the rights that accrue to citizens under the treaty 
are protected at the national level.21 Where these rights are violated either by 
the state or a non-state actor, the aggrieved citizen can seek redress in the 
national courts based on the rights created in the Banjul Charter. Where the 
state fails to give effect to the rights of the aggrieved citizen, they can have 
their case heard at the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, or the court of the regional 
economic community REC) to which the state belongs.22  
                                                                                                                                                                    
102(3) American Journal of International Law 540–551; Carlos Manuel Vazquez ‘The four 
doctrines of self-executing treaties’ (1995) 89(4) American Journal of International Law 695–
723.In South Africa, self-executing provisions of a treaty become law once they are not 
inconsistent with the Constitution. See s 231(4) of the Constitution. 
19
 See Kal Raustiala ‘The domestication of international commitments’ (1995) International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis Working Paper WP-95-115; David Sloss ‘The 
domestication of international human rights: non-self-executing and human rights treaties’ 
(1999) 24 Yale Journal of International Law 129–221; John Jackson ‘Status of treaties in 
domestic legal systems: a policy analysis’ (1992) 86 American Journal of International Law 
310–340; Anthony Aust Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2000) 143–161.  
20
 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (‘Banjul Charter’) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 
rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982). 
21
 See Solomon Ebobrah ‘Application of the African Charter by African sub-regional 
organisations: gains, pains and the future’ (2012) 16 Law, Democracy & Development 49–
68; Solomon Ebobrah ‘Human rights developments in African sub-regional economic 
communities during 2010’ (2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 216–250. 
22
 See Abubakar v Ghana (2000) AHRLR 124 (ACHPR 1996); Constitutional Rights Project 
(in respect of Akamu and Others v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 180 (ACHPR 1995). These cases 
were heard by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The jurisdiction of 
the courts of the RECs to hear human rights cases is not straightforward. There is no 
controversy in regions like West Africa, where the court is expressly vested with human 
rights jurisdiction. See Socio-Economic Rights Accountability Project v The Federal Republic 
of Nigeria and the Universal Basic Education Commission ECW/CCJ/APP/0808 (ECOWAS, 
27 October 2009); Hadidjatou Mani Koraou v The Republic of Niger ECW/CCJ/APP/08/08 
(ECOWAS, 27 October 2008). In East Africa, the East African Court of Justice has heard 
human rights cases even though it does not have the express jurisdiction to do so. See 
Ruling on Preliminary Objection in Independent Medical Legal Unit v The Attorney General 
of Kenya and 4 Others (Reference No 3 of 2010, First Instance Division) 3–6; The 
Honourable Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya v Independent Medical Legal Unit 
Appeal No 1 of 2011 (Appellate Division) 7–13; James Katabazi & 21 Others v EAC 
Secretary General & Attorney General of Uganda Reference No 1 of 2007: Judgment of 1 
November 2001. However, in Southern Africa, the SADC Tribunal was suspended after it 
gave its ruling in the case of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v The Republic of Zimbabwe SADC (T) 
Case No 2/2007.  
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In respect of trade, SADC member states, as part of their obligation 
under the SADC Trade Protocol, have created a free trade area within the 
region that requires the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers. For 
importers and exporters within the SADC region to benefit from the duty-free 
access, the member states have to put in place regulations at the national 
level that will prevent their customs authority or the relevant authority from 
charging customs duties on goods that originate in the SADC region. The 
member state also has to ensure that policies are put in place to eliminate 
non-tariff barriers. If the customs authority still charges tariffs when there is a 
regulation in place that forbids such charges, the affected entity can seek 
redress either in the national courts or in the established regional mechanism 
for dispute settlement.23 
  Apart from the requirement that member states give effect to 
integration treaties, the hierarchical nature of treaty law after it has been 
domesticated is significant. The relationship between international law and 
national law is straightforward – states are bound by their treaty obligations. 
This rule, known as pacta sunt servanda, is provided for in article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).24 
Furthermore, article 27 of the Vienna Convention prevents states from 
escaping their international obligations by invoking the provisions of their 
domestic legislation. Once a state agrees to a rule or a set of rules in the 
international arena, it is under an obligation to give effect to those rules and 
cannot deviate from those rules on the basis that the rule is contrary to its 
domestic law. In essence, international law takes precedence over national 
law (at least in the international arena). In this regard, Thomas Cottier argues 
that, as a matter of logic, ‘international law can only assume its role of 
                                                          
23
 In line with the proposed Tripartite FTA in SADC, COMESA and the EAC, an online non-
tariff barriers complaint mechanism has been set up for reporting, monitoring and eliminating 
non-tariff barriers. Exporters or importers within these RECs can lodge online complaints 
about non-tariff barriers that impede trade within these regions. Since the mechanism was 
set up, 330 complaints have been resolved, seven were deemed non-actionable and 87 are 
being processed. See http://www.tradebarriers.org/ [accessed 27 December 2012]. 
24
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties International Legal Materials 8 (1969) 679, 
entered into force 27 January 1980. 
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stabilizing a global order if it supersedes particular and local rules’.25 
Similarly, African integration treaties ought to take primacy over national laws 
to ensure that the integration treaties can regulate the conduct of African 
states. This is, however, not the case. Even in instances where there is an 
express indication as to the primacy of the rules of international law over 
national law, challenges may still abound in the event of a conflict between 
international norms and national norms.26 
 Most African constitutions regard the constitution of the state as the 
supreme law of the land against which every law must be tested.27 Not only 
is the constitution supreme, some constitutions expressly require 
international law in general and treaties to be consistent with the 
constitution.28 Thus, any law that is inconsistent with the constitution is null 
and void.29 The primacy or supremacy of the constitution over every other 
law in the state could affect the application of integration norms in member 
states, because the integration norms become subservient to the constitution 
and must conform to the constitution in order to have the force of law. An 
example of a situation where the constitution of a state was given primacy 
                                                          
25
 Thomas Cottier ‘A theory of direct effect in global law’ in Armin von Bogdandy (ed) 
European Integration and International Co-ordination (Kluwer Law International, Hague, 
2002) 102. 
26
 See V Vereshchetin, ‘New constitutions and the old problem of the relationship between 
international law and national law,’ (1996) 7 European Journal of International Law 35.  
27
 Interestingly, some countries in Europe and the Middle East take a different view on the 
status of treaties or international agreements. Article 6 of the Armenian Constitution, article 
5(4) of the Bulgarian Constitution, article 123 of the Estonian Constitution, article 4 of the 
1995 Kazakh Constitution, article 15(4) of the Russian Constitution and article 11 of the 
Tadzhik Constitution all provide for the supremacy of treaties over national law in the event 
of a conflict between the laws. See Vladlen Vereshchetin (note 26) 34.  
28
 In this regard, some constitutions, such as the South African Constitution, also require 
customary international law to be consistent with the Constitution. See section 232 of the 
South African Constitution. 
29
 This feature is not unique to African states alone, and forms part of the broader discussion 
of whether international law should have a claim to supremacy over national law. The 
manner in which international law is received differs from state to state, and the perceptions 
in terms of hierarchy also differ. See Anne Peters ‘The globalization of state constitutions’ in 
Jane Nijman and Andre Nollkaemper (eds) New Perspectives on the Divide between 
National and International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) 251–301; V 
Vereshchetin (note 26) 29–41; Anne Peters ‘Supremacy lost: international law meets 
domestic constitutional law’ (2009) 3(3) Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law 
170–198; Thomas Franck and Arun Thiruvengadam ‘International law and constitution-
making’ (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of International Law 467–518; AO Adede 
‘Constitutionalism, culture and tradition: African experiences on the incorporation of treaties 
into domestic law’ (1999) 7 African Yearbook of International Law 239–253. 
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over integration norms is the Mike Campbell case.30 In determining the 
legality of the expropriation of the farms of the applicants, the SADC Tribunal 
was of the opinion that Zimbabwe had breached its obligations under the 
SADC Treaty, and therefore held in favour of the applicants.31 The applicants 
brought an application before the High Court of Zimbabwe to register the 
judgment of the SADC Tribunal.32 In deciding whether the judgment could be 
registered in Zimbabwe, the High Court of Zimbabwe held that, while 
Zimbabwe was bound by the SADC Treaty,33 registering the judgment of the 
SADC Tribunal would be contrary to public policy because the government 
would be required to ‘act in a manner that is manifestly incompatible with 
what is constitutionally ordained’.34 The High Court therefore denied the 
application for registration.  
If decisions of this nature become the usual practice, then the 
implementation of integration norms in member states may be constantly 
fraught with challenges whenever an integration norm conflicts with the 
constitution. The supremacy clause in the constitutions of African states 
could be a major impediment to the implementation of integration norms. The 
germane question is how integration norms can be incorporated into the laws 
of member states notwithstanding the supremacy clauses present in most 
constitutions. 
In the European Union (EU) these challenges have been resolved by 
applying the principle of primacy or supremacy of the European Union law 
and the direct application of Community law in member states. Although the 
principle of the supremacy of EU law over national legislation was not 
expressly provided for in the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
through judicial decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), EU law 
has been declared to be hierarchically superior to national law in the event of 
                                                          
30
 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and 78 others v The Republic of Zimbabwe SADC (T) Case No 
2/2007. 
31
 supra 55–58. 
32
 Gramara (Private) Limited and Colin Bailie Cloete v Government of the Republic of 
Zimbabwe and Attorney General of Zimbabwe and Norman Kapanga HC 5483/09. 
33
 supra 8–14. 
34
 Supra 19. 
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a conflict.35 Thus, even in instances where EU law is inconsistent with 
national law, a member state is under an obligation to bring its national laws 
into line with EU law. 
The principle of direct application makes EU laws directly applicable in 
member states. Therefore, member states do not necessarily need to enact 
national legislation to give effect to regulations made pursuant to the EU 
Treaty.36 The ECJ pointed out that the ‘direct application of a regulation 
means that its entry into force and its application in favour of or against those 
subject to it are independent of any measure of reception into national law.’37 
This decision means that the applicability of EU law is not subject to the 
incorporation of treaties into the legal systems of member states.38 The 
above description of the principles of primacy of EU law and the direct 
application thereof is rather simplistic, but shows how the challenge of 
domestication of regional rules and the supremacy of national constitutions 
has been addressed in the European integration process. 
 One might argue that the EU’s approach to the supremacy or primacy 
of EU law and the principle of direct application radically altered the 
traditional relational dynamics between national constitutions and 
international law by creating an international (regional) constitutional order 
where in the event of a conflict; EU laws trump the constitution of member 
                                                          
35
 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie Belastingen ECJ Case 26/62, [1963] ECR 
1; Costa v Ente Nazionale per L’Energia Elettrica (ENEL) ECJ Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585; 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr – und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und 
Futtermittel (Case 11/70) [1970] ECR 1125; Martin Stiernstrom ‘The relationship between 
community law and national law’ Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series vol. 5 no 33 
(October 2005); Karen Alter Establishing the Supremacy of the European Law: The Making 
of an International Rule of Law in Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) 2; Joseph 
Weiler ‘The community system: the dual character of supranationalism’ (1981) 1 Yearbook 
of European Law 274; Roman Kwiecien ‘The primacy of European Union law over national 
law under the constitutional treaty’ (2005) 6(11) German Law Journal 1479–1495; Ines 
Weyland ‘The application of Kelsen’s theory of the legal system to European community 
law–the supremacy puzzle resolved’ (2002) 21(1) Law and Philosophy 1–37. 
36
 See generally Martin Stiernstrom (note 35). 
37
 Amsterdam Bulb v Produktschap voor Siergewassen (50/76) (1976) ECR 146; Variola 
SpA v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze [1973] ECR 990.  
38
 See JA Winter ‘Direct applicability and direct effect: two distinct and different concepts in 
community law’ (1972) 9 Common Market Law Review 425–438; PJG Kapteyn ‘The 
application and enforcement of community law in the national legal systems’ in PJG Kapteyn 
et al (eds) The Law of the European Union and the European Communities (Kluwer Law 
International, Netherlands, 2008) 511–574.  
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states.39 The joint application of these principles is regarded as forming a 
strong basis for the effectiveness of the legal order of the EU.40 The 
presence of a strong ECJ that was able to stretch the limits of EU law and 
the acceptance of its interpretation by member states has had an undeniable 
influence on the development of this kind of sui generis law.41 In the case of 
the integration process in Africa, the regional courts have not made such 
strong pronouncements on the status of integration norms in national legal 
systems. While our regional courts have, in instances like the Campbell 
case, ruled that member states have an obligation to give effect to integration 
norms, there has not been an express pronouncement on their supremacy 
over national laws.  
In the absence of such express pronouncements by the courts, it is 
the responsibility of the legislature to ensure that integration treaties are not 
affected by the supremacy clause. This could be achieved by amending 
national constitutions to reflect the intention of the state to be bound at the 
national level by the integration treaties. Interaction between the national 
focal points and the legislature could even commence prior to the signing of 
the relevant treaty or protocol. At the negotiation stage of the treaty or 
                                                          
39
 This is by no means an indication that the national constitutions of member states in the 
EU play no role whatsoever in the integration process. It can be argued that the validity of 
the authority conferred on the EU by member states is derived from their constitutions. See 
Jan Wouters ‘National constitutions and the European Union’ (2000) 27 Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration 28–46. For more discussions of the constitutional legal order in 
Europe, see Paul Craig ‘Constitutions, constitutionalism, and the European Union’ (2001) 
7(2) European Law Journal 25–150; Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek (eds) Four Visions of 
Constitutional Pluralism EUI Working Paper Law No 2008/21 European University Institute; 
Neil Walker ‘The idea of constitutional pluralism’ (2002) 65(3) The Modern Law Review 317–
359; Miguel Poiares Maduro ‘Three claims of constitutional pluralism’ in M Avbelj and J 
Komarek (eds) Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2012) 68–84; Rene Barents ‘The fallacy of European multilevel constitutionalism’ in 
M Avbelj and J Komarek (eds) Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) 153–183; A von Bogdandy and J Bast (eds) Principles of 
European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010); JHH Weiler The Constitution 
of Europe: ‘Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?’ and Other Essays on European 
Integration (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999); Ingolf Pernice ‘Multilevel 
constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European constitution–making revisited’ 
(1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 703–750.  
40
 Roman Kweiecien (note 35) 1479. 
41
 The ECJ has pointed out that EU law ‘constitutes a new legal order of international law’ 
and ‘[b]y contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC has created its own legal 
system’. Thus the traditional approaches to the incorporation of international law into 
national law are not followed in the EU model. This sui generis law, one can argue, is an 
exception to the existing norm. See Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie 
Belastingen 12; Costa v ENEL Supra (note 35) 593. 
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protocol, the national focal point could open lines of communication with the 
relevant legislative committees to brief them on the needs and implications of 
the treaty or protocol that the state is about to enter into. At this stage, the 
compatibility of the treaty with the constitution could be addressed and other 
possible concerns could be raised. These issues could be negotiated and 
clarified to avoid a situation where the legislature fails to ratify the treaty after 
the state has signed it. 
5.1.3 The interface between the state and non-state actors 
National focal points could also serve as the direct interface between the 
government and non-state actors. Non-state actors in this context include 
citizens, professionals, non-governmental organisations, corporations and 
any other actors that are affected by the process of integration. This interface 
is necessary if one considers that the social dimension42 of economic 
integration may not always resonate well with all sections of society.43 
Although integration is social in nature, since it brings about cohesion 
between the societies it integrates,44 inadequate communication or 
awareness about the benefits of economic integration may result in social 
tension in society. These social tensions could impede the pace at which 
integration policies are implemented by the state. In order to diffuse these 
tensions there needs to be a forum for adequate discussions between the 
government and its citizens about the benefits of economic integration. The 
national focal points could be used to facilitate such discussions. 
Examples from some RECs illustrate this point. ECOWAS and the 
EAC have protocols on the free movement of persons and the right of 
establishment for citizens of member states, while SADC has a Charter of 
                                                          
42
 World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation (WCSDG) A Fair 
Globalisation: Creating Opportunities for All (International Labour Office, Geneva, 2004) 71–
74; UNU-CRIS ‘Deepening the social dimensions of regional integration’ Discussion Paper 
Series No 188 (International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva, 2008) 25–28; Rene 
Robert ‘The social dimension of regional integration in ECOWAS’ Working Paper No 49 
(International Labour Office, Geneva, 2005); Letlhokwa Mpedi and Mathias Nyenti 
‘Perspectives towards the development of social protection dimension of the SADC regional 
integration agenda’ (2012) 2(2) SADC Law Journal 164–186. 
43
 World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation (WCSDG) (note 42); UNU-
CRIS (note 42); Rene Robert (note 42); Letlhokwa Mpedi and Mathias Nyenti (note 42). 
44
 Andrew Axline European Community Law and Organizational Development (Oceana 
Publications, New York 1965) 2. 
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Fundamental Social Rights.45 A member state in these regions with high 
rates of unemployment or inadequate social security for its citizens may have 
to go the extra mile in convincing its citizens that implementing the provisions 
of these agreements will benefit the state.46 The severe scarcity of resources 
in African states warrants such a dialogue between the government and its 
citizens to reassure them that opening up the borders of the state to other 
citizens from the region will not lead to a further depletion of the already 
scarce resources. The xenophobic attacks in South Africa on Africans who 
were perceived as threats to scarce employment opportunities and welfare 
services strengthen an argument for such a dialogue between the state and 
its citizens to communicate the benefits of economic integration.47 For there 
to be effective economic integration the norms created at the regional level 
need to translate into substantive realities for the citizens of member states. 
One way in which this could be achieved is if citizens of member states 
directly benefit from and understand the reasons for participating in 
economic integration. Thus, it is vital that the citizens are included at every 
stage of the integration process. 
Non-state actors, particularly non-governmental organisations are 
essential to secure compliance.  
5.1.4 Consultative body for receiving complaints from citizens 
Citizens could also use the national focal points as forums for expressing 
displeasure about non-adherence to the norms of integration by the state or 
other states within the integrating unit. Such an avenue could go a long way 
in mitigating some of the existing challenges faced in eliminating non-tariff 
barriers between African states. The imposition of non-tariff barriers is known 
                                                          
45
 East African Community Common Market (Right of Establishment) Regulations 2009 
(EAC Secretariat: Arusha); East African Community Common Market (Free Movement of 
Workers) Regulations 2009 (EAC Secretariat: Arusha); Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights in SADC; ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and 
Establishment A/P.1/5/79.  
46
 For a discussion of expanding social security benefits for SADC citizens in South Africa, 
see Marius Olivier ‘Enhancing access to South African social security benefits by SADC 
citizens: the need to improve bilateral arrangements within a multilateral framework (Part 1)’ 
(2011) 1 SADC Law Journal 121–148; Marius Olivier ‘Enhancing access to South African 
social security benefits by SADC citizens: the need to improve bilateral arrangements within 
a multilateral framework (Part 2)’ (2012) 2(2) SADC Law Journal 129–163. 
47
 Editorial Opinion ‘No to xenophobia’ Daily Dispatch (7 July 2005) 6; Glynnis Underhill 
‘Xenophobia? What xenophobia?’ Mail&Guardian (28 January 2010) 6. 
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to be one of the greatest impediments to trade liberalisation on the continent. 
Sometimes, these barriers are imposed by agents of the state without the 
consent of the state.  
In Nigeria and other West African countries, for instance, illegal road 
blocks mounted by security operatives along major international trade routes 
and bribery among customs officials are often used to extort money from 
traders involved in cross-border trade.48 These road blocks mounted by 
corrupt government operatives impede the free movement of goods and 
persons across the borders. The illegal activities of these government 
officials could be addressed by the national focal points if citizens constantly 
lodge their complaints through their national focal points. Furthermore, the 
national focal points could address these issues internally by contacting the 
authorities in the relevant departments. If the complaints are about the 
practices in other member states, the national focal point could contact its 
counterparts with a view to finding lasting solutions to the imposition of illegal 
non-tariff barriers by unscrupulous government officials.  
The national focal points could also enable its citizens or corporations 
to resolve the challenges of non-tariff barriers. For example, the Shoprite 
Group in South Africa claims that it spends a weekly average of $20,000 to 
secure permits to import meat and milk for its stores in Zambia. Woolworths 
also claims not to export its goods under the SADC Preferential Tariffs 
because the cost of administering the tariffs is too high. Clearly the legality of 
these high costs of transactions is questionable given the existence of a 
SADC Trade Protocol that prohibits non-tariff barriers. Issues of this nature 
could be brought to the attention of the national focal points, which could 
then bring them before the relevant authorities or the SADC-COMESA-EAC 
Non-Tariffs Barriers Complaints Commission. One of the benefits of raising 
these issues at the governmental level is that states can continually test the 
content of the agreed norms, and this may lead to compliance.  
                                                          
48
 Mombert Hoppe and Francis Aidoo ‘Removing barriers to trade between Ghana and 
Nigeria: strengthening regional integration by implementing ECOWAS commitments’ (2012) 
30 African Trade Policy Notes 6; Habiba Ben Barka ‘Border posts, checkpoints, and intra-
African trade: 
Challenges and solutions’ 2012 African Development Bank Chief Economist Complex 1–19. 
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From the above discussion of national focal points, it is evident that 
not only can they be used to facilitate discussions between government 
departments, citizens and the legislature, but they can also be a medium for 
resolving instances of non-adherence to the norms of integration. It is not the 
contention here that the creation of national focal points will automatically 
eradicate all impediments to the implementation of economic integration 
policies at the national level. However, the impact of having such a facilitative 
and possibly consultative body to constantly create an enabling environment 
for dialogue about the norms of integration should not be overlooked. 
Serious consideration should be given to this mechanism, which could be 
adopted as part of a robust strategy for combating inherent and systemic 
problems associated with mainstreaming regional economic policies into 
national development plans.  
5.2  Creating linkages between regional courts and national 
courts 
How is creating linkages between regional courts and national courts 
relevant to implementing economic integration in member states, particularly 
as regional courts are vested with the jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes 
arising from the integration treaties and the decisions are binding on member 
states? A closer look at the treaties establishing the regional courts reveals 
that creating such links would strengthen the integration process and enable 
national courts to become actively involved in the integration process. In this 
section, three areas are examined to illustrate how the links could benefit the 
integration process and consequently improve the compliance levels of 
member states:49 (1) jurisdiction and access to regional courts; (2) referrals 
of disputes from national courts; and (3) execution of judgments. The courts 
of four RECs are examined:50 the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic 
                                                          
49
 For a detailed discussion of regional courts in Africa, see James Gathii ‘The under-
appreciated jurisprudence of Africa’s regional trade judiciaries’ (2010) 12 Oregon Review of 
International Law 245– 283 
50
 Only four of the eight RECs are discussed because ECCAS, IGAD, AMU and CENSAD do 
not have functioning courts.  
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Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). 
5.2.1 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
COMESA was created in 1994, replacing the former Preferential Trade Area 
for Eastern and Southern Africa. It is presently a customs union and 
comprises 19 states from North, East and Southern Africa.51 The objectives 
of the COMESA Treaty, listed in article 3, include the attainment of 
sustainable growth and development through the harmonious development 
of production and marketing structures, the promotion of peace and security 
to enhance economic development among member states, and contributing 
towards the establishment and realisation of the objectives of the African 
Economic Community (AEC). To achieve the above objectives, the member 
states give specific undertakings in the following areas: trade liberalisation 
and customs cooperation, transport and communications, industry and 
energy, monetary affairs and finance, agriculture, and economic and social 
affairs.52 
5.2.1.1 Jurisdiction and access to regional courts 
Article 7(1)(c) of the Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa established the COMESA Court of Justice (COJ). The 
mandate of the COJ is to ‘ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation 
and application of [the COMESA] Treaty’.53 Article 23 gives it a general 
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all matters referred to it pursuant to the 
COMESA Treaty. Member states may refer another member state or the 
COMESA Council if they fail to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty or 
infringe the provisions of the Treaty.54 A member state may also challenge 
the legality of an act, regulation, directive or decision of Council if it is ultra 
                                                          
51
 Its members are Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Seychelles, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Tanzania, Lesotho, Mozambique and 
Namibia were initially members of COMESA but withdrew their membership in 2000 
(Tanzania), 1997 (Lesotho and Mozambique) and 2004 (Namibia).  
52
 Article 4 COMESA Treaty. 
53
 Article 19 COMESA Treaty. 
54
 Article 24(1) COMESA Treaty. 
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vires or infringes the Treaty or amounts to an abuse or misuse of power.55 
The Secretary-General may also refer a member state to the COJ if the 
member state has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty or has 
infringed the provisions of the Treaty.56 Finally, legal and natural persons 
may challenge the legality of an act, regulation, directive or decision of 
Council or of a member state on the grounds that the act, regulation, 
directive or decision in question is unlawful or has infringed the provisions of 
the Treaty.57 However, legal and natural persons must first exhaust local 
remedies in their national courts or tribunals before they have a right of 
action at the COJ.58 
5.2.1.2 Referrals of disputes from national courts 
Article 29(1) provides that ‘[e]xcept where the jurisdiction is conferred on the 
Court by or under [the] Treaty, disputes to which the Common Market is a 
party shall not, on that ground alone, be excluded from the jurisdiction of 
national courts.’59 However, the COJ’s interpretation of the Treaty takes 
precedence over the decisions of national courts.60 In a dispute before a 
national court, where a question is raised as to the application or 
interpretation of the Treaty or the validity of an act, regulation, directive or 
decision, the national court may refer the matter to the COJ for a preliminary 
ruling if the national court is of the opinion that such a preliminary ruling is 
necessary to enable it to give a judgment.61 The national courts must also 
refer a matter to the COJ where the matter is in relation to the interpretation 
of the Treaty, act, regulation, directive or decision but there is no judicial 
remedy under the national law of the member state.62 
5.2.1.3 Execution of judgments 
Where the COJ gives a judgment that imposes a pecuniary obligation on a 
person, the execution of such judgment is governed by the rules of civil 
                                                          
55
 Article 24(2) COMESA Treaty. 
56
 Article 25 COMESA Treaty. 
57
 Article 26 COMESA Treaty. 
58
 Article 26 COMESA Treaty. 
59
 Article 29(1) COMESA Treaty. 
60
 Article 29(2) COMESA Treaty. 
61
 Article 30(1) COMESA Treaty. 
62
 Article 30(2) COMESA Treaty. 
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procedure that are in force in the member state where the judgment is to be 
executed.63 The execution order is appended to the judgment and its 
authenticity is verified by the registrar. 
5.2.2 The East African Community (EAC)  
The EAC comprises five countries in East Africa, namely, Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi.64 It has its headquarters in Arusha, 
Tanzania and came into existence through the Treaty for the Establishment 
of the East African Community (EAC Treaty).65 The EAC Treaty was signed 
on 30 November 1999, came into force on 7 July 2000,66 and was 
subsequently amended on 14 December 2006 and 20 August 2007. While 
regional integration in East Africa is mainly justified on economic grounds, 
the common history, language and culture of the East African people has 
deepened cooperation in political, economic, social and cultural affairs.67 The 
primary objective of the EAC is to develop policies and programmes aimed at 
strengthening cooperation between member states in the areas of politics, 
the economy, social and cultural affairs, research and technology, defence, 
security, and legal and judicial affairs.68 
                                                          
63
 Article 40 COMESA Treaty. 
64
 At www.eac.int [accessed 2 January 2013]. 
65
 Regional integration in East Africa dates back to the colonial era with the formation of the 
Kenya-Uganda Railway between 1897 and 1901, the Customs Collection Centre in 1900, 
the East African Currency Board in 1905, the Postal Union in 1905, the Court of Appeal for 
Eastern Africa in 1909, the Customs Union in 1919, the East African Governors’ Conference 
in 1926, the East African Income Tax Board in 1940, the Joint Economic Council in 1940, 
the East Africa (High Commission) Orders in Council between 1947 and-1961, and the 
Treaty for East African Co-operation in 1967. With the dissolution of the Treaty for East 
African Co-operation in 1977, the East African Community officially came to an end until its 
resurrection in 1999. See the Preamble to the Treaty for the Establishment of the East 
African Community, as amended on 14 December 2006 and 20 August 2007. See also East 
African Community Experts Report on The East African Political Federation: Addressing 
East Africans’ Fears, Concerns and Challenges and Consolidating its Pillars (EAC, Arusha, 
August 2010) 6; African Union Status of Integration in Africa (SIA) 2 ed (African Union, Addis 
Ababa, 2009) 96–97; Evarist Mugisa et al An Evaluation of the Implementation and Impact 
of the East African Community Customs Union Final Report (EAC, Arusha, 2009); Korwa 
Adar and Mutahi Ngunyi ‘The politics of integration in East Africa since independence’ in 
Walter Oyugi (ed) Politics and Administration in East Africa (Konrad Adenaeur Foundation, 
Nairobi, 1992) 395–442; Ingrid Diomi Delupis The East African Community and Common 
Market (Longman, London, 1970); Joseph Nye Pan-Africanism and East African Integration 
(Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1965); Christian Potholm and Richard Fredland 
Integration and Disintegration in East Africa (University of America Press, Lanham, 1980). 
66
 At http://www.tralac.org/2011/03/23/eac-legal-texts/ [accessed 2 January 2013]. 
67
 African Union Status of Integration in Africa (SIA) 2 ed (African Union, Addis Ababa, 2009) 
99. 
68
 Article 5 EAC Treaty. 
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5.2.2.1 Jurisdiction and access to regional courts 
Article 9(1) (e) of the Treaty Establishing the East African Community 
established the East African Court of Justice (EACJ). The role of the EACJ is 
ensure ‘the adherence to law in the interpretation and application of and 
compliance with [the EAC] Treaty’.69 The EACJ consists of a First Instance 
Division and an Appellate Division.70 The EACJ presently has jurisdiction 
over the interpretation and application of the EAC Treaty.71 Member states, 
the Secretary-General, legal persons and natural persons all have access to 
the EACJ.  
A member state may refer an organ or institution of the EAC to the 
EACJ if there has been a failure to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty or an 
infringement of the provisions of the Treaty.72 A member state may also 
challenge the legality of an act, regulation, directive or decision on the 
grounds that it is ultra vires or unlawful or infringes the provisions of the 
Treaty.73 The Secretary-General may refer a member state to the EACJ if the 
member state has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty or has 
infringed the provisions of the Treaty.74 Legal or natural persons can 
approach the EACJ to determine the legality of an act, regulation, directive or 
decision of a member state or an institution of the EAC on the grounds that 
they have acted unlawfully or infringed the provisions of the Treaty.75 
5.2.2.2 Referrals of disputes from national courts 
The national courts of member states are not precluded from hearing 
disputes that relate to the Treaty except where jurisdiction has been 
conferred on the EACJ by the Treaty.76 However, in instances where the 
national courts entertain a dispute that relates to the Treaty, the 
interpretation given by the EACJ in similar matters takes precedence over 
                                                          
69
 Article 23(1) EAC Treaty. 
70
 Article 23(2) EAC Treaty. 
71
 Article 27(1) EAC Treaty. 
72
 Article 28(1) EAC Treaty. 
73
 Article 28(2) EAC Treaty. 
74
 Article 29 EAC Treaty. 
75
 Article 30(1) EAC Treaty. 
76
 Article 33(1) EAC Treaty. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
175 | P a g e  
 
the decision of the national court.77 The EAC Treaty permits national courts 
to request a preliminary ruling from the EACJ when there is a matter before 
the national courts that relates to the interpretation or application of the 
provisions of the Treaty or the validity of an act, regulation, directive or 
decision.78 
5.2.2.3 Execution of judgments 
If there is a pecuniary obligation in an EACJ judgment, the rules of civil 
procedure in force in the member state where the judgment is to be enforced 
apply.79 The order of execution is attached to the judgement and its 
authenticity is verified by the registrar. 
5.2.3 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
ECOWAS was created in 1975 by the Treaty Establishing the Economic 
Community of West African States (1975 ECOWAS Treaty).80 The 1975 
ECOWAS Treaty was terminated in 1993 when member states adopted a 
revised ECOWAS Treaty in 1993 (Revised ECOWAS Treaty). ECOWAS 
comprises 15 member states from the West African region.81 The objectives 
of ECOWAS are to ‘promote cooperation and integration, leading to the 
establishment of an economic union in West Africa’.82 The underlying 
rationale for these objectives is to raise the living standards of the West 
African people, promote economic stability in the region, nurture relations 
between West African states, and enhance the overall development of the 
African continent.83 To achieve these objectives, ECOWAS member states 
have progressively undertaken to harmonise their national policies and to 
promote economic integration in the areas of agriculture and natural 
resources, industry, transport, trade, money and finance, taxation, economic 
                                                          
77
 Article 33(2) EAC Treaty. 
78
 Article 34 EAC Treaty. 
79
 Article 44 EAC Treaty. 
80
 The Treaty Establishing ECOWAS was adopted on 28 May 1975. For a brief history of 
economic cooperation in West Africa, see Adebayo Adedeji ‘Prospects of regional economic 
co-operation in West Africa’ (1970) 8(2) Journal of Modern African Studies 213–231.  
81
 The present member states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and 
Togo. ECOWAS initially consisted of 16 member states, but Mauritania withdrew its 
membership in 2000. 
82
 Article 3(1) Revised ECOWAS Treaty 1993. 
83
 Ibid. 
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reform policies, human resources, education, information, culture, science, 
technology, tourism, legal matters, and the environment.84 
5.2.3.1 Jurisdiction and access to regional courts in ECOWAS 
The Revised ECOWAS Treaty established a Community Court of Justice for 
the region (ECCJ).85 Article 3 of the Supplementary Protocol Amending the 
Protocol on ECCJ mandates the ECCJ to adjudicate disputes relating to the 
interpretation of the ECOWAS Treaty, Conventions and Protocols of the 
Community.86 The ECCJ also has a mandate to interpret, apply and 
determine the legality of the regulations, directives, decision and other 
subsidiary legal instruments adopted by ECOWAS.87 The ECCJ has the 
powers to determine non-contractual liabilities of ECOWAS and may order 
ECOWAS to pay damages or make reparations for acts or omissions of 
ECOWAS institutions or officials if performed in the course of official duty.88 
Furthermore, the ECCJ has jurisdiction over matters provided for in any 
agreement where the parties to the agreement confer such jurisdiction on the 
ECCJ.89 In terms of access to the ECCJ, member states, the Council of 
Ministers, and the Executive Secretary of the ECOWAS can institute an 
action if another member state has failed to honour its obligations or to 
determine the legality of an action which is related to any ECOWAS text.90 
Individuals and corporate bodies may also institute an action to determine 
the legality of an action or inaction of an ECOWAS official that violates the 
rights of the individual or corporate body.91 
5.2.3.2 Referrals of disputes from national courts 
The Protocol on the ECCJ does not provide for the referral of disputes from 
national courts to the ECCJ. 
                                                          
84
 Article 3(2a) and chapters IV-XI Revised ECOWAS Treaty 1993. 
85
 Article 6(1) (e) Revised ECOWAS Treaty. 
86
 ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05/ Amending the Preamble and Articles 1, 
2, 9 and 30 of Protocol A/P.1/7/91 Relating to the Community Court of Justice.  
87
 Article 3(1) ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on the Community Court. 
88
 Article 3(2) ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on the Community Court. 
89
 Article 3(7) ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on the Community Court. 
90
 Article 4(a) (b) ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on the Community Court. 
91
 Article 4(d) ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on the Community Court. 
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5.2.3.3 Execution of judgments 
Article 24 of the Protocol on the ECCJ requires any decision of the ECCJ to 
be in the form of a writ of execution which is submitted by the registrar of the 
ECCJ to the member state for execution in accordance with the rules of civil 
procedure of the member state.92 In order to enforce the judgments of the 
ECCJ, each member state is required to have a competent national authority 
that can receive and process the execution of the ECCJ’s decisions.93 Upon 
the receipt and verification of the writ of execution by the competent national 
authority, the writ is enforced. 
5.2.4 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
SADC comprises 15 member states.94 SADC started as the Southern African 
Development Cooperation Conference and was later transformed into the 
Southern African Development Community.95 The objectives of SADC 
include promoting economic and social growth, promoting common political 
values, promoting productive employment, achieving sustainable utilisation 
of resources, and ensuring the eradication of poverty.96 
5.2.4.1 Jurisdiction and access to regional courts 
Article 9(1) of the Treaty Establishing the Southern African Development 
Community established a SADC Tribunal.97 Article 16 of the SADC Treaty 
mandates the SADC Tribunal to ensure the ‘adherence to and the proper 
interpretation of the provisions of [the SADC] Treaty and subsidiary 
instruments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it’. 
                                                          
92
 Protocol A/P.1/7/91 Relating to the Community Court of Justice, as amended by article 6 
ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05/ Amending the Preamble and Articles 1, 2, 
9 and 30 of Protocol A/P.1/7/91 Relating to the Community Court of Justice. 
93
 Article 24(4) Protocol A/P.1/7/91 Relating to the Community Court of Justice. 
94
 Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe.  
95
 See Ashimizo Afadameh-Adeyemi and Evance Kalula ‘SADC at 30: re-examining the legal 
and institutional anatomy of the Southern African Development Community’ in Anton Boesl 
et al (eds) Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa in 2010 (TRALAC, 
Stellenbosch, 2011) 5–22. 
96
 Article 5 SADC Treaty as amended. 
97
 The SADC Tribunal is presently under suspension pending a review of its role and 
jurisdiction. See Derek Matyszak ‘The dissolution of the SADC’ Tribunal Research and 
Advocacy Unit, available at 
http://www.researchandadvocacyunit.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_downlo
ad&gid=108&Itemid=90 [accessed 6 June 2010]. 
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Pursuant to article 16 of the SADC Treaty, a SADC Protocol on the Tribunal 
was adopted by member states. Article 14 of the Protocol on the Tribunal 
gives the SADC Tribunal jurisdiction over all disputes and applications which 
relate to the interpretation and application of the SADC Treaty, the 
interpretation, application or validity of the Protocols and all other instruments 
adopted under the auspice of SADC, and the acts of the institutions of 
SADC. The SADC Tribunal also has jurisdiction over any matter provided for 
in an agreement which specifically confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal.98 
Member states, natural persons and legal persons have access to the SADC 
Tribunal. However, natural and legal persons have to exhaust local remedies 
before they can approach the Tribunal.99 
5.2.4.1 Referrals of disputes from national courts 
The Protocol on the SADC Tribunal permits the national courts of member 
states to approach the SADC Tribunal for a preliminary ruling on any dispute 
before the court.100  
5.2.4.3 Execution of judgments 
Article 32 of the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal provides that the applicable 
law for the execution of a judgment is the law for the registration and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in force in the state where the judgment is 
to be enforced. Member states and institutions of SADC are mandated to 
take all necessary steps to ensure that the decisions of the SADC Tribunal 
are executed. 
5.2.5 Why the link is necessary 
From the brief description of the jurisdiction of the regional courts it is 
apparent that the mandate of the COJ and the EACJ relate only to the 
interpretation and application of the constituent treaty.101 This means that 
except a subsequent subsidiary instrument confers jurisdiction on the COJ 
                                                          
98
 Article 14(c) Protocol on the SADC Tribunal. 
99
 Article 15(2) Protocol on the SADC Tribunal. It is important to note that access to the 
Tribunal by natural and legal persons has been the subject of controversy. It has been 
alleged that the right of access by legal and natural persons will be excluded from the new 
protocol that is being drafted. 
100
 Article 16 Protocol on the SADC Tribunal. 
101
 See article 7(1) (e) COMESA Treaty and article 23(1) EAC Treaty. 
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and the EACJ, they would not have the mandate to adjudicate disputes 
resulting from such subsidiary instruments. On the other hand, the ECCJ and 
the SADC Tribunal have the mandate to interpret the constituent treaty and 
other subsidiary instruments.102 To illustrate the implication of this point, let 
us use an example from the EAC.  
 The EAC has adopted a Protocol establishing a Common Market.103 
Among other rights protected by this Protocol, the Protocol protects the free 
movement of workers and prohibits discrimination in employment and 
remuneration on the basis of the nationality of the worker from a member 
state.104 This protection accorded to workers is laudable. However, the 
problem lays in the fact that article 54(1) of the Protocol on the Common 
Market, which deals with dispute settlement, gives member states access to 
the EACJ only to settle any dispute that may arise from the interpretation of 
the Protocol. The entire Protocol is silent on whether legal or natural persons 
can access the EACJ if a member state, legal person or natural person 
violates the provisions of the Protocol. Since the EAC Treaty guarantees the 
right of access by a legal or natural person to the EACJ only in relation to the 
determination of the legality of an act, regulation, directive or decision of a 
member state or an institution of the EAC on the grounds that they have 
acted unlawfully or infringed the provisions of the Treaty,105 it follows that 
legal and natural persons cannot seek recourse at the EACJ where the 
provisions of the Common Market Protocol are being violated.  
One may argue that an activist court like the EACJ, which has in the 
past exercised jurisdiction over disputes that had human rights components 
even though it lacked human rights jurisdiction, may extend its mandate to 
include the interpretation and application of subsidiary instruments of the 
EAC.106 However, such an argument will not succeed if the approach of the 
                                                          
102
 See Article 3 ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on the Community Court and article 16 
SADC Treaty. 
103
 Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market. 
104
 Article 10 Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market. 
105
 Article 30(1) EAC Treaty. 
106
 See James Katabazi and 21 Others  (note 22).Other ground breaking cases from the 
EACJ include a decision on the procedural irregularities in the amendment of the EAC 
Treaty: East African Law Society and Others v Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya 
and Others East African Court of Justice Judgment Ref No 3 of 2007 (September 2008). For 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
180 | P a g e  
 
President of the EACJ, Justice Harold Nsekela, is considered. Justice Harold 
Nsekela is of the opinion that while the Protocol on the Common Market 
guarantees the rights of citizens, these citizens cannot bring an action for 
enforcement before the EACJ.107 In instances of this nature, only an 
amendment of either the EAC Treaty or the Protocol on the Common Market 
will suffice to enable legal or natural persons to enforce their rights under the 
Protocol on the Common Market in the EACJ. 
 In article 54(2) of the Protocol on the Common Market, member 
states guarantee, in accordance with their constitutions and national laws, 
the right to seek redress if the rights of any person guaranteed under the 
Protocol are infringed. In such a case, the competent judicial, administrative 
or legislative authority shall rule on the rights of the person seeking redress. 
The provisions of article 54(2) undoubtedly confers jurisdiction on the 
national courts to protect rights guaranteed by the Protocol. Conferring 
authority on the national courts to adjudicate disputes arising from the 
Protocol on the Common Market could be seen as partially bridging the gap 
which article 54(1) of the Protocol on the Common Market creates. For 
instance, if the right that was breached under the Protocol on the Common 
Market is the right of a worker to non-discrimination and the violator is the 
state, nothing precludes the national court from requesting a preliminary 
ruling from the EACJ on whether the violation under the Protocol on the 
Common Market contravenes the principle of adherence to good 
governance, democracy, the rule of law and social justice, which is clearly 
articulated in article 7(2) of the EAC Treaty.108  
Other than requesting a preliminary ruling from the EACJ, the national 
court may of its own accord determine whether the action of the member 
state has breached the Protocol on the Common Market. Where the national 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the EACJ’s decision on the irregularity in the election of members of the East African 
Legislative Assembly, see Professor Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o and Others v Attorney General 
of Kenya and Others East African Court of Justice, Ref No 1 of 2006 (30 March 2007). 
107
 The East African ‘More teeth needed for the East African Court’ at 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/More-teeth-needed-for-East-African-court/-
/2558/1482514/-/view/printVersion/-/ido1lgz/-/index.html [accessed 4 January 2013]. 
108
 See James Katabazi and 21 Others (note 22)18 where the EACJ held that the 
‘intervention by the armed security agents of Uganda to prevent the execution of a lawful 
Court order violated the principle of the rule of law and consequently contravened the 
Treaty’. 
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court decides in favour of the worker, but the member state fails to comply 
with the decision of the national court, the worker whose rights have been 
violated may approach the EACJ directly for an interpretation as to the 
legality of the non-compliance by the member state. In this case, the issue 
for determination before the EACJ would no longer be whether the worker 
can approach the EACJ when a right under the Protocol on the Common 
Market is violated. Rather, the issue before the EACJ would be the 
determination of the legality of the non-compliance of the member state with 
the decision of the national court. The decision of the EACJ in James 
Katabazi and 21 others v Secretary General of the East African Community 
and Another could serve as a precedent. In this case the EACJ emphasised 
the need for member states to abide by the rule of law and held that, when 
states fail to do so, it is the responsibility of the court to ensure that the rule 
of law is protected.109 Relying on this decision, one may argue that, although 
citizens of member states may not have direct access to the EACJ for the 
purposes of enforcing their rights under the Common Market Protocol, they 
may still benefit from the authoritative interpretation of the EACJ through a 
series of direct and indirect interactions between the EACJ and the national 
courts. 
Creating a close link between regional courts and national courts is 
also essential for enforcing judgments of the regional courts. In COMESA, 
the EAC and ECOWAS, the rules of civil procedure of the member states 
govern the enforcement of the decisions of the regional courts. In SADC, the 
judgments of the SADC Tribunal are executed as foreign judgments in the 
member states. Requiring the rules of civil procedure of member states to 
govern the enforcement of foreign judgments is fairly ambiguous because 
the national courts could either regard the judgments of the regional courts 
as foreign judgments or confer upon them the status of domestic judgments.  
The approach adopted by the national courts has different implications 
for the enforcement of judgments of the regional courts. If the judgment of 
the regional court is treated as a foreign judgment, the national courts may 
have the jurisdiction to determine whether the judgment conforms to certain 
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requirements for the enforcement of foreign judgments.110 In Nigeria and 
South Africa, for instance, the national courts will not execute a foreign 
judgment if the court is of the opinion that enforcing the judgment is contrary 
to the public policy of the state.111 Any determination of the compatibility of 
the decisions of the regional courts with the public policy of the state may 
undermine the decisions of the regional courts. The decision of the High 
Court of Zimbabwe in Gramara (Private) Limited and Another v Government 
of the Republic of Zimbabwe112 illustrates the danger of subjecting the 
decisions of the regional courts to the compatibility test that judgments from 
foreign jurisdictions are usually required to go through.  
On the other hand, if the national court treats the judgment of the 
regional court as a domestic judgment, then the national court does not have 
to subject the judgment to any form of review or to determine its compatibility 
with the public policy of the state. Given that the interpretation of the status of 
the judgments of the regional courts in COMESA, the EAC and ECOWAS 
seems to presently lie with the national courts (at least implicitly), it is 
imperative for the judiciaries of member states to have an in-depth 
understanding of the workings of economic integration in general and, more 
specifically, the role that the courts have to play in ensuring that the norms of 
integration are internalised by member states. 
In SADC, where the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal specifically 
requires a judgment of the Tribunal to be treated as a foreign judgment, the 
national courts do not have the interpretative discretion that the courts in 
COMESA, the EAC and SADC have. Nevertheless, the national courts in 
SADC member states could determine issues of compatibility with public 
policy from a more holistic perspective, by taking into account the 
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 One likely implication of this is that the decision of the court to enforce the judgment may 
be further appealed to the highest court that the law permits. This invariably delays the 
process of implementing the judgment of the regional court.  
111
 See section 6(1)(v) Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, Chapter F35, CAP 
145, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990; section 5(1)(e) Enforcement of Foreign Civil 
Judgments Act 32 of 1988, South Africa. See the decision of the South African Supreme 
Court of Appeal in Jones v Krok 1995 (1) SA 677 (AD). See generally Godwin Omoaka 
‘Nigeria: legal regime for the enforcement of foreign judgments in Nigeria: an overview’ 2 
December 2004. available at http://www.templars-
law.com/media/publications/Enforcement%20of%20Foreign%20Judg-GOO.pdf [accessed 
21 January 2013].  
112
 Gramara (Private) Limited and Another (note 32) 19. See section 5.1.2. 
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international obligations of states. Again, for this to occur, some form of 
judicial activism such as the one demonstrated by the South African 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe 
v Fick & others113 would be required from the national courts. In this case, 
the SCA dismissed an appeal by the government of Zimbabwe that sought to 
challenge an order of the Gauteng High Court authorising the Sheriff in Cape 
Town to attach and sell Zimbabwe’s immovable properties for the purpose of 
paying for the costs awarded by the SADC Tribunal in the Mike Campbell 
case.114 Judicial activism of this nature at the national level could greatly 
influence the manner in which decisions of the regional courts and norms of 
integration in general are treated by member states. 
Another aspect where a linkage between the regional courts and 
national courts is necessary is in the area of resolving jurisdictional 
uncertainties that may arise as a result of overlapping memberships of 
RECs.  Kiplagat rightly suggests that overlapping memberships of RECs 
could create a problem of forum-shopping by litigants.115 Since different 
regional courts and national courts may have jurisdiction over the same 
dispute, litigants may decide to commence action in the court they think will 
be more favourable to their case. This may result to a situation where two 
litigants commence action on the same subject matter in different courts. To 
resolve issues of this nature, it will be necessary for the regional courts and 
courts to maintain comity in order to determine the court with exclusive 
jurisdiction over the dispute. If more than one court has jurisdiction over 
different aspects of the dispute, the courts may also decide which of the 
courts is best suited to effectively resolve the dispute.116 If this is done, the 
possibility of having conflicting judgements in the same dispute will be 
averted. 
                                                          
113
 Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others (657/11) [2012] ZASCA 122 
(20 September 2012). 
114
 Supra 2–3. 
115
 Kenneth Kiplagat, ‘Jurisdictional uncertainties and integration processes in Africa: the 
need for harmony’ (1995-1996) 4 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 51. 
116
 International Tribunals have applied this principle in resolving issues of overlapping 
jurisdiction. In the Mox Plant case, the arbitral tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
suspended its proceedings pending the jurisdictional findings of the European Court of 
Justice on the same dispute. See the Mox Plant case, Ireland v United Kingdom, Order no.3, 
24 June 2003, Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, and a Request for 
Further Provisional Measures, para. 29.  
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In order to promote interaction between regional courts and national 
courts, the regional courts can take the lead in creating linkages with the 
national courts by hosting training sessions or awareness workshops for 
members of the national judiciaries. In this regard, a cue could be taken from 
the ECCJ, which has made several efforts to sensitise members of the 
national judiciaries and legal professions in ECOWAS about the role and 
functioning of the ECCJ.117 Furthermore, creating such linkages would 
enable regional and national judiciaries to create the synergy required to 
secure adherence to the rule of law within the territory of each member state 
and within the REC as a whole. 
5.3 Conclusion 
In order to ensure that the norms of economic integration are implemented 
by member states and that the implemented norms actually align the 
behaviour of member states with the stated goals of economic integration, a 
drastic and coherent approach is needed by member states to internalise the 
norms of integration. Just as member states at the national level cannot 
afford to shy away from their integration obligations by treating the rules of 
integration as alien to their domestic legal systems, so also can citizens not 
afford to resist integration on the grounds that it would make them vulnerable 
to competition from other states. To ensure that states and their citizens fully 
participate in the process of integration at the national level, it has been 
suggested that national focal points should be created in all states where 
they do not presently exist to facilitate adequate interaction at the national 
level between all the relevant stakeholders. These focal points will ensure 
that regional policies are mainstreamed into the development agendas of 
member states and that stakeholders are aware of their rights and 
obligations under the integration treaties.  
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 ‘ECOWAS Court completes training session for Bar Association of Benin Republic’ 
available at 
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=170:
bar-association-benin&catid=14:pressrelease&Itemid=36 [accessed 10 January 2013]; 
Pasco Gerald ‘West African Chief Judges assess ECOWAS Court’ 7 July 2011, available at 
http://www.sierraexpressmedia.com/archives/26034 [accessed 10 January 2013]. 
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Creating links between regional courts and national courts is also vital 
for the implementation of economic integration on the continent. Although the 
regional courts have the final say on issues of integration, they do not have 
the means of enforcing their judgments. Enforcement of the judgments of the 
regional courts lies squarely within the province of the national courts. This 
makes the national courts an integral part of ensuring that the norms of 
integration are given effect to at the national level. To enable the national 
courts to properly perform their duties, the judges need to understand the 
role and functioning of the regional courts. One way of achieving this is to 
create a platform on which judges of the regional courts and the national 
courts can exchange ideas about how both sets of courts can work together 
to achieve the same purpose. 
  Given the number of states currently involved in the integration 
process, it would be over-ambitious to assume that the above 
recommendations can be implemented merely by suggesting them. 
Considerable public advocacy on the part of non-state actors may be needed 
to pressurise governments to create national focal points in states where 
they do not already exist. In states where they do exist, an equal amount of 
public advocacy will be needed to ensure that the national focal points 
adequately perform their role as facilitators and coordinators of the 
integration process. The same applies to creating links between regional 
courts and national courts. Experience from public advocacy in human rights 
indicates that consistent and concerted advocacy from non-governmental 
organisations can play a crucial role in ensuring that governments are held 
accountable. That same level of consistency can be applied to issues of 
economic integration to ensure that the overall behaviour of states is aligned 
with the objectives of the integration treaties. Obviously, there will be 
challenges in changing the existing paradigm. However, the challenges are 
not insurmountable if all stakeholders make a conscious effort. Borrowing 
from the words of Harold Koh, and slightly rephrasing his reasons for why 
nations obey international law, I suggest that African states would obey the 
laws of economic integration if ‘lawyers and citizens who care about [the 
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laws of economic integration], who choose not to leave the law at the water’s 
edge, ... do their utmost to [bring the laws of economic integration home]’.118
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 Harold Koh (note 2) 681. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.0 Introduction  
An important aspect of the discussion about compliance with African 
integration treaties is how the narrative of compliance is framed. To illustrate 
this point, let us start by drawing examples from Africa’s tale of poverty, 
underdevelopment and bad governance. The level of poverty and 
underdevelopment in most African states is relatively high and the 
entrenchment of ‘good governance’ in African states is still a fairly new 
development that is gradually finding its way into the normative frameworks 
of most African states.1 The high level of underdevelopment has been linked 
by some scholars to a deliberate attempt by African leaders to keep the 
African populace impoverished. Greg Mills suggests in his book, Why Africa 
is Poor that ‘the main reason why Africa’s people are poor is because their 
leaders have made this choice’.2 This statement, like many others, 
represents a one-sided view of the problems of poverty and 
underdevelopment in Africa.  
It is true that post-colonial Africa has had its fair share of bad 
leadership. However, other systemic challenges inherent in the global polity 
have also contributed to Africa’s underdevelopment.3 While it is beyond the 
                                                          
1
 The African Governance Report II indicates that there had been marginal progress on 
governance since the first baseline study was conducted in 2005. While the growth might not 
be astronomical, it is an indication that there has been a gradual increase in the observance 
of good governance principles in African states. See Economic Commission for Africa 
African Governance Report II (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) 1. 
2
 Greg Mills Why Africa is Poor and What Africans Can Do About it (Penguin Books, 
Johannesburg, 2010) 1. 
3
 See Makua Mutua ‘What is TWAIL’ (2000) American Society of International Law 
Proceedings 31–40. Mutua argues that current international law operates within a predatory 
and hegemonic construct that in its present composition prevents Third World nations from 
completely unshackling themselves from the grip of persistent subjugation practised by the 
global north. These inherent deficiencies of the international legal arena implicitly contribute 
to some of the systemic challenges faced by African states. See also James Gathii ‘Retelling 
good governance narratives on Africa’s economic and political predicaments: continuities 
and discontinuities in legal outcomes between markets and states’ (2000) 45 Villanova Law 
Review 971–1035. Gathii challenges the narrative of the good governance programmes of 
Bretton Woods institutions and argues that, in reality, there is virtually no difference between 
economic regulation by the state, as practised by most post-colonial African states, and the 
marketplace regulation propounded by Bretton Woods institutions. It is outside the province 
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scope of this thesis to address the reasons for Africa’s poverty, the pertinent 
issue is that there are different perspectives on every problem or set of 
problems. A one-sided perspective is dangerous because it obscures our 
real understanding of a people or set of events, thus creating stereotypes 
that are incomplete, if not untrue.4 Therefore, if one proceeds to resolve a 
problem based on an incomplete narrative, it is very likely that whatever 
solution is proffered will be incomplete.  
If compliance is examined solely from the perspective that African 
leaders are unwilling to surrender sovereignty to supranational institutions 
and that economic integration cannot be achieved in the absence of strong 
supranational institutions, we are in danger of obscuring the analysis of 
compliance. However, we can achieve a more robust analysis if the 
problems around compliance are examined from a br ader perspective. 
 It is within the above context that chapter 1 frames the central 
research question: ‘in the absence of supranational institutions, how can 
compliance with African integration treaties be secured, taking into account 
the legal and non-legal factors that may impact on the ability of states to 
comply with their integration obligations?’ In discussing how to secure 
compliance, it was argued that the absence of supranational institutions does 
not mean that states will not comply with their integration obligations. 
Furthermore, although some Regional Economic Communities have 
supranational courts that have actively influenced human rights norms, these 
courts have not been able to influence the area of economic integration. 
It is also argued in chapter 1 that compliance should not be regarded 
as only meaning a state’s ‘adherence to legal rules’; rather, compliance 
should be equated with ‘conformity of actual behaviour with the prescribed 
behaviour’. The justification for adopting this definition of compliance is that a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
of this thesis to further discuss the arguments canvassed by Mutua, Gathii and other TWAIL 
(Third World Approach to International Law) scholars but it is important to note that these 
issues cannot be overlooked if we are to have a genuine conversation about the place of 
Africa in the global economy. For a bibliography on TWAIL, see James Gathii ‘TWAIL: A 
brief history of its origins, its decentralized network, and a tentative bibliography’ (2011) 3(1) 
Trade and Law Development 26–64.  
4
 Chimamanda Adichie Dangers of a Single Story July 2009. See transcript at 
http://dotsub.com/view/63ef5d28-6607-4fec-b906-
aaae6cff7dbe/viewTranscript/eng?timed=true [accessed 25 January 2013]. 
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state’s adherence to legal rules will not always generate compliance. In 
addition, given the various areas that economic integration in Africa covers, 
taking a more holistic approach to the definition of compliance is required to 
foster an understanding of the real problems around non-compliance. 
Chapter 1 also discussed the context in which economic integration in Africa 
is presently taking place, to draw the distinction between the process of 
integration in Africa and that in the European Union (EU). 
 Two main differences relevant to the discussion on compliance were 
identified. The first was that African states place less emphasis on the 
creation of strong supranational institutions and therefore a direct 
comparison with the institutions of the EU may not enrich our discussion of 
how to proffer institutional solutions to the problem of non-compliance. The 
second difference was that, from the onset, economic integration in Africa 
was designed to go beyond trade liberalisation, and therefore it covers areas 
such as transport, infrastructure, agriculture, and the joint management of 
shared natural resources. The reason for identifying the differences is that a 
direct comparison is often made between economic integration in Africa and 
the EU, without necessarily taking into consideration the specific context in 
which integration is occurring in Africa. To resolve the challenges faced in 
the African integration process, the context must be properly understood so 
as to ensure that the solutions proffered are feasible and effective.  
Taking into account the diverse nature of the problems around non-
compliance, chapter 2 suggests the use of the managerial approach to 
secure compliance with African integration treaties. The chapter suggested 
that African states will tend to comply with their integration obligations to 
avoid the high costs of non-compliance, to protect their interests, and 
because of the implicit understanding that treaty norms are meant to be 
obeyed. The chapter also suggested that non-compliance with African 
integration treaties does not primarily stem from flagrant disregard for 
integration obligations, because there is a presumption that states generally 
do have the intention to comply with their treaty obligations. This 
presumption is manifested in the amount of effort and time that African states 
have put into negotiating series of integration treaties, the declarations and 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
190 | P a g e  
 
resolutions that they have passed to this effect, and the constant restatement 
of the need to integrate the African economies in order to overcome the 
various socio-economic challenges that plague African states. Working from 
the premise that non-compliance is mostly not deliberate, the chapter 
suggests that non-compliance stems from deeper systemic problems that 
include but are not limited to ambiguities in the texts of the integration 
treaties, the lack of capacity of African states and the regional institutions 
vested with the mandate of monitoring the integration process, and the 
ambitious timelines imposed by African states within which they are to 
comply with their integration obligations. These factors manifest in different 
forms or influence other factors that may account for non-compliance. 
It was suggested that resolving issues of non-compliance will require 
more than the mere use of conventional legal methods, such as having 
institutions that coerce compliance by imposing sanctions. A more viable 
option would be the use of a combination of iterative methods that promote 
transparency by ensuring (1) that information about compliance is shared 
between African states, (2) that disputes are resolved by interpretative 
organs that clarify the meaning of the norms and the behaviour that is 
accepted, (3) that institutional capacity is developed in states and regional 
institutions, and (4) that persuasion is employed to ensure that the actual 
behaviour of states conforms with the behaviour prescribed by integration 
treaties. The combined application of these methods will not only ensure the 
legitimacy of the integration process but will also help to internalise 
integration obligations at the national level. 
Since economic integration operates within an institutional framework, 
chapter 3 examines the primary organs of the African Union (AU) with a view 
to indicating how they can facilitate the use of the iterative methods 
discussed in chapter 2. Before discussing the organs of the AU, the chapter 
gave a brief summary of the history of the AU, to show the efforts that African 
states have made to ensure that integration succeeds on the continent. The 
chapter also showed that African states have delegated certain levels of 
authority to the AU. Chapter 3 argues that the organs of the AU need to play 
a more decisive role in coordinating economic integration on the continent by 
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creating a platform for more interaction between all the relevant stakeholders 
in the integration process. In this regard, the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government, as the supreme policy organ of the AU, is enjoined to be more 
proactive in addressing the core substantive issues of economic integration 
through frequent clarification and interpretation of the norms of integration. 
Such interpretation and clarification will enable member states to understand 
the specific action required to give effect to each of their obligations. 
However, given the busy schedule of the Assembly, it has been suggested 
that the Assembly could delegate these functions to another organ of the AU.  
The need for such delegation of powers is particularly important 
because the Executive Council, which ranks next to the Assembly of Heads 
of State, is not properly equipped to perform its function of coordinating and 
taking decisions on policies in areas of common interest to member states. 
The suitability of the Executive Council to perform its function is questioned 
because it comprises Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the areas about which 
they must make decisions are not traditionally within the sphere of influence 
of the foreign ministry. This inevitably raises doubts about whether the 
Executive Council has the technical capacity to efficiently perform its 
functions. An inefficient Executive Council increases the likelihood of non-
compliance because the policies it develops may not address the real 
concerns or pertinent issues in each sector.  
The institutional incapacity of the African Union Commission was also 
discussed and it was pointed out that while the Commission is vested with 
the responsibility of monitoring the implementation of the decisions of the 
Assembly, it does not have a hands-on presence in either the regional 
economic communities (RECs) or in the member states. Finally, in terms of 
the organs of the AU, the decision to merge the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights with the African Court of Justice was also questioned, as this 
may have affected the proper functioning of the court. The relationship 
between the AU, the AEC and the RECs was also discussed, and the 
chapter concluded with a discussion of how the AU can resolve the 
challenge of overlapping membership of RECs and also monitor the pace of 
economic integration on the continent. 
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Chapter 4 further examined the function of the AU as the coordinator 
of the integration process by discussing the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
initiatives which ensure capacity building and entrenchment of good 
governance at the national level. The chapter noted that in the absence of 
strong supranational institutions, African states have been able to establish 
mechanisms that could facilitate compliance by creating transparency in 
governance and facilitating the participation of non-state actors in the review 
of the performance of member states. Furthermore, transparency enables 
periodic reviews and reporting measures that have a reputational effect in 
terms of ensuring compliance. These initiatives also create a platform for 
non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations, to participate in 
the process of evaluating the performance of African states and actively 
building transnational networks to influence change not only in their countries 
but across the African continent. The chapter argued that if the NEPAD and 
APRM initiatives are continued, they will help to clarify what constitutes 
acceptable behaviour and will consequently instil adherence to the norms of 
integration.  
Chapter 5 examined how the norms of economic integration agreed to 
by member states at the regional and sub-regional levels can be internalised 
at the national level. The primary argument in this chapter is that, since 
compliance will not occur if the norms agreed to at the regional level are not 
able to change the behaviour of states at the national level, then it is 
important to ensure that norms are implemented at the national level. 
However, the challenge lies in the fact that, at the national level, various 
interests have to be accounted for before the integration obligations can be 
implemented. The chapter suggested that, in order to balance all the 
interests at the national level and ensure that economic integration is 
collectively embarked upon by the state and its citizens, member states need 
to create national focal points that can coordinate the implementation of 
integration norms by various agencies of government, civil society, the 
private sector and other stakeholders. Since integration requires a collective 
effort between the state and its citizens, the national focal points can also 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
193 | P a g e  
 
serve as the interface between the government and the people to ensure that 
citizens are actively involved in integration.  
Finally, the chapter called for adequate links to be created between 
the regional courts and the national courts to ensure that the rights which 
accrue to citizens under the integration treaties are adequately protected. 
The creation of this link is particularly important since regional courts depend 
on the relevant state to enforce their judgments. The national courts can 
ensure that judgments of the regional courts are registered and enforced. 
The link is also required to create mutual respect and comity among the 
courts, particularly when they are faced with issues of conflicting jurisdiction. 
Overall, chapter 5 argues that, for economic integration to succeed, the 
norms of integration will have to be internalised by member states, and this 
can only be done with the participation of state and non-state actors. 
6.1 How do we proceed? 
If we work from the premise that non-compliance with integration treaties 
does not emanate from deliberate disobedience on the part of African states, 
but from ambiguity in the treaties or capacity constraints, then to achieve 
compliance, numerous strategies are required to address these problems at 
the regional and national levels. An essential aspect of the strategy will be to 
ensure that the integration norms are adequately clarified and internalised by 
member states. Clarifying the acceptable conduct of member states is 
relevant also because the conditions in a state may change between the time 
of adoption of a treaty and the implementation phase. Therefore, it is 
important for member states to have a forum where they can bring these 
changes in circumstance to the fore so that the impact of these changes on 
the ability of states to comply can be discussed. It is not sufficient for heads 
of state to meet twice a year to discuss generally the challenges faced by 
African states. Rather, organs such as the commissions of the AU and the 
RECs should constantly engage with the member states to ascertain the 
progress that is being made and the challenges that the member states may 
be encountering. 
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  A clarification of the norms of integration is also important because it 
will enable legal and natural persons to identify a state’s integration 
obligations and the action that is required by that state to give effect to its 
integration obligations. From the perspective of legal and natural persons, 
such clarification is vital to ascertain the duties of the state. As discussed in 
chapter 1, legal and natural persons have not been actively involved in 
litigation arising from a breach of the norms of economic integration. Most 
litigation in the regional courts has been on human rights breaches by 
member states. A possible explanation for this is that, while the human rights 
norms are clear and easily identifiable when the breach occurs, the same 
cannot be said of the norms of economic integration. Presently, in most 
RECs it is difficult to authoritatively ascertain the core norms of economic 
integration, and to establish whether they create enforceable rights for legal 
and natural persons. If the norms of economic integration are clarified and 
interpreted, in instances where they are breached, legal and non-legal 
persons may seek recourse either in the regional courts or in their national 
courts to enforce such rights. This will help to resolve the challenge of 
insufficient litigation arising from the breach of the norms of economic 
integration. 
 A framework is also needed for member states to continually report on 
the steps they have taken to implement their obligations. A possible way of 
achieving this is to require states to submit periodic reports on steps they 
have taken to implement their integration obligations. Since over 30 African 
states have signed up for the APRM,5 the reporting requirement could form 
part of the APR process. The APR process will significantly improve the 
availability of information about the norms of economic integration and the 
level of performance by each state. While the APRM is a laudable initiative, it 
requires consistent dedication to the process by both state and non-state 
actors. For the APRM to have any meaningful impact there needs to be more 
advocacy and scholarly discussion about it. The euphoria in academic circles 
that followed the launch of NEPAD and the APRM needs to be continued in 
order to sustain the tempo of these initiatives. 
                                                          
5
 See http://www.uneca.org/aprm/CountriesStatus.asp [accessed 4 August 2012].  
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There needs to be active engagement between state and non-state 
actors to monitor the process of integration and to ensure that states give 
effect to their integration obligations. Non-governmental organisations need 
to be actively involved in issues of economic integration because they play a 
significant role in ensuring that states comply with their obligations. The 
participation of non-state actors in the integration process is vital and 
economic integration should not be regarded as solely a governmental 
project. In ECOWAS, for instance, the ECOWAS Commission has set up a 
pilot unit for monitoring the implementation of the free movement of persons. 
This pilot unit comprises members of civil society, the media and the 
judiciary. The intention is to create a sense of ownership of the integration 
process.6 Initiatives of this nature could be replicated in the various sectors in 
which economic integration is taking place. Furthermore, while African states 
might not be inclined to using formal dispute settlement mechanisms to 
resolve inter-state disputes, this does not preclude non-state actors from 
using these formal dispute settlement forums. Non-state actors need to 
continually test the limits of the norms of integration either in the national or 
regional courts to ensure that they are internalised over time. Non-
governmental organisations such as the Pan-African Lawyers Union (PALU), 
Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) and the 
Southern African Litigation Centre (SALC) have been actively involved in 
human rights litigation in the regional courts. Such advocacy is also needed 
in the area of economic integration. 
Conscious efforts also have to be made to address the capacity 
limitations of African states. Public-private sector partnerships are needed to 
invest in building efficient seaports, interconnected railways, transnational 
highways and other infrastructures necessary for the free flow of goods and 
services. With regard to administering the integration process, the 
bureaucratic capacity of the administrative bodies involved in the process of 
integration will need to be enhanced both at the national level and the 
regional level. For example, customs and other security officials at the border 
posts in the member states will have to be enlightened through workshops 
                                                          
6
 African Union Status of Integration in Africa (African Union, Addis Ababa, 2009) 26. 
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and on-going training about the integration obligations of the state and the 
conduct that is required. In instances where incentives such as 
compensatory mechanisms to mitigate the losses that arise from trade 
liberalisation have been created, government officials should have the 
requisite capacity to manage the compensatory mechanisms. 
 6.2 Further research required  
An essential aspect of compliance that is not discussed in this thesis is the 
actual measurement of the extent of compliance by African states. Empirical 
research would be required to measure the levels of national compliance in 
each area of economic integration. The benefit of carrying out this kind of 
study will be to ascertain the exact factors within the national framework that 
impact on compliance with the integration treaties. The data generated from 
this type of research would be beneficial for states in deciding on the 
practical steps that could be taken to address the specific challenges 
encountered by each member state. For example, it could be useful to know 
what impact unemployment has on compliance with the obligation to 
liberalise trade and free movement of persons. It will also be important to 
know how obligations at the multilateral level impact on national compliance 
with integration obligations. In order to proffer solutions to the challenge of 
non-compliance, it will be necessary to understand the impact, if any, that 
these other factors have on compliance. An understanding of the impact that 
these other factors have on compliance may assist us in understanding how 
and why African states comply with the norms of economic integration. As 
Benedict Kingsbury suggests, ‘[c]oncepts of “compliance” depend upon the 
understandings of the relations of law, behaviour, objectives, and justice. 
These relations are of central importance…, and must be theorized before 
there can be any true theory of “compliance”.’7 Therefore, in order to fully 
understand compliance with African integration treaties, African legal 
scholarship must go beyond examining the text of the various integration 
                                                          
7
 Benedict Kingsbury ‘The conception of compliance as a function of competing conceptions 
of international law’ (1997–1998) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 346. 
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treaties. What is needed is an enquiry into the relationship between all the 
factors that contest the space wherein the integration treaties operate.  
6.3 Concluding remarks  
Securing compliance with African integration treaties is a broad area of 
study. This thesis has sought to narrow the discussion and to focus on how 
to secure compliance in the absence of strong supranational institutions. 
Given the complexity in proposing solutions to a range of problems that 
involve a large number of states, the suggestions made in this thesis will not 
secure compliance in every instance. However, a consistent and 
simultaneous application of these suggestions will significantly increase the 
levels of compliance. Below are the main suggestions made in this thesis 
that, if applied, could increase levels of compliance: 
1. The norms of economic integration need to be constantly clarified and 
interpreted to enable states internalise them. Some form of 
persuasion is needed to convince states to adhere to their integration 
obligations. 
2. Clarification is important also because its helps legal and natural 
persons to understand the rights that accrue to them. 
3. The process of clarification and interpretation is not necessarily the 
responsibility of regional courts, but this is certainly one of the 
possibilities. 
4. For economic integration to succeed, subsidiarity has to be applied to 
define the areas of competence of the AU, the RECs and the member 
states. 
5. The NEPAD agenda cannot be ignored, particularly with regard to 
building infrastructural capacity on the continent. 
6. The peer-review process under the APRM is an essential component 
in facilitating compliance because it can improve good governance 
member states and consequently influence the level of compliance 
with their integration obligations. This is because the APRM enables 
non-governmental organisations and other non-state actors to take 
part in the periodic reviews of the activities of states and allows for the 
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reports generated to be scrutinised by other states. The peer-review 
process also allows the public to have access to information about the 
compliance efforts of states.  
7. At the national level, a collective effort is needed by states and their 
citizens to ensure that the benefits of integration are clearly 
understood by all the stakeholders involved. 
8. Public awareness is needed to educate citizens about the steps that 
are being taken by the state to comply with the integration obligations 
9. At the national level, the creation of national focal points in all the 
member states is essential to ensure that the norms of integration 
agreed to at the regional level are implemented at the national level. 
10. It is important to create links between regional courts and national 
courts to ensure that the rights under the integration treaties are 
always protected. 
The basic approach in the thesis has been to explore the possibility of 
achieving economic integration in the absence of strong supranational 
institutions. The underlying reason for this approach is that, while we may 
hope that strong supranational institutions are created by African states, the 
fact remains that African states are not in favour of creating strong 
supranational institutions. This is evidenced by their ‘move away from formal 
institutions’ and their affinity for the use of informal processes or tools to 
achieve their goals.8 Interestingly, African states are not alone in the 
application of i formal processes to achieve specific goals. Professor Eyal 
Benvenisti, in his analysis of the evolution of informal international law, draws 
several examples – from money laundering to the fight against AIDS – to 
show how states engage in informal processes or formal processes of a non-
legally binding character to achieve their goals in specific areas. He suggests 
that:  
[t]his new attitude toward international obligations reflects 
both the availability of novel ways for governments to interact 
across political borders, as well as new concerns about 
international legal tools, especially the formal international 
                                                          
8
 Tiyanjana Maluwa ‘The move from institutions: examining the phenomenon in Africa (2006) 
100 American Society of International Law Proceedings 294–298. 
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institutions. This preference for informal lawmaking suggests 
that international cooperation can be achieved without 
recourse to international legal tools and that the informality 
offers significant benefits to some governments.9  
In order to contribute meaningfully to the discussion about how to make 
economic integration feasible in Africa, it is important for us to have a deeper 
understanding of the less formal approach that has been adopted by African 
states. This thesis has not argued that, to secure compliance, adherence to 
the rule of law and treaty obligations should be jettisoned in favour of 
informal processes. Instead, the argument has been that informal processes 
could be used in combination with formal processes to enhance adherence 
to treaty obligations.
                                                          
9
 Eyal Benvenisti ‘“Coalitions of the willing” and the evolution of informal international law’ 
2006 Tel Aviv University Law Faculty Papers 1, available at 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=taulwps [accessed 15 
January 2013]. 
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